INTRODUCTION

1. THE SETTING OF THE DIALOGUE

(i) The Context

The *Symposium* departs from the largely interrogatory format of most of Plato's works in featuring a drinking party (*sumposion*) to which Socrates is invited along with a number of other guests, who, in the course of the party, are all asked to deliver speeches praising the god Eros (Ἔρως = Love).[1] The party is given by the tragic playwright Agathon, and, whether an invention of Plato or a real event, it is fixed to an unusually precise date, since we are told (173a5–7) that it takes place the day after a sacrificial feast to celebrate Agathon's first victory in the dra-

[1] The speeches delivered at the party are formally in praise of the God Eros. In the *Symposium* as a whole, however, it is frequently a matter of interpretation in individual cases whether the speakers are praising aspects of the god or speaking about love as an abstract force or emotion, or even whether a conscious distinction is always made between the two aspects. Classical Greek did not distinguish between upper- and lowercase letters, and the Greek text that is adopted for this edition uses either, as and when the editor felt appropriate in the context. Accordingly, we will generally translate Ἔρως/ἔρως as "Love" (the God)/"love" (the emotion).

matic competition of tragedies at Athens at the Lenaia festival (January–February 416).[2]

The question of whether the party actually happened, and whether the particular individuals attending actually came together at this date, or whether the whole occasion is an invention of Plato, is less important than it might seem: we should note rather the choice of an event for which there is a precise date for the background to the dialogue, Agathon's victory, and in particular, the presentation of the party in an unusually complex way. The occasion is retold many years afterward by a follower of Socrates, Apollodorus, who is replying to a request from an unnamed acquaintance representing others, to tell him all about it; he informs him about a similar request he has had previously from a friend, Glaucon,[3] who hailed him while he was walking from his house in Phalerum up to Athens. Glaucon had heard about the party from others and wanted a clearer report, only to learn that it happened much longer ago than he thought. Apollodorus was too young to have been there himself and had his report of it principally from another follower of Socrates, Aristodemus, who had been present at the party in circumstances, initially embarrassing, that we learn about in the dialogue itself (174a3–75c2, and see below, §1(iii)). That Plato intends his audience to remain aware throughout of the ele-

[2] Agathon's victory is recorded by Athenaeus 5.217a–b (ca. AD 200). The ascription to the Lenaia is problematic (Csapo and Slater, *The Context of Ancient Drama*, 3A i. 70A and B), but Plato obviously envisages a winter event (see "the nights were long" at 223c1).

[3] Possibly Plato's brother or half brother (for the complexities of this identification, see Nails, 154–56).

ment of reportage is clear from the persistent use in the dialogue of double indirect speech (he said he said).[4]

As for the date at which Apollodorus is supposed to be relating the event: Agathon had long departed from Athens for the court of Archelaus, ruler of Macedonia. He is presumed still alive, "Agathon hasn't lived here for many years" (172c3–5), and he died probably before 399.[5] Socrates, whose devoted follower Apollodorus has been for less than three years (172c3–6), was tried on an charge of impiety and executed in 399; so a dramatic date set by Plato some few years before 400 seems likely.[6] (On the question of the date of the actual composition of the *Symposium* in relation to *Lysis* and *Phaedrus*, see the Appendix at the end of this Introduction).

Why so complex a narrative framework? Several other dialogues feature conversations that portray Socrates conversing with friends and associates, reported to those anxious to know about their content: notably *Phaedo*, Socrates' last conversation in prison before his death, and two later more technical dialogues, *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*. These latter two both resemble the *Symposium*

[4] See 175a3, etc. Clumsy in translation and used sparingly in this edition.

[5] The scholion to Aristophanes' *Frogs* 83 (produced 405) comments on the statement that Agathon has gone "to the banquet of the blessed" as supposedly referring either to his departure to the Macedonian court or, less likely, to his death (see Csapo and Slater, *The Context of Ancient Drama*, IA i. 26A).

[6] On the dramatic date of the dialogue, see further Bury, lxvi–lxviii. For the suggestion (there is no direct evidence) that Plato may have intended Socrates' indictment actually to have been the stimulus to recall the party, see Nails, "Tragedy Off-Stage," 205 and n. 70. See also below, §5.

to the limited extent that they relate conversations told at secondhand that allegedly took place many years previously. However, the *Symposium* is distinguished, first, by featuring not, like *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus*, complex and theoretical subjects (discussions concerning the Theory of Forms and the epistemological status of knowledge and perception) but rather a celebration around a notable public event (Antiphon's victory) involving praise speeches (*enkōmia*) in honor of the god Love. Second, the subject of Love or love (see n. 1) bridges ethical and social issues likely to be of interest to a wide range of people; third, the guests are not, as in *Parmenides*, long-dead visiting philosophers, but some of the most prominent figures in the intellectual, artistic, and political life of later fifth century Athens, including, among others, the comic playwright Aristophanes, the tragedian Agathon, and a late drunk gate-crasher, the politician and playboy Alcibiades. Finally, and most significant, the pressing desire of a number of people to know from Apollodorus about a comparatively distant private event, initially surprising, and their perseverance in the face of the difficulty in acquiring an accurate account, serve to emphasize its importance. Apollodorus' continuing devotion to Socrates (172c4ff.) serves to draw our attention to the ongoing influence of the latter as a teacher and foreshadows his key role in the work.

(ii) The Symposium

The tradition of the aristocratic male drinking party, dating back to its military and political origins in the archaic

period, was by the fifth and fourth centuries in Athens a largely social bonding of men that took place in the *andrōn*, the main room in the men's section of the private house. Underlying the symposium's activities was the demonstration, transmission, and reinforcement of social and ethical values appropriate to the gender and class of the participants.

More formal than a modern dinner party, the symposium consisted of a clear separation of activities: eating was followed by the ritual washing of hands, libations to the gods, and (often hard) drinking accompanied by poems and songs provided by the guests. Young men and all women were absent, apart from slaves of both sexes to wait on the guests and provide musical entertainment and other services.[7] The guests lay on a number of couches in an open square around the room, usually two to a couch, reclining on their left side and eating and drinking with the right hand. As we shall see in the *Symposium* (e.g., 185c, 222d–23b), Plato uses the placing of the guests to dramatic effect.

Plato roughly follows the traditional procedure for the gathering, with the proviso that the latter part is to be a relatively sober affair, as they had all had too much to drink the previous day at Agathon's victory celebration. It

[7] An example of the activities of a symposium from the archaic period (somewhat sanitized) is provided by an elegiac poem of the pre-Socratic philosopher Xenophanes, DK 2B1, Edmonds fr.1 (*Elegy and Iambus*), also translated by Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, 1:360. On the symposium in general, see Murray, *Sympotica.*

is proposed to send the entertainer, a flute girl, away, and the time is to be filled with discussion of a serious subject, namely a series of speeches praising the god Eros (Love). The speeches that follow, despite their manifest diversity in style and content, mostly adhere fairly closely to a succession of themes that were traditionally laid down as suitable for an *encomion* (a speech of praise) to a deity, including the origins of the god, his nature and qualities, his achievements, and the benefits bestowed on mortals.[8]

(iii) Plato's Dramatic Sense and Platonic Philosophy

The *Symposium* is delicately balanced between the comic and the serious. The mixture of formality and spontaneous humor in *Symposium* is handled by Plato with great dexterity and lightness of touch. Aristodemus, Socrates' follower (and Apollodorus' source), ends up at the party almost by accident, having been invited by Socrates rather than by the host; when he arrives, his obvious embarrassment at a social *faux pas* is smoothed over by Agathon, who claims (pretends?) he was meaning to invite him anyway (174e). Socrates himself has no worries about such social niceties and behaves in a characteristically eccentric manner: absorbed in some philosophical problem, he stands becalmed in a neighboring porch and arrives late, Aristodemus having assured an anxious Agathon that there

[8] The rules for *encomia* were codified later in the fourth century by the author of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, on which see Dover, 11–12.

was no point in trying to fetch him, "this is a habit of his" (175b1–2).[9]

The speeches that make up the bulk of the work are interspersed with comic episodes: Aristophanes unable to take his turn because of hiccups, and two abrupt and unexpected interruptions, the first by a drunk Alcibiades (212c6ff.), the second right at the end of the dialogue (223b), when a sudden influx of revelers breaks up the relatively calm atmosphere and leads to the end, when only Socrates, still talking (and never, apparently, the worse for drink), Agathon, and Aristophanes are still (just) awake. Plato also exploits the traditional element of competition, open or disguised, between speakers, in the exchanges that occur in the interludes between speeches, for example, Eryximachus and Aristophanes at 189a–c, Agathon and Socrates at 193d6–94e3. Plato draws attention to his own gift of stylistic parody by having his characters intersperse sly comments on individual speakers' idiosyncrasies, for example, Apollodorus as narrator on Pausanias (185c4–5), and, more extensively, Socrates on Agathon (198c3–5).

2. THE FIRST FIVE SPEECHES

The *Symposium* contains seven speeches on Love, presided over by a self-appointed "master of ceremonies" (*sumposiarchos*), the medical and scientific Eryximachus,

[9] For a further example of Socrates' absorption in a philosophical problem, in an even more improbable situation, see below, 220c–d.

and delivered in turn in the order of guests on the couches, from left to right (177d3). Here for purposes of discussion, we separate them into three main groups, representing significant shifts in the argument and mood: the first five, Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, and Agathon; second, Socrates/Diotima; third, Alcibiades. They were the ones, Aristodemus tells us, "worth remembering" (178a3–4); the party also had other unidentified guests, omission of whose speeches Aristodemus (or Apollodorus) explains by stating that he could not properly remember all the details (178a1–5). Moreover, we have no speech from Aristodemus himself, who, once he has prevented Agathon from fetching Socrates in at 175c, is confined to the role of reporter, effectively "disappearing" as a character in the dialogue until just before the end (223cff.).[10]

The first five speeches belong together as *encomia* praising the workings and effects of Love (Eros). Each speaker, either explicitly or by implication, aims to correct, expand, or change the emphasis of his predecessor. The speeches as a whole articulate in a variety of ways the aims and benefits of Love from a number of viewpoints.

(i) The Speeches of Phaedrus and Pausanias (178a6–85c3)

These two belong naturally together as expressing an Athenian social perspective on upper-class Athenian erotic relationships. Eryximachus tells us that Phaedrus is the

[10] The elaborate narrative frame that starts the dialogue has no corresponding conclusion: at 223d we are not returned to Apollodorus and his listening audience.

originator of the theme (177a3–c5), and, as the speeches proceed *epi dexia* (from left to right around the couches), he goes first (177d3–4). His starting point is a conventional one: mythology as set out by the traditional teachers, the poets. He celebrates Love as being among the oldest of the gods according to the genealogy found in Hesiod (*Theogony* 116–20) and others. Love, presiding over the conventional homoerotic relationship between an older man (*erastēs*) and an adolescent boy, (*erōmenos*) represents, he claims, a powerful inducement for them both to be seen as avoiding shameful deeds and acting honorably and bravely in each other's eyes (178d), an inducement much greater than the attitude of family or society in general.[11] In a relatively superficial and orthodox exposition relying on poetic authority, Phaedrus uses mythological examples to prove that love leads to great sacrifices: Alcestis dying for her husband, Admetus; Achilles avenging Patroclus. Any more searching exploration of the nature of the relationship beyond these simple aims is left for subsequent speeches.

In the following much longer speech (180c2ff.), Pausanias also starts with mythological precedent, but in his case to discriminate between different types of Love. In a speech that is more complex in argument than that of Phaedrus (see esp. 182d5ff.), he distinguishes "Heavenly" love (Aphrodite as the daughter of Uranus, without a mother) and "Common" love (a younger Aphrodite as the daughter of Zeus and Dione). An activity associated with the former is fine (*kalon*), concerned with *aretē* (virtue,

[11] On this relationship in Classical Athens, see General Introduction, §2. On "shameful deeds," see the following note.

excellence); with the latter, concentrated on the body, it is shameful (*aischron*).[12] As a lover of Agathon, a partnership unusual in being apparently lifelong,[13] Pausanias betrays his exclusively homoerotic outlook in denigrating heterosexual relationships, along with other exclusively sensual partnerships, as an indication of "Common" love in favor of what he sees as the "Heavenly" ideal: an exclusively male partnership (Aphrodite born without a mother) between a man and an adolescent boy, combining a physical and an intellectual relationship, in which the older man influences the younger by tuition and example. In contrast to the lack of discrimination in other societies, Athens has a complex convention (*nomos*) in which considerable moral license is allowed to the partners provided that their ultimate goal is the pursuit of a higher love, involving *aretē* (excellence).

In his speech he expands on Phaedrus' blanket approval of Love, yet going one better than Phaedrus, by accurately pinpointing the double standards involved in the approval/disapproval of the *erastēs/erōmenos* relationship (183cff.). In his broad references to *aretē* and the soul, it remains unclear what the *erastēs* has to do to cultivate in the *erōmenos* qualities associated with goodness and wisdom (*sophia*), beyond what is generally accepted as the ethical norm (*nomos*): the excellence (*aretē*) associated with an educated Athenian citizen.

[12] *Kalos* (fine, beautiful, noble) and its opposite *aischros* (shameful) were the most powerful terms of general approval/disapproval in the Greek ethical vocabulary.

[13] See Xenophon, *Symposium* 8.32.

(ii) The Speech of Eryximachus (185e6–88e4)

The next speaker, Eryximachus, like Pausanias, distinguishes a double aspect of Love, but with a medical/scientific dimension: as a medical man familiar with Hippocratic medicine and the pre-Socratic philosophers, his authority derives not from mythological tradition but from science, in which he distinguishes Pausanias' Common Love and the Heavenly Love as sickness and health, respectively, in the human body.[14] It is fine (*kalon*) to gratify what is healthy but shameful (*aischron*) to do this with regard to what is sick. The job of the expert medical practitioner is to harmonize the opposites, cold/hot, sweet/bitter, dry/wet, etc. Eryximachus extends the pre-Socratic/Hippocratic theory of the harmonization of opposites into such diverse human pursuits as gymnastic activity, agriculture, and music, where the expert's job is to help to create prosperity and health through the gratification of an orderly (*kosmios*), as opposed to a violent, love. In this way, by maintaining moderation and justice, mortals maintain good relationships with each other and with the gods.

Eryximachus' broadening of the subject into the scientific realm makes an advance on the previous speeches to the extent that it outlines a general theory of human activity that represents a step up from Pausanias' *nomos* in that it claims to be based on scientific knowledge. However, it takes the reader no further on the subject of love as a human emotion, and it still remains as unclear as it did with

14 For pre-Socratic and medical authority for Eryximachus' theories, see *Symposium* translation nn. 48–52.

Pausanias how Eryximachus' exposition, in his case in terms of the body, relates to the emotional aspect of the relationship of love between individuals.

It is not immediately obvious either how seriously Plato intends us to take Eryximachus' speech. The learned, rather pompous style suggests elements of parody in Plato's portrayal. It may also be significant that Plato has placed Eryximachus out of turn ahead of Aristophanes, who was prevented from speaking by hiccups (185c–e). This may suggest that we are to see Plato's disruption of the designated speech order by couches as a deliberate dramatic device to imagine Eryximachus' prescribed cure for Aristophanes as a chance for the latter to do his comic turn: the gargling and sneezing going on at least for part of Eryximachus' speech as a background to the doctor's lofty exposition.[15]

(iii) The Speech of Aristophanes (189c2–93d5)

At all events Eryximachus' cure works, and with Aristophanes' speech we enter a different world. Set loosely in the tradition of speculation about human origins,[16] Aristophanes' account is an invented story with the characteristics

[15] Eryximachus' name could be punned on as "burp-" or "hiccup fighter." There are different opinions on how seriously we are to take Eryximachus' speech: on the positive side, see Edelstein, "The Role of Eryximachus in Plato's Symposium," and McPherran, "Medicine, Magic, and Religion in Plato's *Symposium*"; on the negative, see Trivigno, "A Doctor's Folly."

[16] See especially Empedocles, DK B31.57–62, on the grotesque appearance of the earliest humans (Waterfield, 152–53)

of a folk tale or fairy story in a "once upon a time" tradition that explains how people are now. Once upon a time, he says, humans had two opposite fronts, four limbs, and were any one of three sexes: wholly male, male-female (hermaphrodite), and wholly female. They proved to be violent and threatened (like the giants of mythology Ephialtes and Otus) to attack the gods.[17] In order to prevent this, Zeus cut them in half, threatening to repeat the process if they caused any more trouble. This splitting of the original body in half serves to explain why each individual, half of a severed whole, seeks his or her particular other half; if this other half is found, there is an innate desire for a union beyond mere sexual intercourse, which will restore their original wholeness, fused by the god Hephaestus into one being.

Like previous speakers, Aristophanes is celebrating the workings of Love, but unlike their conception his myth focuses more on Love as an emotional need for an attachment to a particular individual as an explanation of an exclusive and lifelong relationship (with an incidental reference to Agathon and Pausanias, 193b7). There is a single "other" out there to which we belong (our *oikeios*), to which Love leads us (191d2ff). Aristophanes moves us from a generalized discussion of the social context of love in the other speeches toward a closer focus on the emotional impulse behind the relationship. And, to the extent that his treatment of Love demonstrates a lack in the in-

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and Protagoras, DK 80C1, speaking of the origins of humans in Plato, *Protagoras* 320c8ff. (Waterfield, 217–19).

[17] On Ephialtes and Otus, see Homer, *Odyssey* 11.307–20.

dividual, Aristophanes goes some way toward anticipating Diotima's argument at 203ff.[18] But where Aristophanes stops is where, in a sense, Socrates/Diotima later picks up.

(iv) The Speech of Agathon (194e4–97e8)

Agathon, reflecting perhaps his own youthful demeanor and good looks, claims the key aspects of Love as youth and beauty. Continuing the competitive element inherent in the succession of speeches by directly contradicting Phaedrus' mythology in *his* speech (see above, §2(i)), Agathon says that Love, far from being involved in the violent activities of the oldest of the gods, is the youngest (195–96b3). Agathon proceeds to couple the god Love to qualities such as beauty, gentleness, and grace, and to virtues such as justice, moderation, and courage. Exhibiting the highly stylized and balanced sentence structure and florid language of the sophist and rhetorician Gorgias, especially toward the end (as Socrates humorously observes, 198b–c), Agathon's speech is a victory of manner over matter, a rhetorical tour de force. It is closely followed by Socrates' public demolition of his argument in the only passage of Socratic cross-examination (*elenchus*: "examination" or "scrutiny") in the whole dialogue.

Of the first five speeches, Agathon's is the one, Aris-

[18] Aristophanes' idea of lovers "belonging" to each other finds an echo in Socrates' (Diotima's) speech; however, Aristophanes is Diotima's obvious target at 205e, when she says that love is not a search for the other half that "belongs," unless it is a search for the good (see Aristophanes recognition of this implicit correction at 212c5–6).

todemus tells us, where "all those present . . . broke into thunderous applause" (*anathorubēsai*) (198a2), in marked contrast, we may note, to the "praise" that later greets Socrates' speech (212c4). This audience reception of Agathon's speech suggests that Plato is portraying it as a kind of theatrical performance, following their host's public success the previous day. Plato prepares us for this in advance in the interlude before Agathon's speech (193d6–94e3), where Socrates appears to be sending up Agathon by feigning stage fright at the prospect of having to follow what he fears is going to be a fine display (194a2ff.). This is followed by what threatens to develop into a deadly Socratic *elenchus* in which Agathon is saved by the bell, as it were, by Phaedrus, who puts a stop to Socrates' disruption of proceedings (194c–d).[19] But after Agathon's speech and in the preliminaries to his own, Socrates reveals his real feelings, in which he includes all the other speeches, when he says:

> I think you (*plural*) are digging up everything you can say and ascribing it to Love . . . in order that he may appear to be the finest and the best possible, obviously for people who do not know him—for it surely couldn't be for those who do—and the eulogy is certainly delivered in a fine and impressive manner. (198e4–99a3)

[19] On the conversational play between Agathon and Socrates at 193d4–94e3, cut short by Phaedrus, see Emlyn-Jones, "The Dramatic Poet and His Audience," 397–402. Note also Agathon's characterization of his own speech as combining play/entertainment (*paidias*) and moderate seriousness (*spoudēs metrias*, 197e7–8).

This is an immediate preliminary to his close examination of Agathon's central thesis, the beauty and the goodness of Love, with a characteristically disarming "just a few little questions" (199b8–9).

In this way Plato prepares us for the radical contrast to be drawn between these speeches and Socrates' original and profound treatment of the subject. However, despite Socrates' damaging criticisms, the contributions of the preceding speakers, which take up more than a third of the whole work, amount to something more than simply a foil to Socratic exploration. Their obvious individual limitations may perhaps be seen by us, the external audience, as those of men of social standing, intellect, and learning who contribute a broad and interesting range of perspectives that give a context to Socrates/Diotima's argument.[20]

3. THE SPEECH OF SOCRATES/DIOTIMA

(i) The Nature of Love (199c3–204c8)

In his dialectic with Agathon (a mini *elenchus*), in working with "love" as a relational term, that is, love must be love *of* something, Socrates establishes that Love must be love of what he does not possess: so, if Love is love of the beautiful (*to kalon*), Love cannot, as Agathon maintained in his speech, be beautiful; and if good things are beautiful, he would also be lacking in good things (201a–c). Socrates develops a logical argument that, whatever its ambiguities

[20] See especially Sheffield, "The Role of the Earlier Speeches in the *Symposium*, 23–46. On the speeches as an intertextual structured development, see Rowe, 8–10.

and flaws, lays the foundation for the subsequent theory of the nature and aims of Love (love).[21] At the end of his *elenchus* with Agathon, in reply to the latter's admission that he cannot argue against Socrates, in a brief phrase Socrates disclaims any independent knowledge: "No . . . it is rather the truth that you cannot argue against . . . since there's nothing difficult about arguing against Socrates" (201c8–9).

At this point Socrates hands over the argument, so to speak, to Diotima, a woman from Mantinea whom he once spoke to as a wise woman, an "expert" (*sophē*) in love (201d–e), with Socrates taking the unusual role of respondent. Both at the end of the previous *elenchus* (see immediately above) and in what follows, it appears that Plato is placing Socrates dramatically in the position of an ignorant learner whose possession of the truth comes from an authoritative source outside himself, so perhaps lessening the impact of his previous criticism of Antiphon and the others.[22]

The other speakers have almost all, in different ways,

[21] For a close analysis of the argument, see Stokes, *Plato's Socratic Conversations*, chap. 3 (114–82), and Rowe, n. on 199c5ff; see also Dover, 133ff., Waterfield, n. on 201b. For the relationship of "good" and "beautiful," see below, n. 24.

[22] Diotima = "honored by (or "honoring") Zeus"; she is almost definitely a Platonic fiction, both sides of the conversation representing Socrates himself, which is certainly what Aristophanes assumes (see 212c4–6). Her place of origin, Mantinea, resembles the word *mantis* = "seer." The story of the postponement of the plague may be modeled on the story (*Laws* 642d) of Epimenides the Cretan, brought to Athens to prophesy that the Persian invasion would not happen for ten years (see Dover, n. on 201d3). For Socrates' self-confessed "ignorance," see *Apology* 21d).

concentrated on the *aims* of Love, not what his *nature* is, which is, according to Socrates, an essential first step: to know exactly what it is you are talking about.[23] Agathon, despite being the most directly criticized of the symposiasts, alone followed the rule (195ff.), and it is from his assertion that Love is the most beautiful (195a7ff.) that Diotima starts out. Love, she claims, is neither beautiful nor ugly, neither good nor bad, but something in between; not a god or a mortal but a "spirit" (*daimōn*), an intermediary between gods and men. In the following (203bff.) myth of Penia (Poverty) and Porus (Resource, Contrivance), Love, living with characteristics of both, is in constant need, scheming to acquire what he lacks (203b–4c6).

(ii) The Aim of Love (204d1–6a13)

Socrates earlier linked *to agathon* (the good) with *to kalon* (the beautiful), in the cross-examination of Agathon at 201c2; from this point on they are closely identified as a fundamental basis of the argument. The possibility that not all that is *kalon* is necessarily *agathon* is not considered. This close identification of *kalon* and *agathon* is less problematic in Greek, given the spectrum of meaning of *kalos*: not just "aesthetically beautiful," but "fine, noble, honorable"—often close in meaning to *agathos* = ethically "good."[24] The lover of the beautiful will love good

[23] Socrates forcibly makes the same point at *Phaedrus*, e.g., 237cff.: the need to establish right at the beginning the nature of what is being discussed.

[24] "It might be near the truth to say that τὸ καλόν is neither less nor more than τὸ ἀγαθόν in its external aspect, 'goodness' as apprehended by the aesthetic faculty, or goodness *qua* attractive and soul-stirring" (Bury, n. on 201c1–2).

things, which will result in happiness (*eudaimonia*). The attainment of *eudaimonia* in the *Symposium* appears to assume the Socratic ethical principal that all basically want what is good as a route to happiness, and wrongdoing comes from ignorance (as in *Apology* and other early dialogues):

> DIOTIMA: "Do you think this wish and this love are common to all people, and do they all wish for good things always for themselves, or what do you say?"
>
> SOCRATES: "Just as you say," I said, "it's common to everyone." (205a5–8)[25]

(iii) The Activity of Love (206b1–9e4)

The activity of Love between the *erastēs* and the *erōmenos* is centered on the image of pregnancy, the desire to give birth in the beautiful (206bff.).[26] There are those (by implication males) who are pregnant in their soul even more than in the body, whether poets, politicians, or lovers, wishing to bring forth, with their beloved, wisdom: those associating in this way give birth to "offspring" more beautiful and immortal than the result of any physical union between a man and a woman.

Behind all this is the desire for immortality, common to all living creatures, human and animal. Plato's Socrates builds on the common Greek aspiration of *kleos* (immortal

[25] On the Socratic aspect of knowledge and desire in the *Symposium*, see Rowe, "The *Symposium* as a Socratic Dialogue," 9–22.

[26] See Hobbs, "Female Imagery in Plato," 252–71.

fame), taking to a new level the mythical examples of the power of Love in the speech of Phaedrus (179b–80b). For Socrates this is, in its highest form, the production of mental "children" in a relationship with a beautiful loved one. As she develops her description of the needs of the *erastēs* in terms of love, Diotima broadens description of the conventional erotic situation, using sexual language metaphorically to describe the creation of "children," offspring in the form of wisdom and virtue, with widening reference to the "offspring" of the great poets and lawgivers (209c–e).

(iv) The "Final Mysteries" (209e5–12c3)

Diotima goes on to reveal the ultimate goal, established at an earlier stage, where it was stated that being happy (*eudaimōn*) "seems to contain the end (*telos*) of the inquiry" (205a3). But how is this final goal reached? *Eudaimonia* is the key: as Diotima stated earlier, it is a state that makes life completely worthwhile; this, Diotima now says, can come only ultimately from an encounter with absolute beauty. To have what really leads to a flourishing life, we need to listen to the final section of the speech, a revelation of the final mysteries. This section (210aff.) uses the imagery of initiation into secret religious rites such as the Eleusinian Mysteries to depict the ascent of the lover, led by his guide, from attachments to beautiful individuals, toward the realization that one beautiful body is much like another, and from that position to the study of beauty in souls, and from there to the "great ocean of beauty" contained in knowledge (210d4), and finally to initiation into the final goal, eternal beauty that "alone by itself with itself . . . is an eternal single form" (211b1–2). This beauty is

essentially one of Plato's unchanging Forms, the absolutes, imperfectly reflected in the changing things of our world.[27]

From early in the speech, the goal of Love, *eudaimonia*, has been seen in terms of a search for "possession" (*ktēsis*) of "good things" (*agatha*) for himself by the *erastēs*, which will lead to his happiness. It seems to follow that, right from the beginning of the exposition, the main perspective on Love (love) is that of the needs and desires of the *erastēs*. Diotima says, "It seems to me, judging by what you're telling me, you thought that Love was what is loved, not that which loves. This is the reason I think Love appeared to be most beautiful to you. Indeed it is that which is loved which is in reality beautiful, gentle, perfect and regarded as most blessed" (204c4–5). This perspective appears to underlie the whole speech.

A much-debated issue arises from this: if love is defined in terms of the needs and the desires of the aspirant *erastēs*, does concern for the *erōmenos* get left behind as the *erastēs* ascends through the stages of loving in his approach toward the final mysteries and the Form of Beauty (211bff.)? In *Nichomachean Ethics* Books 8 and 9, in a discussion of different types of friendship, Aristotle distinguishes one type of friend as "one who wishes, and promotes by action, the real or apparent good of another for

[27] The Form is described in language more or less identical to that in, e.g., *Phaedo* (78d5–6), where Socrates attempts to prove that the immortal soul acquires knowledge of the Forms before birth. The argument for personal immortality (set out in *Meno* 81aff., *Phaedo* 72eff., and *Phaedrus* 249c) does not occur unambiguously in the *Symposium*.

that other's sake" (1166a3–5). If, for Plato's Socrates, the ultimate goal of the loving relationship is for the lover to gain personal *eudaimonia* through contemplation of the Form of Beauty, is the good of the loved one for his own sake lost sight of in this ascent? However, could it be argued that for someone who has succeeded in reaching the ultimate goal, a loving relationship must involve caring for another and acting as a guide (as Diotima does for Socrates) as an integral part of perfecting the flourishing life? If this is the case, part of the duty of the initiate philosopher—an expression of his love and fulfillment of his *eudaimonia*—is to descend from the highest mysteries to assist those aspirants at a lower level. One might perhaps make a comparison with the philosopher rulers in *Republic* 540aff., who descend from contemplation of the Form of the Good back into the Cave to take their turn in ruling and assist those in the everyday world.[28]

4. THE SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES

The entry of Alcibiades, immediately following the philosophical climax of Diotima's speech, is the dramatic masterstroke of the work. His inebriated and noisy gate-

[28] The whole issue was raised by Vlastos, "The Individual as an Object of love in Plato," 137–63. Vlastos argues that the crucial flaw in Plato's theory of love was that it was compatible with a view that the love of beautiful individuals was used by the lover "instrumentally," as means of his own ascension to the contemplation of the Forms. For a dissenting view, see Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle*, 45–49, and for a judicious

crashing abruptly returns us from the elevated heights to rowdy semidrunken reality (212cff.). Following humorous byplay involving suggestive innuendo between Socrates, Alcibiades, and Agathon (213a–e), Alcibiades delivers his speech, which stands out from the others as an encomium not of Love but of Socrates himself. It follows the form of the *enkomion*: a description of the subject's nature, followed by his fine qualities (*aretē*), and his achievements. Socrates (notoriously ugly) is compared superficially to a sculptured figurine of Silenus that opens up to reveal a statue of a god inside; his words have an emotional effect on Alcibiades more powerful than the *aulos*-player Marsyas (215bff.). As a youth, Alcibiades had tried unsuccessfully to seduce Socrates (effectively reversing the roles of *erastēs* and *erōmenos*), thereby demonstrating the latter's moderation and self-control (217aff.). Socrates' physical endurance and bravery were amply demonstrated when on campaign in the Peloponnesian War he rescued a wounded Alcibiades (220ff.). Finally, Alcibiades reverts to what he said at the beginning: underneath a superficially mundane manner of speech, once opened up, Socrates reveals a divinely inspired wisdom.

Alcibiades has not, of course, heard Socrates' speech; yet the positioning of his speech *after* that of Socrates is significant and suggests from its content that Plato intends Alcibiades unconsciously to provide a commentary on key points in Socrates' speech, though its total

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analysis of both sides of the argument, see Sheffield, *Plato's Symposium*, chap. 5, 154–82 ("Socrates' Speech: Concern for Others?", and bibliography cited there).

significance in this respect remains for the reader/listener to perceive. Like Socrates, Alcibiades undertakes to tell the truth, which he undoubtedly does, according to his lights (215a). In recounting a situation in which he attempted to seduce Socrates in exchange for instruction in virtue (218d), it becomes clear that what he actually wanted is something not far from the conventional homoerotic relationship (not unlike that outlined by Pausanias earlier, see §3(i)), in which he, as beautiful *erōmenos*, is seduced by the older man who would give, in exchange for sex, instruction in *aretē* (virtue, excellence), the possession of which Socrates, with characteristic *eironea* (mock modesty), disclaimed. It becomes clear that Socrates would have regarded this as a one-sided bargain, if he really did possess the wisdom Alcibiades seeks (he would be giving away "gold for bronze" (218e7).[29]

Yet Alcibiades is depicted by Plato as a torn character. He has a glimpse of something beyond the conventional, but he demonstrates that, despite being bitten by the "madness and frenzy of philosophy" (218b), he is ambivalent about the effort it would take to reform his way of life and make a joint inquiry with Socrates that might be the beginning of an ascent toward the knowledge of love, beauty, and goodness. He is ultimately unwilling or unable to follow Socrates even beyond the basic stages of the relationship.

[29] Socrates' positioning of himself in his own speech earlier as someone ignorant and desiring wisdom from Diotima (206b5–6) suggests that he wishes to present himself as a seeker rather than a possessor of what Alcibiades imagines he is looking for.

5. CONCLUSION

The whole work ends on a lighter note: humorously erotic byplay between Alcibiades, Socrates, and Agathon (222cff.) is followed by a rowdy invasion of revelers, and eventually most of the partygoers either leave or fall asleep. Socrates eventually goes off to spend the day in his usual manner and then goes home to rest.

Abrupt alternation of serious philosophical discussion, humorous byplay, and comic knockabout pervade the whole work; this may well lie behind the claim by Socrates, still arguing at cockcrow with Aristophanes and Agathon (the only remaining partygoers left half-awake), that the accomplished poet should know how to write comedy and tragedy (223d2–6). Exactly what Plato intended us to imagine lay behind this claim is unclear, since Aristodemus woke up to find Socrates in full flow. Yet the personality of Socrates himself may have embodied both genres: external comic ugliness combined with inner beauty, as Alcibiades had been at pains to emphasize in his speech (215a–16c). This contrast is reflected in Socrates' customary way of speaking, in which ordinary prose and homely images are used to reveal divinely inspired truths, as Alcibiades points out (221e–22a).

Yet a tragic (in our sense) subtext in the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades may perhaps be intended by Plato, looking back in retrospect from the fourth century. On the one hand, there is Plato's choice of a precise historical context, the public festival of the Lenaia and Agathon's dramatic triumph (early in 416). This event shortly preceded the ill-fated Athenian expedition

to Sicily (spring 415), in which Alcibiades was involved as one of the military leaders. We learn from Thucydides (6.27–29) that one night during the preparations for this expedition religious sacrilege was committed involving desecration of images of the god Hermes and profanation of the sacred mysteries. Accusations were made against several of those whom Plato portrays as having attended Agathon's party, particularly Alcibiades (Thuc. 6.28), but also Phaedrus and Eryximachus (Phaedrus, and possibly Eryximachus, fleeing into exile and avoiding trial).[30]

Between the date of the party and the likely intended dramatic date of the frame conversation (see §1(i)), Athens suffered defeat at the hands of the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War (404), followed by a period of political upheaval. Alcibiades died at about this time, but earlier, following his prominent involvement in the religious sacrilege and debacle of the Athenian expedition to Sicily, he had played a dubious role in subsequent events, at one point deserting to the Spartan side to avoid prosecution in connection with the above-mentioned religious sacrilege (Thuc. 6.60–61). It is possible that in the *Symposium* (whether recording a real or fictional event) Plato wished to present the conduct and attitudes of Alcibiades and the others in the light of the subsequent political upheaval and witch hunt.

On the other hand, there is the other key dramatic date, that of the *Symposium* frame conversation itself. Its date, close to Socrates' trial and execution in 399, may possibly explain the urgency of the desire of Socrates' devotee, Apollodorus, and his friends to hear about the

30 See Nails (n. 6), 202–3.

party (see above, §1(i)). In reflecting on the trial and death of his master, Plato may have been using the drama of the *Symposium*, and the desire of others to hear it, to lead his audience to reflect on why Socrates' pursuit of the fulfilled life based on an erotic relationship aiming at *eudaimonia*, advocated in his speech, appeared to have so little effect on some of his listeners. This question emerges sharply in the case of Alcibiades. In Socrates' 399 trial on a charge of *asebeia* (impiety), the most serious accusation, Plato tells us, was corruption of the young (*Apology* 24b8–c1). Alcibiades is not mentioned by Plato's Socrates in the *Apology* (he had died in 404), but one of the allegations behind this charge was thought to be Socrates' earlier corrupting relationship with him (Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.12ff.). Alcibiades' role in the *Symposium* is perhaps being used as an example of this inability to follow Socrates in his quest for wisdom in the face of the competing desire for fame and personal honor. In this he appears to be quite unlike the speakers in the frame dialogue, Apollodorus and Aristodemus, devoted followers, for whom Socrates represented *the* route to the fulfilled life.

The setting, the structure, and above all the abrupt changes of mood characteristic of *Symposium* have practically no parallels within the Platonic corpus, a fact that renders conclusions as to its meaning and its purpose difficult to draw. The *Symposium* as Plato's apologia for Socrates? Perhaps through Alcibiades' speech we are to see Socrates' own tragedy: his failure, as an *erastēs* searching to attain *eudaimonia*, to take his potential *erōmenos*, or for that matter his whole audience, with him, the endpoint of this failure being his trial and execution.

APPENDIX: DRAMATIC DATE AND DATE OF COMPOSITION OF THE *SYMPOSIUM*

The dramatic date at which the actual *Symposium* and the later reporting of it is set is discussed in detail at §1(i) above, and so needs no further amplification here.

As to the date of composition, there are three references in the dialogue to external events: (1) at 178e–79b3, one of the speakers, Phaedrus, refers to an army of lovers and loved ones, which may be a reference to the "sacred band" of Thebans, dated to ca. 379/8; (2) at 182b6ff., another of the speakers, Pausanias, speaks of "Ionia and many other places elsewhere . . . under foreign rule," which suggests composition after The King's Peace of 387/6, which recognized Persian claims to rule the cities in Asia (i.e., Asia Minor Greeks) that had previously been under Greek rule; (3) at 193a2ff., Aristophanes in his speech refers to the splitting up of the Arcadians by the Lacedaemonians, which occurred in 385 (for discussion of the significance of this reference for the dating of the composition of the *Symposium*, see Mattingly, "The Date of Plato's *Symposium*").

Internal evidence from Plato's supposed philosophical development does not provide precise dating. Assuming a developmental model of Early-Middle-Late dialogues, a model not universally accepted (see Chronology of Plato's Life and Works), the *Symposium* fits into the Middle period, along with *Meno* and *Phaedo*, in its clear reference to the theory of Forms; but it almost definitely precedes *Republic* and *Phaedrus* in apparently assuming a "Socratic psychology"—that all desire the good (see, e.g., 205a),

involving the absence of reference in the individual soul to an element of desire conflicting with the reasoning part (see the tripartite model in *Republic* 439b4ff. and *Phaedrus* 253cff.).[31]

The evidence, external and internal, suggests a date in the late 380s for composition of the *Symposium*, that is, the "Middle Period."

[31] The absence of evidence in the *Symposium* of a view that the individual can experience personal immortality as indicated in the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* (rather than "immortality" through reproduction, or *kleos* [immortal fame] through the creation of laws, poetic works, etc.) has also been cited as evidence that the *Symposium* precedes those dialogues, but the value of this evidence for dating is inconclusive. See, for example, Rowe, n. on 206e8–7a2 (184–85), for a discussion of the evidence.

ΣΥΜΠΟΣΙΟΝ

ΑΠΟΛΛΟΔΩΡΟΣ ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ

172 ΑΠΟΛΛΟΔΩΡΟΣ Δοκῶ μοι περὶ ὧν πυνθάνεσθε οὐκ
*ἀμελέτητος εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ἐτύγχανον πρῴην εἰς ἄστυ
οἴκοθεν ἀνιὼν Φαληρόθεν· τῶν οὖν γνωρίμων τις ὄπι-
σθεν κατιδών με πόρρωθεν ἐκάλεσε, καὶ παίζων ἅμα
τῇ κλήσει, "Ὦ Φαληρεύς," ἔφη, | "οὗτος Ἀπολλόδω-
ρος, οὐ περιμένεις;"* Κἀγὼ *ἐπιστὰς περιέμεινα.* Καὶ
*ὅς, "Ἀπολλόδωρε," ἔφη, "καὶ μὴν καὶ ἔναγχός σε ἐζή-
τουν βουλόμενος διαπυθέσθαι τὴν Ἀγάθωνος συνου-
σίαν καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων*
b *τῶν τότε ἐν τῷ συνδείπνῳ παραγενομένων, περὶ τῶν
ἐρωτικῶν λόγων τίνες ἦσαν· ἄλλος γάρ τίς μοι διη-
γεῖτο ἀκηκοὼς Φοίνικος τοῦ Φιλίππου, ἔφη δὲ καὶ σὲ
εἰδέναι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν εἶχε | σαφὲς λέγειν. σὺ οὖν*

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1 Apollodorus addresses his recital of the whole event to a friend who is the spokesperson for a number of enquirers (plural at a1 and 173c–e). On the dramatic date of the dialogue, its significance, and the complexity of the dialogue frame detailed in 172a–73b8, see Introduction, §1(i). The devotion of Apollodorus to Socrates, as well as his emotional nature, is also dem-

SYMPOSIUM

APOLLODORUS COMPANION

APOLLODORUS: I think I'm not unprepared for what 172
you're inquiring about.[1] For I happened to be going up to town the other day from my house in Phalerum.[2] One of my acquaintances caught sight of me from behind and hailed me from some distance, and jokingly called out: "Hey, Phalerian, you, Apollodorus, wait, won't you?"[3] And I stopped and waited. And he said: "Apollodorus, why, it was only just now I was looking for you as I wanted to find out all about Agathon's party, that time when Socrates and
Alcibiades and the others had gathered for dinner, and b
about what they said in their speeches on love. You see someone else was recounting it to me, having heard it from Phoenix, Philippus' son,[4] but he said you knew about it too. But the truth is he had nothing precise to say. So

onstrated in his reaction to Socrates' imminent death in *Phaedo* 117d3–6.

2 Phalerum was the main harbor of nearby Athens until the fifth century, when it was displaced by Piraeus.

3 The joke probably lies in the mock formality of addressing Apollodorus with the name of his deme (district of Athens), Phalerum (see previous note).

4 Otherwise unknown.

μοι διήγησαι· δικαιότατος γὰρ εἶ τοὺς τοῦ ἑταίρου
λόγους ἀπαγγέλλειν. πρότερον δέ μοι," ἦ δ' ὅς, "εἰπέ,
σὺ αὐτὸς παρεγένου τῇ συνουσίᾳ ταύτῃ ἢ οὔ;" Κἀγὼ
εἶπον ὅτι "Παντάπασιν ἔοικέ σοι οὐδὲν διηγεῖσθαι
σαφὲς ὁ διηγούμενος, εἰ νεωστὶ ἡγῇ τὴν συνουσίαν
γεγονέναι ταύτην ἣν ἐρωτᾷς, ὥστε καὶ ἐμὲ παραγενέ-
c σθαι." "Ἐγώ γε δή," ἔφη. "Πόθεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύ-
κων; οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι πολλῶν ἐτῶν Ἀγάθων ἐνθάδε οὐκ
ἐπιδεδήμηκεν, ἀφ' οὗ δ' | ἐγὼ Σωκράτει συνδιατρίβω
καὶ ἐπιμελὲς πεποίημαι ἑκάστης ἡμέρας εἰδέναι ὅτι
173 ἂν λέγῃ ἢ πράττῃ, οὐδέπω τρία ἔτη ἐστίν; πρὸ τοῦ δὲ
περιτρέχων ὅπῃ τύχοιμι καὶ οἰόμενος τὶ ποιεῖν ἀθλιώ-
τερος ἦ ὁτουοῦν, οὐχ ἧττον ἢ σὺ νυνί, οἰόμενος δεῖν
πάντα μᾶλλον πράττειν ἢ φιλοσοφεῖν." Καὶ ὅς, "Μὴ
σκῶπτ'," ἔφη, "ἀλλ' εἰπέ μοι πότε ἐγένετο ἡ συνουσία
| αὕτη." Κἀγὼ εἶπον ὅτι "Παίδων ὄντων ἡμῶν ἔτι, ὅτε
τῇ πρώτῃ τραγῳδίᾳ ἐνίκησεν Ἀγάθων, τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ᾗ
ᾗ τὰ ἐπινίκια ἔθυεν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ χορευταί." "Πάνυ,"
ἔφη, "ἄρα πάλαι, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἀλλὰ τίς σοι διηγεῖτο; ἢ
b αὐτὸς Σωκράτης;" "Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία," ἦν δ' ἐγώ, "ἀλλ'
ὅσπερ Φοίνικι. Ἀριστόδημος ἦν τις, Κυδαθηναιεύς,
σμικρός, ἀνυπόδητος ἀεί· παρεγεγόνει δ' ἐν τῇ συνου-
σίᾳ, Σωκράτους ἐραστὴς ὢν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα τῶν

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[5] That is, Socrates.

[6] Possibly the half brother of Plato, a major respondent of Socrates in *Republic* (see further Nails, 154–56).

you tell me about it, for you're just the right person to
report the words of your companion.[5] But before that," he
said, "tell me, were you yourself present at that gathering,
or not?" And I replied: "it looks as if your informant got
absolutely nothing clear, if you think this party you're ask-
ing about took place recently enough for me to have been
there too." "Well, that's indeed what I thought," he said. c
"Where did you get that from, Glaucon?"[6] I said, "don't
you know that Agathon hasn't lived here for many years,
and it's not yet three years I've spent with Socrates and
made it my business every day to know what he was saying
or doing? Previously, I was running about at random, 173
thinking I was achieving something, but in a more miser-
able state than anyone else you might mention, no less
than you right now, and thinking I should be doing any-
thing rather than philosophy." And he said: "Don't mock
me, but tell me when this gathering took place." And I
said: "When we were still boys, when Agathon won with
his first tragedy, the day after he and his choral dancers
celebrated their victory with the sacrificial feast."[7] "It
seems it really was a long time ago then," he said, "but who
described it to you? Or was it Socrates himself?" "Oh no, b
by Zeus," I said, "but the person who told Phoenix. Some-
one called Aristodemus, from Cydatheneum, a small man,
always going around barefoot. He was at the gathering,
being a lover of Socrates, as much as any, I think, of those

[7] The "sacrificial feast" for chorus and actors was a thanksgiving for victory in the dramatic competition held at one of the festivals in the year, in this case the Lenaia (Winter) festival, 416. On the evidence for the festival and the (unusually) precise dramatic date, see Introduction, §1(i).

τότε, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ | Σωκράτη γε ἔνια ἤδη ἀνηρόμην ὧν ἐκείνου ἤκουσα, καί μοι ὡμολόγει καθάπερ ἐκεῖνος διηγεῖτο." "Τί οὖν," ἔφη, "οὐ διηγήσω μοι; πάντως δὲ ἡ ὁδὸς ἡ εἰς ἄστυ ἐπιτηδεία πορευομένοις καὶ λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν."

Οὕτω δὴ ἰόντες ἅμα τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ἐποιούμεθα, ὥστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον, οὐκ ἀμελετήτως
c ἔχω. εἰ οὖν δεῖ καὶ ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι, ταῦτα χρὴ ποιεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ ἄλλως, ὅταν μέν τινας περὶ φιλοσοφίας λόγους ἢ αὐτὸς ποιῶμαι ἢ ἄλλων ἀκούω, χωρὶς τοῦ οἴεσθαι ὠφελεῖσθαι | ὑπερφυῶς ὡς χαίρω· ὅταν δὲ ἄλλους τινάς, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοὺς ὑμετέρους τοὺς τῶν πλουσίων καὶ χρηματιστικῶν, αὐτός τε ἄχθομαι ὑμᾶς τε τοὺς ἑταίρους ἐλεῶ, ὅτι οἴεσθε τὶ
d ποιεῖν οὐδὲν ποιοῦντες. καὶ ἴσως αὖ ὑμεῖς ἐμὲ ἡγεῖσθε κακοδαίμονα εἶναι, καὶ οἴομαι ὑμᾶς ἀληθῆ οἴεσθαι· ἐγὼ μέντοι ὑμᾶς οὐκ οἴομαι ἀλλ' εὖ οἶδα.

ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ Ἀεὶ ὅμοιος εἶ, ὦ Ἀπολλόδωρε· ἀεὶ γὰρ σαυτόν | τε κακηγορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ δοκεῖς μοι ἀτεχνῶς πάντας ἀθλίους ἡγεῖσθαι πλὴν Σωκράτους, ἀπὸ σαυτοῦ ἀρξάμενος. καὶ ὁπόθεν ποτὲ ταύτην

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[8] Cydathenaeum, is Aristodemus' deme, near the center of Athens. He is otherwise unknown in Plato; his small size is also noted in Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.4.2. "Lover" translates *erastēs*, most usually found in erotic contexts, but here denotes his passionate devotion to Socrates and his teaching; he is barefoot (173b2) in imitation of Socrates (see 174a4). On the meaning of

around at the time,[8] but mind you, afterward I asked Socrates about some of the things I heard from Aristodemus, and he confirmed it just as the other had related it." "So why don't you recount it to me?" he said. "At all events the road into town is convenient for us to talk and listen as we go along."

So as he suggested we went along and at the same time talked about the occasion so that, as I said when I started,
I am not unprepared. If therefore I am to recount it to you c
all too that's what I must do. You see in any case when either I myself have any discussion about philosophy, or I listen to others, quite apart from thinking I am benefiting from it, it's extraordinary how delighted I am. But whenever it's any other kind of discussion, especially the talk of those of you who are rich and into moneymaking, I get bored and feel sorry for you, my companions, because you think you're doing something, when you're achieving
nothing. And you in your turn think perhaps I'm the one d
who is a wretched fellow,[9] and I believe you are right to think so. However, I don't just think you are wretched, I know full well you are.

COMPANION: You're always the same, Apollodorus, for you're always running yourself and others down, and you seem to me to think that all are miserable without exception, apart from Socrates, beginning with yourself. And where on earth you got this nickname from, being

words for "love," "friendship," "desire" (*erōs*, *philia*, *epithumia*), see General Introduction §2.

9 "Wretched" = *kakodaimōn*, the opposite of *eudaimōn* (happy, fulfilled), objective states and not merely psychological.

τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔλαβες τὸ μαλακὸς[1] καλεῖσθαι, οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος εἶ, σαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγριαίνεις | πλὴν Σωκράτους.

e ΑΠ. Ὦ φίλτατε, καὶ δῆλόν γε δὴ ὅτι οὕτω διανοούμενος καὶ περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ περὶ ὑμῶν μαίνομαι καὶ παραπαίω;

ΕΤ. Οὐκ ἄξιον περὶ τούτων, Ἀπολλόδωρε, νῦν ἐρίζειν· | ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ ἐδεόμεθά σου, μὴ ἄλλως ποιήσῃς, ἀλλὰ διήγησαι τίνες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι.

ΑΠ. Ἦσαν τοίνυν ἐκεῖνοι τοιοίδε τινές—μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑμῖν ὡς ἐκεῖνος διηγεῖτο καὶ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι διηγήσασθαι.

174 Ἔφη γάρ οἱ Σωκράτη ἐντυχεῖν λελουμένον τε καὶ τὰς βλαύτας ὑποδεδεμένον, ἃ ἐκεῖνος ὀλιγάκις ἐποίει· καὶ ἐρέσθαι | αὐτὸν ὅποι ἴοι οὕτω καλὸς γεγενημένος.

Καὶ τὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι Ἐπὶ δεῖπνον εἰς Ἀγάθωνος. χθὲς γὰρ αὐτὸν διέφυγον τοῖς ἐπινικίοις, φοβηθεὶς τὸν ὄχλον· ὡμολόγησα δ᾽ εἰς τήμερον παρέσεσθαι. ταῦτα δὴ ἐκαλλωπισάμην, ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν ἴω. ἀλλὰ σύ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἐθέλειν ἂν ἰέναι ἄκλητος ἐπὶ δεῖπνον;

[1] μαλακὸς B: μανικὸς TW

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[10] The textual variant *manikos* (mad) (see textual note), would not make sense of the following sentence.

called "Softy,"[10] for my part I don't know. For you are always like this in our discussions; you get angry with both yourself and others, apart from Socrates.

A. Oh my dearest fellow, so it's obvious, is it, that in e
thinking in this way about myself and all of you, I'm mad and out of my wits?

C. It's not worth squabbling about these things now, Apollodorus, but please, do what we were asking you to do, just recount what the speeches were.

A. Well now, they went something like this:—but rather, just as he did,[11] so too I'll try to recount them to you from the beginning.

So he told him that he came across Socrates bathed and 174
wearing his sandals, a thing he rarely did, and he asked him where he was going, to have made himself so smart.

And he replied: "To dinner at Agathon's. For yesterday I kept out of his way at the victory celebrations, afraid of the crowd; but I agreed to be there today. So I have smartened myself up like this in order to go as one smart fellow to another smart fellow.[12] But what about you, he said, how would you feel about being willing to come to a dinner uninvited?"

11 That is, Aristodemus, who was present at the party.

12 "Smart" is how we are translating *kalos* here, a term with a wide range of meaning, but basically indicating strong approval (fine, beautiful, noble, good) with an overlap between aesthetic and moral meaning (often = *agathos*, "good"). *To kalon* (the beautiful) is a key concept in Socrates' speech later in the dialogue (204bff.).

b Κἀγώ, ἔφη, εἶπον ὅτι Οὕτως ὅπως ἂν σὺ κελεύῃς.

Ἕπου τοίνυν, ἔφη, ἵνα καὶ τὴν παροιμίαν διαφθείρωμεν μεταβαλόντες, ὡς ἄρα καὶ

Ἀγάθων'[2] ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν | αὐτόματοι ἀγαθοί.

Ὅμηρος μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύει οὐ μόνον διαφθεῖραι ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑβρίσαι εἰς ταύτην τὴν παροιμίαν· ποιήσας γὰρ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα διαφερόντως ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα τὰ
c πολεμικά, τὸν δὲ Μενέλεων "μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν," θυσίαν ποιουμένου καὶ ἑστιῶντος τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἄκλητον ἐποίησεν ἐλθόντα τὸν Μενέλεων ἐπὶ τὴν θοίνην, χείρω ὄντα ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀμείνονος. |

Ταῦτ' ἀκούσας εἰπεῖν ἔφη Ἴσως μέντοι κινδυνεύσω καὶ ἐγὼ οὐχ ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καθ' Ὅμηρον φαῦλος ὢν ἐπὶ σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἰέναι θοίνην ἄκλητος. ὅρα οὖν ἄγων με τί ἀπολογήσῃ, ὡς ἐγὼ μὲν οὐχ ὁμολογήσω ἄκλητος ἥκειν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ σοῦ κεκλημένος.

d "Σύν τε δύ'," ἔφη, "ἐρχομένω πρὸ ὁδοῦ" βουλευσόμεθα ὅτι ἐροῦμεν. ἀλλ' ἴωμεν.

[2] Ἀγάθων' Lachmann: ἀγαθῶν BTW

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[13] This double-reported speech, Apollodorus reporting what Aristodemus told him (for reasons of readability often omitted here in translation) frequently though not consistently used, is a deliberate feature of the dialogue, doubtless to keep reminding us of the frame of the narrator and the audience. The element of reportage is also frequently indicated in the Greek by extended passages governed by the accusative + infinitive of indirect speech.

And I said, he said,[13] "just whatever you say." b

"Then follow," said Socrates, "so that we can also spoil the proverb by changing it, so then actually it's:

> 'Good men go of their own accord to dinner at
> Agathon's.'[14]

For it looks as if Homer not only undermines, but also does violence to this proverb for having made Agamemnon an outstandingly good man in warfare, but Menelaus c a 'fainthearted spearman,' when Agamemnon was making a sacrifice and feasting, he made Menelaus go to the feast uninvited, as an inferior going to the feast of a superior."

When he heard this, Aristodemus said he replied: "But perhaps I too shall run the risk, Socrates, and not as you say, but according to Homer, I, an undistinguished man, shall be going to an accomplished man's feast uninvited. So consider what excuse you'll make if you take me, as I shall not confess to going uninvited, but invited by you."

"While the two of us make our way together along the d road,"[15] he said, "we'll discuss what we're going to say. Well, let's go."

[14] The point of the saying lies in the pun on Agathon's name (*agathos* = "good"), and the "undermining" of Homer, where it is the *inferior* Menelaus ("fainthearted spearman," *Il.* 17.587–88) who goes of his own accord to Agamemnon's feast at *Iliad* 2.408. The MSS (see textual note) translate as: "Good men go uninvited to good men's feasts." We follow the reading of Burnet in OCT (see textual note), which follows a modern conjecture and arguably gives more point to the pun.

[15] A quotation loosely based on Homer, *Iliad* 10.222–26, suggesting that when two travel together, one looks out to see what's best—in this case, Socrates leaves it to Aristodemus!

Τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα σφᾶς ἔφη διαλεχθέντας ἰέναι. τὸν οὖν
| Σωκράτη ἑαυτῷ πως προσέχοντα τὸν νοῦν κατὰ τὴν
ὁδὸν πορεύεσθαι ὑπολειπόμενον, καὶ περιμένοντος οὗ
e κελεύειν προϊέναι εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ γενέσθαι
ἐπὶ τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῇ Ἀγάθωνος, ἀνεῳγμένην καταλαμβά-
νειν τὴν θύραν, καί τι ἔφη αὐτόθι γελοῖον παθεῖν. οἷ
μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς παῖδά τινα τῶν ἔνδοθεν ἀπαντήσαντα
ἄγειν οὗ κατέκειντο οἱ ἄλλοι, καὶ καταλαμβάνειν ἤδη
μέλλοντας δειπνεῖν· εὐθὺς δ᾽ οὖν ὡς | ἰδεῖν τὸν Ἀγά-
θωνα, Ὦ, φάναι, Ἀριστόδημε, εἰς καλὸν ἥκεις ὅπως
συνδειπνήσῃς· εἰ δ᾽ ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκα ἦλθες, εἰς αὖ-
θις ἀναβαλοῦ, ὡς καὶ χθὲς ζητῶν σε ἵνα καλέσαιμι,
οὐχ οἷός τ᾽ ἦ ἰδεῖν. ἀλλὰ Σωκράτη ἡμῖν πῶς οὐκ
ἄγεις;

Καὶ ἐγώ, ἔφη, μεταστρεφόμενος οὐδαμοῦ ὁρῶ Σω-
κράτη | ἑπόμενον· εἶπον οὖν ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς μετὰ Σω-
κράτους ἥκοιμι, κληθεὶς ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου δεῦρ᾽ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον.

Καλῶς γ᾽, ἔφη, ποιῶν σύ· ἀλλὰ ποῦ ἔστιν οὗτος;

175 Ὄπισθεν ἐμοῦ ἄρτι εἰσῄει· ἀλλὰ θαυμάζω καὶ
αὐτὸς ποῦ ἂν εἴη.

Οὐ σκέψῃ, ἔφη, παῖ, φάναι τὸν Ἀγάθωνα, καὶ εἰ-
σάξεις Σωκράτη; σὺ δ᾽, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, Ἀριστόδημε, παρ᾽
Ἐρυξίμαχον | κατακλίνου.

Καὶ ἓ μὲν ἔφη ἀπονίζειν τὸν παῖδα ἵνα κατακέοιτο·
ἄλλον δέ τινα τῶν παίδων ἥκειν ἀγγέλλοντα ὅτι "Σω-
κράτης οὗτος ἀναχωρήσας ἐν τῷ τῶν γειτόνων προ-
θύρῳ ἕστηκεν, κἀμοῦ καλοῦντος οὐκ ἐθέλει εἰσιέναι." |

After talking about such things as this he said they went
on their way. Then Socrates was somehow absorbed by his
own thoughts and while making his way along the road he
was falling behind, and when Aristodemus stopped to wait
for him, he told him to go on ahead. When he arrived at e
Agathon's house, he discovered the door open, and there,
he said, he found himself in a ridiculous position. For one
of the slaves of those inside immediately met him and led
him to where the others were reclining and he found them
already about to eat. Anyway as soon as Agathon saw him:
"Aristodemus," he said, "you have come just at the right
moment to join us in a meal. If you've come for some other
reason, leave it for another time, as I came looking for you
yesterday in order to invite you, but I wasn't able to see
you. But how come you're not bringing Socrates to us?"

And I turned round, he said, and nowhere could I see Socrates following. So I said that it was in fact I who was coming with Socrates, at *his* invitation to come here for dinner.

"Well done you," he said, "but where is the man himself?"

"He was coming in behind me just now, but I'm won- 175
dering myself where he might be."

"Won't you go and look for Socrates, boy," said Agathon, "and bring him here? But you, Aristodemus," he said, "lie down beside Eryximachus."

And he said the slave boy washed him so he could lie down. Another of the slave boys came and announced that "Socrates is here but has gone back and is just standing in the neighbors' porch, and when I called him he was unwilling to come in."

Ἄτοπόν γ', ἔφη, λέγεις· οὔκουν καλεῖς αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ ἀφήσεις;

b Καὶ ὃς ἔφη εἰπεῖν Μηδαμῶς, ἀλλ' ἐᾶτε αὐτόν. ἔθος γάρ τι τοῦτ' ἔχει· ἐνίοτε ἀποστὰς ὅποι ἂν τύχῃ ἕστηκεν. ἥξει δ' αὐτίκα, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι. μὴ οὖν κινεῖτε, ἀλλ' ἐᾶτε.

Ἀλλ' οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη φάναι τὸν | Ἀγάθωνα. ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς, ὦ παῖδες, τοὺς ἄλλους ἑστιᾶτε. πάντως παρατίθετε ὅτι ἂν βούλησθε, ἐπειδάν τις ὑμῖν μὴ ἐφεστήκῃ—ὃ ἐγὼ οὐδεπώποτε ἐποίησα—νῦν οὖν, νομίζοντες καὶ ἐμὲ ὑφ' ὑμῶν κεκλῆσθαι ἐπὶ δεῖπνον καὶ τούσδε τοὺς ἄλλους, θεραπεύετε, ἵν' ὑμᾶς ἐπαινῶμεν.

c Μετὰ ταῦτα ἔφη σφᾶς μὲν δειπνεῖν, τὸν δὲ Σωκράτη οὐκ εἰσιέναι. τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα πολλάκις κελεύειν μεταπέμψασθαι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἓ δὲ οὐκ ἐᾶν. ἥκειν οὖν αὐτὸν οὐ | πολὺν χρόνον ὡς εἰώθει διατρίψαντα, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα σφᾶς μεσοῦν δειπνοῦντας. τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα—τυγχάνειν γὰρ ἔσχατον κατακείμενον μόνον—Δεῦρ', ἔφη φάναι, Σώκρατες, παρ' ἐμὲ κατάκεισο, ἵνα καὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ ἁπτόμενός σου ἀπολαύσω,
d ὅ σοι προσέστη ἐν τοῖς προθύροις. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ηὗρες αὐτὸ καὶ ἔχεις· οὐ γὰρ ἂν προαπέστης.

Καὶ τὸν Σωκράτη καθίζεσθαι καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι, φάναι, ὦ Ἀγάθων, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη ἡ σοφία ὥστ' ἐκ τοῦ πληρεστέρου | εἰς τὸ κενώτερον ῥεῖν ἡμῶν, ἐὰν ἁπτώμεθα ἀλλήλων, ὥσπερ τὸ ἐν ταῖς κύλιξιν ὕδωρ τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἐρίου ῥέον ἐκ τῆς πληρεστέρας εἰς τὴν

"That's odd what you're saying," he said. "Won't you call him and not let him go?"

And, said Aristodemus, he replied: "No way, but let him be. You see, this is a habit of his. Sometimes he turns aside wherever he happens to be and just stands there. He'll come presently, I think. Don't disturb him then, just let him be." b

"Well that's what we must do if you think so," Agathon replied. "But you, slaves, entertain the rest of us. In any case, you bring us entirely what you like when there's no one supervising you (which I've never ever done) so now, just imagine that I too have been invited by you for dinner as well as the rest of these people, and look after us, so that we may sing your praises."

After this, he said, they had their meal, but Socrates c
did not come in. So Agathon ordered Socrates to be sent for several times, but Aristodemus did not allow it. Then not long afterward he did come in having spent time in his usual manner; but by then they were about halfway through the meal. Then Agathon,—for he happened to be reclining alone on the last couch—said: "come over here, Socrates, and recline beside me so that being in contact with you I too can enjoy the piece of wisdom that came to
you in the porch. For it's clear you have found it, and have d
a hold on it, for otherwise you wouldn't have stopped searching."

So Socrates sat himself down, and said: "It would be a good thing, Agathon, if wisdom were such a thing as to flow from the fuller one of us into the emptier if we were touching each other, like the water in wine cups that flows through the strand of wool from the fuller into the emptier

κενωτέραν. εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἡ σοφία, πολλοῦ
e τιμῶμαι τὴν παρὰ σοὶ κατάκλισιν· οἶμαι γάρ με παρὰ
σοῦ πολλῆς καὶ καλῆς σοφίας πληρωθήσεσθαι. ἡ
μὲν γὰρ ἐμὴ φαύλη τις ἂν εἴη, ἢ καὶ ἀμφισβητήσι-
μος ὥσπερ ὄναρ οὖσα, ἡ δὲ σὴ λαμπρά τε καὶ πολ-
λὴν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχουσα, ἥ γε | παρὰ σοῦ νέου ὄντος
οὕτω σφόδρα ἐξέλαμψεν καὶ ἐκφανὴς ἐγένετο πρῴην
ἐν μάρτυσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων πλέον ἢ τρισμυρίοις.

Ὑβριστὴς εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Ἀγάθων. καὶ
ταῦτα μὲν καὶ ὀλίγον ὕστερον διαδικασόμεθα ἐγώ τε
καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς σοφίας, δικαστῇ χρώμενοι τῷ Διο-
νύσῳ· νῦν δὲ πρὸς τὸ | δεῖπνον πρῶτα τρέπου.

176 Μετὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, κατακλινέντος τοῦ Σωκράτους
καὶ δειπνήσαντος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, σπονδάς τε σφᾶς
ποιήσασθαι, καὶ ᾄσαντας τὸν θεὸν καὶ τἆλλα τὰ νο-
μιζόμενα, τρέπεσθαι πρὸς τὸν πότον· τὸν οὖν Παυσα-
νίαν ἔφη λόγου τοιούτου | τινὸς κατάρχειν. Εἶεν, ἄν-
δρες, φάναι, τίνα τρόπον ῥᾷστα πιόμεθα; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν
λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι τῷ ὄντι πάνυ χαλεπῶς ἔχω ὑπὸ τοῦ
χθὲς πότου καὶ δέομαι ἀναψυχῆς τινος—οἶμαι δὲ καὶ
ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλούς· παρῆστε γὰρ χθές—σκοπεῖσθε
οὖν τίνι τρόπῳ ἂν ὡς ῥᾷστα πίνοιμεν.

b Τὸν οὖν Ἀριστοφάνη εἰπεῖν, Τοῦτο μέντοι εὖ λέ-

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[16] A deliberately teasing wild exaggeration (recognized as such by Agathon in the following line); the Theater of Dionysus, where Agathon's play was performed, may have held up to 14,000

one. For if this is the case with wisdom too, I think highly of reclining next to you, for I think I'll be filled with much e
fine wisdom from you. For mine would be an inferior thing, or even debatable, being like a dream, but yours is both bright and shows much promise, seeing that only the day before yesterday it shone out from you so vividly, young as you are, and displayed with more than thirty thousand Greeks as witnesses."[16]

"You are outrageous, Socrates," said Agathon. "We'll sort out our claims to wisdom, you and I, in court a little later, with Dionysus as our judge.[17] But now first turn your attention to your dinner."

After this, he said, when Socrates had reclined and 176
eaten his food along with the others, they made their libation, sang a hymn to the god and carried out the rest of the customary rituals and turned to the drink. Then Pausanias, he said, began with a speech that went something like this: "Well now, gentlemen, he said, what will be the easiest way for us to drink? From my point of view I tell you I'm really in a pretty bad way after yesterday's drinking and I need a break—as I think most of you do too; for you were there yesterday—so consider in what way we can drink that is easiest on us."

Then Aristophanes spoke: "That's a good idea, Pausa- b

spectators (31,000 was roughly the number of citizens in early fourth century Athens), and the Lenaia would have attracted mainly a local audience.

[17] That is, when they've all had plenty of wine. However: "In the end, it is logic, not drunken confidence or sentimentality which helps the reader to decide the question (199c3–201c9)," Dover, n. ad loc.

γεις, ὦ Παυσανία, τὸ παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευάσασθαι ῥᾳστώνην τινὰ τῆς πόσεως· καὶ γὰρ αὐτός εἰμι τῶν χθὲς βεβαπτισμένων. |

Ἀκούσαντα οὖν αὐτῶν ἔφη Ἐρυξίμαχον τὸν Ἀκουμενοῦ Ἦ καλῶς, φάναι, λέγετε. καὶ ἔτι ἑνὸς δέομαι ὑμῶν ἀκοῦσαι πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐρρῶσθαι πίνειν, Ἀγάθων<ος>.

Οὐδαμῶς, φάναι, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔρρωμαι.

c Ἕρμαιον ἂν εἴη ἡμῖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐμοί τε καὶ Ἀριστοδήμῳ καὶ Φαίδρῳ καὶ τοῖσδε, εἰ ὑμεῖς οἱ δυνατώτατοι πίνειν νῦν ἀπειρήκατε· ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ ἀδύνατοι. Σωκράτη δ' ἐξαιρῶ λόγου· ἱκανὸς γὰρ καὶ ἀμφότερα, ὥστ' | ἐξαρκέσει αὐτῷ ὁπότερ' ἂν ποιῶμεν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν μοι δοκεῖ οὐδεὶς τῶν παρόντων προθύμως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ πολὺν πίνειν οἶνον, ἴσως ἂν ἐγὼ περὶ τοῦ μεθύσκεσθαι οἷόν ἐστι τἀληθῆ λέγων ἧττον ἂν εἴην ἀηδής. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε οἶμαι κατάδηλον γεγονέναι ἐκ τῆς ἰατρικῆς, ὅτι χαλεπὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
d ποις ἡ μέθη ἐστίν· καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς ἑκὼν εἶναι πόρρω ἐθελήσαιμι ἂν πιεῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ συμβουλεύσαιμι, ἄλλως τε καὶ κραιπαλῶντα ἔτι ἐκ τῆς προτεραίας. |

Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη φάναι ὑπολαβόντα Φαῖδρον τὸν Μυρρινούσιον, ἔγωγέ σοι εἴωθα πείθεσθαι ἄλλως τε καὶ ἅττ' ἂν περὶ ἰατρικῆς λέγῃς· νῦν δ', ἂν εὖ βουλεύ-
e ωνται, καὶ οἱ λοιποί. ταῦτα δὴ ἀκούσαντας συγχωρεῖν πάντας μὴ διὰ μέθης ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι συνουσίαν, ἀλλ' οὕτω πίνοντας πρὸς ἡδονήν.

Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν, φάναι τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, τοῦτο μὲν

nias, to devise in any way some sort of relief from drinking: for I was myself one of those who got a good soaking yesterday."

Now when he heard them, he said, Eryximachus, Acumenus' son, joined in: "That's certainly a good idea. And yet I still need to hear from one of you, namely Agathon, how he feels about his ability to cope with the drink."

"There's no way I can cope with it either," Agathon said.

"I think it would be a godsend for us," Eryximachus c
said, "both for me and Aristodemus and Phaedrus, and these people here, if you, the people most able to hold your drink, have now renounced it, for we're always incapable. I'm leaving Socrates out of account, for he is all right either way and it'll be fine with him whatever we do. Since then I get the impression that no one here is keen to drink a lot of wine, perhaps I would be less of a bore if I say what the truth is about getting oneself intoxicated. You see I think this has become quite evident to me from my medical calling: that being drunk is bad for people. I d
myself wouldn't willingly go on drinking if I could help it, nor would I advise anyone else to, especially someone with a hangover from the day before."

"Very well," said Phaedrus from the deme of Myrrhinous, joining in, "I myself am used to doing what you say, especially in anything connected with medicine, and on this occasion, if they are well advised, so should the rest." When they heard this, they all agreed in the present cir- e
cumstances not to conduct the party by getting drunk, but drinking simply to enjoy themselves.

"Well then," said Eryximachus, "since this has been

δέδοκται, | πίνειν ὅσον ἂν ἕκαστος βούληται, ἐπάναγκες δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰσηγοῦμαι τὴν μὲν ἄρτι εἰσελθοῦσαν αὐλητρίδα χαίρειν ἐᾶν, αὐλοῦσαν ἑαυτῇ ἢ ἂν βούληται ταῖς γυναιξὶ ταῖς ἔνδον, ἡμᾶς δὲ διὰ λόγων ἀλλήλοις συνεῖναι τὸ τήμερον· καὶ δι' οἵων λόγων, εἰ βούλεσθε, ἐθέλω ὑμῖν | εἰσηγήσασθαι.

177 Φάναι δὴ πάντας καὶ βούλεσθαι καὶ κελεύειν αὐτὸν εἰσηγεῖσθαι. εἰπεῖν οὖν τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον ὅτι Ἡ μέν μοι ἀρχὴ τοῦ λόγου ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν Εὐριπίδου Μελανίππην· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλὰ Φαίδρου τοῦδε, ὃν μέλλω λέγειν. | Φαῖδρος γὰρ ἑκάστοτε πρός με ἀγανακτῶν λέγει Οὐ δεινόν, φησίν, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, ἄλλοις μέν τισι θεῶν ὕμνους καὶ παίωνας εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πεποιημένους, τῷ δὲ Ἔρωτι, τηλικούτῳ ὄντι καὶ τοσούτῳ θεῷ, μηδὲ ἕνα πώποτε τοσούτων γεγονότων
b ποιητῶν πεποιηκέναι μηδὲν ἐγκώμιον; εἰ δὲ βούλει αὖ σκέψασθαι τοὺς χρηστοὺς σοφιστάς, Ἡρακλέους μὲν καὶ ἄλλων ἐπαίνους καταλογάδην συγγράφειν, ὥσπερ ὁ βέλτιστος Πρόδικος—καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἧττον καὶ θαυμαστόν, ἀλλ' ἔγωγε | ἤδη τινὶ ἐνέτυχον βιβλίῳ ἀν-

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18 An allusion to a lost play of Euripides, *Melanippe the Wise* (fr. 488 Nauck[2]). The heroine prefaces a speech about the origin of the world with the words "The story is not mine, but from my mother."

19 Probably not strictly true, or at least a rhetorical exaggeration; a fragment of the sixth-century lyric poet Alcaeus (fr. 327 Campbell) appears to come from a hymn to Love.

agreed, that each will drink only as much as he wishes, and there's to be no compulsion, as for what happens next I propose that we dismiss the flute girl who has just arrived; she can play to herself, or if she wishes to the women inside, while for today we occupy each other in talk and, if you wish, I'm willing to propose to you what kind of talk we should have."

They all said they were willing and told him to make 177
his proposal. Then Eryximachus said: "the beginning of my speech is after the manner of Euripides' Melanippe. For it is not my story I intend to tell, but one of Phaedrus' here.[18] You see all the time Phaedrus complains to me and says: Isn't it strange, Eryximachus, he says, that there are hymns and paeans composed by the poets to some of the other gods, but to Love, a god of such age and so great, not one of the great number of our poets that have ever been has ever yet written anything in his praise?[19] But b
again, if you care to consider the worthy sophists,[20] that they write eulogies of Heracles and others in prose, such as the excellent Prodicus—and that is not so very surprising, but a while ago I came across some book by a clever

20 "Worthy" (*chrēstos* = "deserving," close to "good") sophists, possibly with an ironical connotation here (the term *sophistēs* has a generally pejorative or condescending connotation in Plato); or he may be representing Phaedrus' own view, or perhaps contrasting the older sophists, e.g., Prodicus (a near contemporary of Socrates who wrote a "Choice of Heracles," DK 84B2, Waterfield, 246–49), from a more recent generation. *Encomia* on salt (b5): see Isocrates *Helen* 12, referring to those who praise "bumblebees, salt and suchlike."

δρὸς σοφοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἐνῆσαν ἅλες ἔπαινον θαυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὠφελίαν, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συχνὰ ἴδοις
c *ἂν ἐγκεκωμιασμένα—τὸ οὖν τοιούτων μὲν πέρι πολλὴν σπουδὴν ποιήσασθαι, Ἔρωτα δὲ μηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων τετολμηκέναι εἰς ταυτηνὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ἀξίως ὑμνῆσαι· ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως ἠμέληται τοσοῦτος θεός. ταῦτα δή μοι δοκεῖ εὖ | λέγειν Φαῖδρος. ἐγὼ οὖν ἐπιθυμῶ ἅμα μὲν τούτῳ ἔρανον εἰσενεγκεῖν καὶ χαρίσασθαι, ἅμα δ᾽ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πρέπον μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡμῖν τοῖς*
d *παροῦσι κοσμῆσαι τὸν θεόν. εἰ οὖν συνδοκεῖ καὶ ὑμῖν, γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἡμῖν ἐν λόγοις ἱκανὴ διατριβή· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι χρῆναι ἕκαστον ἡμῶν λόγον εἰπεῖν ἔπαινον Ἔρωτος ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ὡς ἂν δύνηται κάλλιστον, ἄρχειν δὲ Φαῖδρον πρῶτον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρῶτος κατάκειται καὶ ἔστιν | ἅμα πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου.*

Οὐδείς σοι, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, *φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἐναντία ψηφιεῖται. οὔτε γὰρ ἄν που ἐγὼ ἀποφήσαιμι, ὃς οὐδέν φημι ἄλλο ἐπίστασθαι ἢ τὰ ἐρωτικά, οὔτε*
e *που Ἀγάθων καὶ Παυσανίας, οὐδὲ μὴν Ἀριστοφάνης, ᾧ περὶ Διόνυσον καὶ Ἀφροδίτην πᾶσα ἡ διατριβή, οὐδὲ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τουτωνὶ ὧν ἐγὼ ὁρῶ. καίτοι οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου γίγνεται ἡμῖν τοῖς ὑστάτοις κατακειμένοις· ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν οἱ πρόσθεν ἱκανῶς καὶ καλῶς | εἴπωσιν, ἐξαρκέσει ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ καταρχέτω Φαῖδρος καὶ ἐγκωμιαζέτω τὸν Ἔρωτα.*

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[21] The speakers go in the order they are reclining, from left to right. For the organization of couches, see Introduction, §1(ii).

fellow in which salt was lauded in a remarkable way for its usefulness and you can see many other things like that extolled—to think that they have devoted much serious c effort to such things, but no human being to this day has ever yet ventured to sing the praises of Love in worthy fashion! Yet this is how far such a great god has been neglected. That's the reason I think Phaedrus is right. Therefore I am keen to make my contribution to the feast and gratify him, and at the same time in the present circumstances it seems to me fitting for us who are here to honor the god. If then you also think the same, there would be d enough time to keep us busy with speeches: for I think each of us should make a speech in praise of the god from left to right, the finest he can, and Phaedrus should be the first to start, since he is in first place and at the same time he is father of the speech."[21]

"Nobody, Eryximachus," said Socrates, "is going to vote against you. For I don't think I would say no either, seeing that I claim to understand nothing but the affairs of love, nor I think would Agathon and Pausanias, nor even e Aristophanes who spends all his time on Dionysus and Aphrodite, nor anyone else of these people who I see here.[22] Yet it isn't fair on those of us reclining on the last couches; but if those who speak first do it adequately and well, it will be good enough for us. Well, let Phaedrus begin and praise Love and good luck to him."

22 The special sense in which Socrates understands "affairs of love" (*ta erōtica*) becomes clear in his exchange with Diotima (201d1ff.) and with Alcibiades (215a5ff.). Agathon and Pausanias were lifelong same-sex partners (193b–c); the reference to Aristophanes the writer of comedy jokingly implies that his plays were exclusively devoted to wine and love (Dionysus and Aphrodite).

Ταῦτα δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄρα συνέφασάν τε
178 καὶ ἐκέλευον ἅπερ ὁ Σωκράτης. πάντων μὲν οὖν ἃ ἕκαστος εἶπεν, οὔτε πάνυ ὁ Ἀριστόδημος ἐμέμνητο οὔτ' αὖ ἐγὼ ἃ ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγε πάντα· ἃ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ὧν ἔδοξέ μοι ἀξιομνημόνευτον, τούτων ὑμῖν ἐρῶ ἑκάστου τὸν | λόγον.

Πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἔφη Φαῖδρον ἀρξάμενον ἐνθένδε ποθὲν λέγειν, ὅτι μέγας θεὸς εἴη ὁ Ἔρως καὶ θαυμαστὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θεοῖς, πολλαχῇ μὲν καὶ ἄλλῃ, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν. τὸ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύτατον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν τίμιον, ἦ δ'
b ὅς, τεκμήριον δὲ τούτου· γονῆς γὰρ Ἔρωτος οὔτ' εἰσὶν οὔτε λέγονται ὑπ' οὐδενὸς οὔτε ἰδιώτου οὔτε ποιητοῦ, ἀλλ' Ἡσίοδος πρῶτον μὲν Χάος φησὶ γενέσθαι |

αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
Γαῖ' εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεί,
ἠδ' Ἔρος

Ἡσιόδῳ δὲ καὶ Ἀκουσίλεως σύμφησιν μετὰ τὸ Χάος δύο τούτω γενέσθαι, Γῆν τε καὶ Ἔρωτα. Παρμενίδης δὲ τὴν | γένεσιν λέγει—

πρώτιστον μὲν Ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων.

c οὕτω πολλαχόθεν ὁμολογεῖται ὁ Ἔρως ἐν τοῖς πρε-

All the rest then agreed and repeated Socrates' instruction. Now Aristodemus didn't recall entirely everything 178
that each person said, nor could in I in my turn remember everything that he told me, but of the speeches he remembered best and of the ones which seemed to me to contain what was worth remembering, of these I shall recount each man's speech to you.

The Speech of Phaedrus

So first, as I say, Phaedrus spoke beginning at roughly this point, saying that Love is a great god, a wonder to both men and gods in many different ways, but not least in his birth. For the god is honored for being among the oldest among them, he said, and there is proof of this: there are b
no parents of Love and none are mentioned by writers in prose or verse, but Hesiod says that Chaos first came into being:

> . . . but then
> Broad-bosomed Earth, the secure abode of all forever
> And Love . . .

and Acusilaus agrees with Hesiod and says after Chaos these two were born: Earth and Love. Parmenides says of his birth:

> Love was devised first of all the gods.[23]

Thus from many sources Love is agreed to be among the c

[23] References are to Hesiod, *Theogony* 116–17, 120; Acusilaus (? 5th century); Parmenides, DK B13 and 14 (Waterfield, 63–64).

σβύτατος εἶναι. πρεσβύτατος δὲ ὢν μεγίστων ἀγα-
θῶν ἡμῖν αἴτιός ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγ᾽ ἔχω εἰπεῖν ὅτι
μεῖζόν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν εὐθὺς νέῳ ὄντι ἢ ἐραστὴς χρη-
στὸς καὶ ἐραστῇ | παιδικά. ὃ γὰρ χρὴ ἀνθρώποις
ἡγεῖσθαι παντὸς τοῦ βίου τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς βιώ-
σεσθαι, τοῦτο οὔτε συγγένεια οἵα τε ἐμποιεῖν οὕτω
καλῶς οὔτε τιμαὶ οὔτε πλοῦτος οὔτ᾽ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὡς
d ἔρως. λέγω δὲ δὴ τί τοῦτο; τὴν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς
αἰσχύνην, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς καλοῖς φιλοτιμίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν
ἄνευ τούτων οὔτε πόλιν οὔτε ἰδιώτην μεγάλα καὶ καλὰ
ἔργα ἐξεργάζεσθαι. φημὶ τοίνυν ἐγὼ ἄνδρα ὅστις |
ἐρᾷ, εἴ τι αἰσχρὸν ποιῶν κατάδηλος γίγνοιτο ἢ πά-
σχων ὑπό του δι᾽ ἀνανδρίαν μὴ ἀμυνόμενος, οὔτ᾽ ἂν
ὑπὸ πατρὸς ὀφθέντα οὕτως ἀλγῆσαι οὔτε ὑπὸ ἑταίρων
e οὔτε ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ὡς ὑπὸ παιδικῶν. ταὐτὸν δὲ
τοῦτο καὶ τὸν ἐρώμενον ὁρῶμεν, ὅτι διαφερόντως τοὺς
ἐραστὰς αἰσχύνεται, ὅταν ὀφθῇ ἐν αἰσχρῷ τινι ὤν. εἰ
οὖν μηχανή τις γένοιτο ὥστε πόλιν γενέσθαι ἢ στρα-
τόπεδον ἐραστῶν τε καὶ παιδικῶν, | οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως
ἂν ἄμεινον οἰκήσειαν τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἢ ἀπεχόμενοι πάν-
179 των τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ φιλοτιμούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους,
καὶ μαχόμενοί γ᾽ ἂν μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων οἱ τοιοῦτοι νικῷεν
ἂν ὀλίγοι ὄντες ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πάντας ἀνθρώπους.
ἐρῶν γὰρ ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ παιδικῶν ὀφθῆναι ἢ λιπὼν τάξιν

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[24] *Kalos* (fine) and its opposite *aischros* (shameful) were the most powerful terms of general approval/disapproval in the

oldest of them. Being very old he is the cause of the greatest good things for us. For I myself cannot say what is a greater good for someone, just as soon as he reaches boyhood, than a worthy lover, nor for a lover a boy to be loved. Now that which should guide men who intend to live well throughout their lives—this neither family, nor honor, nor wealth, nor anything else can implant as well as love can.
So what is it I'm talking about? The shame that comes d
from shameful deeds; and the love of honor that comes from those that are fine.[24] For without these no city or individual can accomplish great and noble deeds. Now I say if a man who is in love is palpably doing something shameful, or through cowardice does not defend himself when he is maltreated by someone, he wouldn't feel so much pain when he is seen by his father, or his comrades,
or anyone else, as when he is seen by his beloved. We see e
this same thing also in the loved one, that he especially feels shame toward his lovers when he is seen in a shameful situation. If therefore there were some means of creating a city, or an army of lovers and their loved ones, there cannot be a better way to organize their affairs than by
abstaining from all things shameful, and competing with 179
each other in honor, and fighting alongside each other; such a force, even though few in number, would, so to speak, conquer all mankind.[25] For a man in love would be less inclined, I suppose, to be seen by his beloved either

Greek ethical vocabulary (also adverb καλῶς, "well"); see especialy Pausanias' speech at 181a. "Noble" in the following sentence (178d4) also translates *kalos*.

[25] Possibly an anachronistic reference to the Theban "Sacred Band" of the 380s (see Introduction, Appendix).

ἢ ὅπλα ἀποβαλὼν ἧττον ἂν δήπου δέξαιτο ἢ ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν | ἄλλων, καὶ πρὸ τούτου τεθνάναι ἂν πολλάκις ἕλοιτο. καὶ μὴν ἐγκαταλιπεῖν γε τὰ παιδικὰ ἢ μὴ βοηθῆσαι κινδυνεύοντι—οὐδεὶς οὕτω κακὸς ὅντινα οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸς ὁ Ἔρως ἔνθεον ποιήσειε πρὸς ἀρετήν, ὥστε ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ ἀρίστῳ φύσει· καὶ ἀτεχνῶς, ὃ ἔφη Ὅμηρος, "μένος ἐμπνεῦσαι" ἐνίοις τῶν ἡρώων
b τὸν θεόν, τοῦτο ὁ Ἔρως τοῖς ἐρῶσι παρέχει γιγνόμενον παρ᾽ αὑτοῦ.

Καὶ μὴν ὑπεραποθνῄσκειν γε μόνοι ἐθέλουσιν οἱ ἐρῶντες, | οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες. τούτου δὲ καὶ ἡ Πελίου θυγάτηρ Ἄλκηστις ἱκανὴν μαρτυρίαν παρέχεται ὑπὲρ τοῦδε τοῦ λόγου εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἐθελήσασα μόνη ὑπὲρ τοῦ αὑτῆς ἀνδρὸς
c ἀποθανεῖν, ὄντων αὐτῷ πατρός τε καὶ μητρός, οὓς ἐκείνη τοσοῦτον ὑπερεβάλετο τῇ φιλίᾳ διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα, ὥστε ἀποδεῖξαι αὐτοὺς ἀλλοτρίους ὄντας τῷ ὑεῖ καὶ ὀνόματι μόνον προσήκοντας, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐργασαμένη τὸ ἔργον οὕτω καλὸν ἔδοξεν ἐργάσασθαι οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώποις | ἀλλὰ καὶ θεοῖς, ὥστε πολλῶν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐργασαμένων εὐαριθμήτοις δή τισιν ἔδοσαν τοῦτο γέρας οἱ θεοί, ἐξ Ἅιδου ἀνεῖναι πάλιν τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνης ἀνεῖσαν ἀγασθέντες τῷ ἔργῳ·
d οὕτω καὶ θεοὶ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα σπουδήν τε καὶ ἀρετὴν μάλιστα τιμῶσιν. Ὀρφέα δὲ τὸν Οἰάγρου ἀτελῆ ἀπέπεμψαν ἐξ Ἅιδου, φάσμα δείξαντες τῆς γυναικὸς ἐφ᾽ ἣν ἧκεν, αὐτὴν δὲ οὐ δόντες, ὅτι μαλθακί-

deserting the line, or throwing away his weapons, than by all others, and he would choose to die many times over rather than that. And again as for leaving his beloved in the lurch, or not running to his aid when in danger—no one is so cowardly that Love himself would not cause him to be inspired with courage, so that he becomes like a man who is supremely brave by nature, and it's exactly as Homer said: the god 'breathed might' into some of the heroes:[26] this is what Love produces, arising from his par- b
ticular power, for those in love.

Furthermore it's only lovers who are willing to die for another, and I don't just mean men, but also women. And of that Peleas' daughter Alcestis offers adequate evidence among the Greeks in support of this argument, she who was the only one willing to die on behalf of her own husband, though he had a father and mother living, whom she c
so exceeded in devotion through her love as to show them up as strangers to their son, related only in name; and having performed such a deed as this, she seemed not only to men but also to the gods to have done such a fine deed that, although many have carried out many fine deeds, and it would be easy to count the number to whom the gods granted the prize of sending back their soul from Hades, they released hers in admiration of her deed.[27] Thus the d
gods too honor especially the zeal and courage associated with love. But they sent Orpheus, son of Oeagrus, out of Hades empty-handed, showing him an apparition of his wife for whom he had come, but not giving him the woman herself, because he was regarded as fainthearted in that

26 A common Homeric formula for heroes preparing for combat.

27 For the dramatized story, see Euripides, *Alcestis*.

ζεσθαι ἐδόκει, | ἅτε ὢν κιθαρῳδός, καὶ οὐ τολμᾶν
ἕνεκα τοῦ ἔρωτος ἀποθνῄσκειν ὥσπερ Ἄλκηστις,
ἀλλὰ διαμηχανᾶσθαι ζῶν εἰσιέναι εἰς Ἅιδου. τοιγάρ-
τοι διὰ ταῦτα δίκην αὐτῷ ἐπέθεσαν, καὶ ἐποίησαν τὸν
e θάνατον αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ γυναικῶν γενέσθαι, οὐχ ὥσπερ
Ἀχιλλέα τὸν τῆς Θέτιδος ὑὸν ἐτίμησαν καὶ εἰς μακά-
ρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψαν, ὅτι πεπυσμένος παρὰ τῆς
μητρὸς ὡς ἀποθανοῖτο ἀποκτείνας Ἕκτορα, μὴ ποιή-
σας δὲ τοῦτο οἴκαδε ἐλθὼν γηραιὸς τελευτήσοι, |
ἐτόλμησεν ἑλέσθαι βοηθήσας τῷ ἐραστῇ Πατρόκλῳ
καὶ τιμωρήσας οὐ μόνον ὑπεραποθανεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ
180 ἐπαποθανεῖν τετελευτηκότι· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ὑπεραγασθέν-
τες οἱ θεοὶ διαφερόντως αὐτὸν ἐτίμησαν, ὅτι τὸν ἐρα-
στὴν οὕτω περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιεῖτο. Αἰσχύλος δὲ φλυα-
ρεῖ φάσκων Ἀχιλλέα Πατρόκλου | ἐρᾶν, ὃς ἦν καλλίων
οὐ μόνον Πατρόκλου ἀλλ' ἅμα καὶ τῶν ἡρώων ἁπάν-
των, καὶ ἔτι ἀγένειος, ἔπειτα νεώτερος πολύ, ὥς φησιν
Ὅμηρος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι μάλιστα μὲν ταύτην τὴν
b ἀρετὴν οἱ θεοὶ τιμῶσιν τὴν περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα, μᾶλλον
μέντοι θαυμάζουσιν καὶ ἄγανται καὶ εὖ ποιοῦσιν ὅταν
ὁ ἐρώμενος τὸν ἐραστὴν ἀγαπᾷ, ἢ ὅταν ὁ ἐραστὴς τὰ
παιδικά. θειότερον γὰρ ἐραστὴς παιδικῶν· ἔνθεος γάρ
ἐστι. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα τῆς Ἀλκήστιδος |

[28] The story of Orpheus and his wife Eurydice is most fully available to us in Virgil, *Georgics* 4.453–527.

he was a cithara player and did not have the courage to die for love as Alcestis had done, but had contrived to enter Hades while alive. This is the reason therefore they punished him and caused his death to come about at the hands of women.[28] They did not honor him as they did Achilles, e
son of Thetis, whom they sent off to the Isles of the Blessed because when he had found out from his mother that he was to die after killing Hector, but if he didn't do this he would return home to die in old age, he had the courage to choose to come to the aid of his lover Patroclus and in avenging him not only to die for him, but also to add his own death when Patroclus himself had died.[29] Hence with 180
greatest admiration the gods gave him especial honor because he valued his lover so highly. But Aeschylus is talking nonsense in claiming that Achilles was the lover of Patroclus, because he was not only more handsome than Patroclus, but also more than all the other heroes, and still beardless as well as being far younger, as Homer says.[30] But the fact is in truth the gods honor this excellence the most, the kind that is related to love; however, they reserve b
greater wonder and admiration for the beloved and are more generous to him when he feels affection for his lover more than when the lover loves the beloved. For a lover is something more divine than a loved one, for he is inspired by a god. For these reasons they honored Achilles

29 Achilles tells of his fated choice at *Iliad* 9.410–16, and makes his choice at 18.88–96.

30 On Achilles' surpassing beauty, cf. *Iliad* 2.673ff. As the younger partner he would have been, according to normal Athenian practice, Patroclus' *erōmenos* (beloved) rather than his *erastēs*: hence, Phaedrus' comment on Aeschylus.

μᾶλλον ἐτίμησαν, εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀποπέμψαντες.

Οὕτω δὴ ἔγωγέ φημι Ἔρωτα θεῶν καὶ πρεσβύτατον καὶ τιμιώτατον καὶ κυριώτατον εἶναι εἰς ἀρετῆς καὶ εὐδαιμονίας κτῆσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ ζῶσι καὶ τελευτήσασιν.

c Φαῖδρον μὲν τοιοῦτόν τινα λόγον ἔφη εἰπεῖν, μετὰ δὲ Φαῖδρον ἄλλους τινὰς εἶναι ὧν οὐ πάνυ διεμνημόνευε· οὓς παρεὶς τὸν Παυσανίου λόγον διηγεῖτο.

Εἰπεῖν δ' αὐτὸν ὅτι Οὐ καλῶς μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, προβεβλῆσθαι ἡμῖν | ὁ λόγος, τὸ ἁπλῶς οὕτως παρηγγέλθαι ἐγκωμιάζειν Ἔρωτα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἷς ἦν ὁ Ἔρως, καλῶς ἂν εἶχε, νῦν δὲ οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εἷς· μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἑνὸς ὀρθότερόν ἐστι πρότερον προρρηθῆναι
d ὁποῖον δεῖ ἐπαινεῖν. ἐγὼ οὖν πειράσομαι τοῦτο ἐπανορθώσασθαι, πρῶτον μὲν Ἔρωτα φράσαι ὃν δεῖ ἐπαινεῖν, ἔπειτα ἐπαινέσαι ἀξίως τοῦ θεοῦ. πάντες γὰρ ἴσμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ Ἔρωτος Ἀφροδίτη. μιᾶς μὲν οὖν | οὔσης εἷς ἂν ἦν Ἔρως· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ δύο ἐστόν, δύο ἀνάγκη καὶ Ἔρωτε εἶναι. πῶς δ' οὐ δύο τὼ θεά; ἡ μέν γέ που πρεσβυτέρα καὶ ἀμήτωρ Οὐρανοῦ θυγάτηρ,

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[31] Underlying Phaedrus' argument here is that traditionally the lover (*erastēs*) as the active partner in the relationship is "possessed" and so "more divine," whereas the beloved (*erōmenos*) being the passive recipient of love and only human (the word

more than Alcestis, and sent him to the Isles of the Blessed.[31]

Thus I declare that Love is the oldest and most honored and most powerful of the gods in enabling the acquisition of excellence and happiness by humans both living and dead.[32]

The Speech of Pausanias

Phaedrus made his speech along these lines, he said, but c
after Phaedrus there were some others which he didn't quite remember. Passing over them he related Pausanias' speech. Pausanias said:

"I don't think the topic has been proposed well to us, Phaedrus, in that we have been instructed to praise Love and simply that; for if Love were one god, all would be well, but as it is, you see, he isn't one god; and since he isn't, it is more correct to state first which kind of Love we
must praise. So I shall try to set this right and first make d
clear the Love we must praise, and then praise the god in a manner worthy of him. For we all know there is no Aphrodite without Love. So, if she were one, there would be one Love, but since there are actually two, then there must be two Loves also. How can there not be two goddesses? The one, I take it, is older and daughter of Uranus

to express his love is *agapē* = [brotherly] love) has to make a greater sacrifice, and so is worthy of greater respect from the gods.

32 "Excellence" = *aretē* (virtue, goodness, valor), the positive quality required of the man who wished to be generally well-thought of.

ἣν δὴ καὶ Οὐρανίαν ἐπονομάζομεν· ἡ δὲ νεωτέρα Διὸς
e καὶ Διώνης, ἣν δὴ Πάνδημον καλοῦμεν. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ
καὶ Ἔρωτα τὸν μὲν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συνεργὸν Πάνδημον ὀρ-
θῶς καλεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ Οὐράνιον. ἐπαινεῖν μὲν οὖν δεῖ
πάντας θεούς, ἃ δ' οὖν ἑκάτερος εἴληχε πειρατέον εἰ-
πεῖν. πᾶσα γὰρ πρᾶξις ὧδ' | ἔχει· αὐτὴ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς
181 πραττομένη οὔτε καλὴ οὔτε αἰσχρά. οἷον ὃ νῦν ἡμεῖς
ποιοῦμεν, ἢ πίνειν ἢ ᾄδειν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, οὐκ ἔστι
τούτων αὐτὸ καλὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ πράξει, ὡς ἂν
πραχθῇ, τοιοῦτον ἀπέβη· καλῶς μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενον
καὶ ὀρθῶς καλὸν γίγνεται, μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ αἰσχρόν.
οὕτω δὴ | καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν καὶ ὁ Ἔρως οὐ πᾶς ἐστι καλὸς
οὐδὲ ἄξιος ἐγκωμιάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ὁ καλῶς προτρέπων
ἐρᾶν.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν τῆς Πανδήμου Ἀφροδίτης ὡς ἀληθῶς
b πάνδημός ἐστι καὶ ἐξεργάζεται ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ· καὶ οὗτός
ἐστιν ὃν οἱ φαῦλοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐρῶσιν. ἐρῶσι δὲ
οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν οὐχ ἧττον γυναικῶν ἢ παίδων,
ἔπειτα ὧν καὶ ἐρῶσι τῶν σωμάτων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ψυ-
χῶν, ἔπειτα ὡς ἂν | δύνωνται ἀνοητοτάτων, | πρὸς τὸ
διαπράξασθαι μόνον βλέποντες, ἀμελοῦντες δὲ τοῦ
καλῶς ἢ μή· ὅθεν δὴ συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι
τοῦτο πράττειν, ὁμοίως μὲν ἀγαθόν, ὁμοίως δὲ τοὐναν-
τίον. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς θεοῦ νεωτέρας τε οὔσης

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[33] There were two version of the birth of Aphrodite: (1) she was formed from the foam from the genitals of the castrated Uranus, cf. Hesiod, *Theogony* 188–202 (hence, Uranian); (2) she

without a mother, whom in fact we call Uranian. The younger is daughter of Zeus and Dione, whom we call Pande-
mus. So necessarily the one Love, coworker with the latter e
goddess, must rightly be called Common and the other one Heavenly.[33] On the one hand then we must praise all gods, but for now we must try and say what each Love has been allotted to do. For every activity is like this: per-
formed in and by itself it is neither fine nor shameful, such 181
as what we are now doing: drinking, or singing, or having a discussion; of these none is in itself fine, but it is the nature of the activity, the way it is performed, which determines the way it turns out. If it's performed well and correctly, it becomes fine; if not it's shameful. So too also with loving and Love: it is not all fine or worth praising, but only the one who urges us toward loving well.

"Now the Love who belongs to Common Aphrodite is
truly common and acts at random, and this is the one or- b
dinary people love. Firstly these sorts of people love women no less than boys, secondly, they love those they love more for their bodies than their souls, and thirdly, they love those who have the least possible understanding, looking only to achieve their aim,[34] with no concern for whether it's done well or not. Hence it turns out for them that they do whatever they chance on, irrespective of whether it's good or the opposite. For this love comes not only from the goddess who is much younger than the

was born more naturally from Zeus and Dione, cf. Homer, *Iliad* 5.370ff. (Pandemus)—translated as, respectively, "Heavenly" and "Common."

34 One of a number of euphemisms for sexual activity (*diaprassō* = "accomplish [one's purpose]").

πολὺ ἢ τῆς ἑτέρας, καὶ μετεχούσης ἐν τῇ γενέσει καὶ
c θήλεος καὶ ἄρρενος. ὁ δὲ τῆς Οὐρανίας πρῶτον μὲν οὐ μετεχούσης θήλεος ἀλλ' ἄρρενος μόνον—καὶ ἔστιν οὗτος ὁ τῶν παίδων ἔρως—ἔπειτα πρεσβυτέρας, ὕβρεως ἀμοίρου· ὅθεν | δὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τρέπονται οἱ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ ἔρωτος ἔπιπνοι, τὸ φύσει ἐρρωμενέστερον καὶ νοῦν μᾶλλον ἔχον ἀγαπῶντες. καί τις ἂν γνοίη καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ παιδεραστίᾳ τοὺς εἰλικρινῶς
d ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ἔρωτος ὡρμημένους· οὐ γὰρ ἐρῶσι παίδων, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὰν ἤδη ἄρχωνται νοῦν ἴσχειν, τοῦτο δὲ πλησιάζει τῷ γενειάσκειν. παρεσκευασμένοι γὰρ οἶμαί εἰσιν οἱ ἐντεῦθεν ἀρχόμενοι ἐρᾶν ὡς τὸν βίον ἅπαντα συνεσόμενοι | καὶ κοινῇ συμβιωσόμενοι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐξαπατήσαντες, ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ λαβόντες ὡς νέον, καταγελάσαντες οἰχήσεσθαι ἐπ' ἄλλον ἀποτρέ-
e χοντες. χρῆν δὲ καὶ νόμον εἶναι μὴ ἐρᾶν παίδων, ἵνα μὴ εἰς ἄδηλον πολλὴ σπουδὴ ἀνηλίσκετο· τὸ γὰρ τῶν παίδων τέλος ἄδηλον οἷ τελευτᾷ κακίας καὶ ἀρετῆς ψυχῆς τε πέρι καὶ σώματος. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀγαθοὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς ἑκόντες τίθενται, χρῆν δὲ καὶ τούτους | τοὺς πανδήμους ἐραστὰς προσαναγκάζειν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων γυναικῶν προσαναγκάζομεν αὐτοὺς καθ' ὅσον δυνάμεθα μὴ

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[35] That is, Dione and Zeus. [36] In Greek popular morality, violence was a characteristic of the young (see Dover, *GPM*, 103). For the general view that men were naturally more intelligent than women, see Dover, *GPM*, 98–102.

other, but also in her birth has a share of both female and
male.[35] But the Love who accompanies the Heavenly god- c
dess firstly has no share of the female, but only the male—
and this is the love of boys—secondly, she being the elder,
has no share of lawless violence (*hubris*). Hence those who
are inspired by this kind of love turn to the male, attracted
to that which is naturally stronger and more intelligent.[36]
And one is able to recognize, within the love of boys itself,
those who are aroused purely by this kind of love. For they d
don't love boys except at the point when they begin to
develop the mind, and this comes on when they are near
to growing a beard. For I think those who begin to love
them from that point are prepared to be with them for the
whole of their lives, and share their lives with them, and
not deceive them by taking advantage of their simple
mindedness as a youngster, and then, mocking them, go
running off to someone else.[37] There should actually be e
a law against loving young boys in order to prevent seri-
ous attention being paid to something with unclear out-
come: for it's not clear where boys will end up with regard
to badness and excellence in both soul and body. Now
those who are good voluntarily apply this law to them-
selves, but it's necessary to compel those commonplace
lovers also to adopt such behavior, just as we compel them
as far as we can not to make love to freeborn women.[38]

[37] For the unusual state in Athens of a lifelong exclusively same-sex partnership, as advocated here (Pausanias and Agathon being an example), see General Introduction, §2.

[38] For the distinction in sexual freedom between freeborn and slave women, see General Introduction, §2.

182 *ἐρᾶν. οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν οἵ καὶ τὸ ὄνειδος πεποιηκότες,
ὥστε τινὰς τολμᾶν λέγειν ὡς αἰσχρὸν χαρίζεσθαι
ἐρασταῖς· λέγουσι δὲ εἰς τούτους ἀποβλέποντες,
ὁρῶντες αὐτῶν τὴν ἀκαιρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν, ἐπεὶ οὐ δή-
που | κοσμίως γε καὶ νομίμως ὁτιοῦν <πρᾶγμα> πραττ-
τόμενον ψόγον ἂν δικαίως φέροι.*

*Καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα νόμος ἐν μὲν ταῖς
ἄλλαις πόλεσι νοῆσαι ῥᾴδιος, ἁπλῶς γὰρ ὥρισται· ὁ*
b *δ᾽ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ποικίλος.*[3] *ἐν Ἤλιδι μὲν
γὰρ καὶ ἐν Βοιωτοῖς, καὶ οὗ μὴ σοφοὶ λέγειν, ἁπλῶς
νενομοθέτηται καλὸν τὸ χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς, καὶ
οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι οὔτε νέος οὔτε παλαιὸς ὡς αἰσχρόν,
ἵνα οἶμαι μὴ πράγματ᾽ | ἔχωσιν λόγῳ πειρώμενοι πεί-
θειν τοὺς νέους, ἅτε ἀδύνατοι λέγειν· τῆς δὲ Ἰωνίας
καὶ ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται, ὅσοι ὑπὸ
βαρβάροις οἰκοῦσιν. τοῖς γὰρ βαρβάροις διὰ τὰς τυ-
ραννίδας αἰσχρὸν τοῦτό γε καὶ ἥ γε φιλοσοφία καὶ*
c *ἡ φιλογυμναστία· οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι συμφέρει τοῖς ἄρ-
χουσι φρονήματα μεγάλα ἐγγίγνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχομέ-
νων, οὐδὲ φιλίας ἰσχυρὰς καὶ κοινωνίας, ὃ δὴ μάλι-
στα φιλεῖ τά τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐμποιεῖν.*

[3] *καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι* secl. Winckelmann vel post *γὰρ* transp.

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[39] An editorial suggestion (see textual note) is to delete the reference to Lacedaemon (Sparta) or move it to the next sentence after "in Elis . . . ," on the grounds that inarticulateness was a notorious characteristic of Sparta. But see Xenophon, *Constitution of Sparta* 1.12ff., where Sparta is contrasted with Boeotia and

For these are the men who have brought about the reproach which makes some venture to say that it's shameful to grant favors to lovers, and they say it with these people in mind, seeing their importunity and injustice, since I imagine doing anything whatsoever in a decent and lawful way would surely not justly incur censure. 182

"And in particular, the convention about love in other cities is easy to grasp for it has been defined in simple terms. But here and in Lacedaemon it is complicated.[39]
You see in Elis and among the Boeotians and where they b
are not skilled in speaking it is simply laid down that it is a fine thing to grant favors to lovers and no one, young or old, would say it is shameful, in order, I suppose, that they should have no problems trying to persuade the young verbally, inasmuch as they are not capable of making speeches. But in Ionia and many other places elsewhere, for as many as live under foreign rule, it is considered shameful.[40] For it is owing to their tyrannies that foreigners think this is shameful, along with the pursuit of philosophy and of physical exercise; for I don't think it's in the c
rulers' interest that big ideas should be engendered among their subjects, nor strong friendships and associations, which all the other activities, but especially love, tend to

Elis with respect to acceptable and unacceptable same-sex relations.

[40] At the supposed dramatic date of Agathon's dinner party (416), the Ionians were still part of the Athenian empire; they were later ceded to Persia to be "under foreign rule" (b7) by a peace treaty of 387/6. For this anachronism as an indication of the date when the dialogue was written, see Introduction, Appendix.

ἔργῳ δὲ | τοῦτο ἔμαθον καὶ οἱ ἐνθάδε τύραννοι· ὁ γὰρ
Ἀριστογείτονος ἔρως καὶ ἡ Ἁρμοδίου φιλία βέβαιος
γενομένη κατέλυσεν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀρχήν. οὕτως οὗ μὲν
d αἰσχρὸν ἐτέθη χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς, κακίᾳ τῶν θεμέ-
νων κεῖται, τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων πλεονεξίᾳ, τῶν δὲ ἀρ-
χομένων ἀνανδρίᾳ· οὗ δὲ καλὸν ἁπλῶς ἐνομίσθη, διὰ
τὴν τῶν θεμένων τῆς ψυχῆς ἀργίαν. ἐνθάδε δὲ πολὺ
τούτων κάλλιον νενομοθέτηται, καὶ | ὅπερ εἶπον, οὐ
ῥᾴδιον κατανοῆσαι. ἐνθυμηθέντι γὰρ ὅτι λέγεται κάλ-
λιον τὸ φανερῶς ἐρᾶν τοῦ λάθρᾳ, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν
γενναιοτάτων καὶ ἀρίστων, κἂν αἰσχίους ἄλλων ὦσι,
καὶ ὅτι αὖ ἡ παρακέλευσις τῷ ἐρῶντι παρὰ πάντων
θαυμαστή, οὐχ ὥς τι αἰσχρὸν ποιοῦντι, καὶ ἑλόντι τε
e καλὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἑλόντι αἰσχρόν, καὶ πρὸς τὸ
ἐπιχειρεῖν ἑλεῖν ἐξουσίαν ὁ νόμος δέδωκε τῷ ἐραστῇ
θαυμαστὰ ἔργα ἐργαζομένῳ ἐπαινεῖσθαι, ἃ εἴ τις τολ-
μῴη ποιεῖν ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν διώκων καὶ βουλόμενος δια-
183 πράξασθαι πλὴν τοῦτο, †φιλοσοφίας†[4] τὰ μέγιστα
καρποῖτ' ἂν ὀνείδη—εἰ γὰρ ἢ χρήματα βουλόμενος
παρά του λαβεῖν ἢ ἀρχὴν ἄρξαι ἤ τινα ἄλλην δύνα-
μιν ἐθέλοι ποιεῖν οἷάπερ οἱ ἐρασταὶ πρὸς τὰ παιδικά,
ἱκετείας | τε καὶ ἀντιβολήσεις ἐν ταῖς δεήσεσιν ποι-

[4] secl. Schleiermacher

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[41] See Thucydides 6.53–59. Harmodius and Aristogeiton had been responsible in 514 for assassinating Hipparchus, brother of the Athenian tyrant Hippias. The matching of the older partner Aristogeiton's *erōs* (love) with the younger Harmodius' *philia*

bring about. Our tyrants here too learned this from expe-
rience, for it was Aristogeiton's love and Harmodius'
friendship, when both grew steadfast, which destroyed
their rule.[41] Thus where it has been laid down that it is
shameful to gratify lovers, it is established by the bad char- d
acter of those who made the laws, the greed of the rulers
and the cowardliness of their subjects. But where it was
simply considered fine (*kalon*) it was on account of the
laziness of mind of the lawmakers. But here the conven-
tion is laid down in a much better way, and as I said, it's
not easy to grasp. For when we think that it's said to be
finer to love openly than in secret, and especially with the
noblest and the best, even if they are more ill-favored than
others; and again that the encouragement of the lover by
all is extraordinary, not to be expected for someone doing
anything shameful; and it is thought fine for him if he
catches his love, and shameful for him if he doesn't,
and that in his attempt to seduce his beloved, custom e
has given the lover the freedom to do, and be praised for
doing, extraordinary deeds, for which, if anyone were to
dare to do them in pursuit of anything else whatsoever,
and wanting to accomplish anything except this,[42] he 183
would incur the strongest reproaches—for if in wanting
either to gain money from someone, or political office,
or some other function, he were willing to do the sort
of things lovers do for their loved ones, begging them by
offering supplications and entreaties, and swearing oaths,

(friendship) precisely mirrors the asymmetry of the homosexual relationship (see General Introduction, §2).

42 Note φιλοσοφίας (183a1), which Burnet (OCT) and all editors regard as an intrusive error (see textual note).

ούμενοι, καὶ ὅρκους ὀμνύντες, καὶ κοιμήσεις ἐπὶ θύραις, καὶ ἐθέλοντες δουλείας δουλεύειν οἵας οὐδ᾽ ἂν δοῦλος οὐδείς, ἐμποδίζοιτο ἂν μὴ πράττειν οὕτω τὴν
b *πρᾶξιν καὶ ὑπὸ φίλων καὶ ὑπὸ ἐχθρῶν, τῶν μὲν ὀνειδιζόντων κολακείας καὶ ἀνελευθερίας, τῶν δὲ νουθετούντων καὶ αἰσχυνομένων ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν—τῷ δ᾽ ἐρῶντι πάντα ταῦτα ποιοῦντι χάρις ἔπεστι, καὶ δέδοται ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἄνευ ὀνείδους πράττειν, ὡς πάγκαλόν τι πρᾶγμα | διαπραττομένου· ὃ δὲ δεινότατον, ὥς γε λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοί, ὅτι καὶ ὀμνύντι μόνῳ συγγνώμη παρὰ θεῶν ἐκβάντι τῶν ὅρκων—ἀφροδίσιον γὰρ ὅρ-*
c *κον οὔ φασιν εἶναι· οὕτω καὶ οἱ θεοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι πᾶσαν ἐξουσίαν πεποιήκασι τῷ ἐρῶντι, ὡς ὁ νόμος φησὶν ὁ ἐνθάδε—ταύτῃ μὲν οὖν οἰηθείη ἄν τις πάγκαλον νομίζεσθαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν καὶ τὸ φίλους γίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἐρασταῖς. ἐπειδὰν δὲ παιδαγωγοὺς | ἐπιστήσαντες οἱ πατέρες τοῖς ἐρωμένοις μὴ ἐῶσι διαλέγεσθαι τοῖς ἐρασταῖς, καὶ τῷ παιδαγωγῷ ταῦτα προστεταγμένα ᾖ, ἡλικιῶται δὲ καὶ ἑταῖροι*
d *ὀνειδίζωσιν ἐάν τι ὁρῶσιν τοιοῦτον γιγνόμενον, καὶ τοὺς ὀνειδίζοντας αὖ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι μὴ διακωλύωσι μηδὲ λοιδορῶσιν ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντας, εἰς δὲ ταῦτά τις αὖ βλέψας ἡγήσαιτ᾽ ἂν πάλιν αἴσχιστον τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐνθάδε νομίζεσθαι. τὸ δὲ οἶμαι ὧδ᾽ ἔχει· οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἐστιν, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέχθη οὔτε καλὸν |*

lying down to sleep at their doors and being willing to perform slavish tasks such as no slave would do, he would be prevented from doing anything like this both by his friends and by his enemies, the one group reproaching b
him for his flattery and servility, the other telling him off and feeling ashamed of his activities—but a lover who does all these things finds favor and it is permitted by custom to do them without reproach on the grounds that he is doing a very fine thing.[43] But what is most extraordinary, at least as most people say, is that even in swearing oaths he alone is to be granted pardon by the gods when he breaks them—for they say a lover's oath is no oath. Thus both gods and men have given full license to the c
lover, as the convention here says—and so from this one would think that in this city it's considered a very fine thing both to be in love and to show affection to lovers. But when fathers put attendants in charge of those who are loved, and do not allow them to speak to their lovers, and these are the instructions given to the attendant, and the boys' contemporaries and companions reproach them if they see anything like this happening, and again their d
elders do not stop those who reproach them, and they do not abuse them for speaking out of turn; anyone looking at this would think that on the contrary such behavior is considered most shameful here.[44] But I think the situation is like this: it's no simple matter; as we said back at the

43 The translation of this long, straggling sentence (with no main verb directly answering "For when we think . . ." [182d5]) is intended to reflect the loosely connected Greek syntax.

44 For "double standards" in social attitudes to erotic relationships in Athenian society, see General Introduction, §2.

εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ οὔτε αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ καλῶς μὲν
πραττόμενον καλόν, αἰσχρῶς δὲ αἰσχρόν. αἰσχρῶς
μὲν οὖν ἐστι πονηρῷ τε καὶ πονηρῶς χαρίζεσθαι,
καλῶς δὲ χρηστῷ τε καὶ καλῶς. πονηρὸς δ᾿ ἐστὶν
ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἐραστὴς ὁ πάνδημος, ὁ τοῦ σώματος μᾶλ-
e λον ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρῶν· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ μόνιμός ἐστιν,
ἅτε οὐδὲ μονίμου ἐρῶν πράγματος. ἅμα γὰρ τῷ τοῦ
σώματος ἄνθει λήγοντι, οὗπερ ἤρα, "οἴχεται ἀποπτά-
μενος," πολλοὺς λόγους καὶ ὑποσχέσεις καταισχύ-
νας· | ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἤθους χρηστοῦ ὄντος ἐραστὴς διὰ βίου
184 μένει, ἅτε μονίμῳ συντακείς. τούτους δὴ βούλεται ὁ
ἡμέτερος νόμος εὖ καὶ καλῶς βασανίζειν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν
χαρίσασθαι, τοὺς δὲ διαφεύγειν. διὰ ταῦτα οὖν τοῖς
μὲν διώκειν παρακελεύεται, τοῖς δὲ φεύγειν, ἀγωνοθε-
τῶν καὶ βασανίζων ποτέρων ποτέ ἐστιν ὁ ἐρῶν καὶ
ποτέρων ὁ | ἐρώμενος. οὕτω δὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας
πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἁλίσκεσθαι ταχὺ αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται,
ἵνα χρόνος ἐγγένηται, ὃς δὴ δοκεῖ τὰ πολλὰ καλῶς
βασανίζειν, ἔπειτα τὸ ὑπὸ χρημάτων καὶ ὑπὸ πολιτι-
κῶν δυνάμεων ἁλῶναι αἰσχρόν, ἐάν τε κακῶς πάσχων
b πτήξῃ καὶ μὴ καρτερήσῃ, ἄν τ᾿ εὐεργετούμενος εἰς
χρήματα ἢ εἰς διαπράξεις πολιτικὰς μὴ καταφρο-
νήσῃ· οὐδὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ τούτων οὔτε βέβαιον οὔτε μό-
νιμον εἶναι, χωρὶς τοῦ μηδὲ πεφυκέναι ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν
γενναίαν | φιλίαν. μία δὴ λείπεται τῷ ἡμετέρῳ νόμῳ
ὁδός, εἰ μέλλει καλῶς χαριεῖσθαι ἐραστῇ παιδικά.

beginning, taken in isolation and by itself it is neither fine nor shameful, but if it is done well it is fine and if done badly, shameful. So if favors are granted to a worthless person in a worthless fashion, this is to act shamefully; to grant them to a decent person in a fine manner is to act in a fine way. Worthless is that lover, the common one, who
loves the body more than the soul: for he is not constant e
either, in that he is not the lover of anything lasting. For as the bloom of the body which he loved fades away 'he flies off and is gone'[45] having dishonored many words and promises. But he who is a lover of worthy character remains so for life in that he has become joined intimately
with something constant. It is these groups of people our 184
custom wants to put well and truly to the test, and to grant favors to one group and shun the other. This is why therefore our rule encourages one group to pursue, the other to flee by setting up a competition and testing which group the lover and which one the beloved belongs to. So this is the reason why firstly it is considered shameful to be caught quickly, so that a period of time may intervene, which seems to test most things well; secondly, why it is considered disgraceful to be caught by money and political influence if, having been treated badly, one cringes and
does not stand firm, or if in being offered favors with re- b
gard to money matters, or in the achievement of political aims, one does not despise the offers. For none of these things seems secure or lasting, quite apart from the fact that a noble friendship cannot not come from them. Indeed there is one way left according to our custom, if a loved one is going to grant his lover a favor in a fine way.

45 Homer, *Iliad* 2.71.

ἔστι γὰρ ἡμῖν νόμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐρασταῖς ἦν
δουλεύειν ἐθέλοντα ἡντινοῦν δουλείαν παιδικοῖς μὴ
c κολακείαν εἶναι μηδὲ ἐπονείδιστον, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἄλλη
μία μόνη δουλεία ἑκούσιος λείπεται οὐκ ἐπονείδιστος·
αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὴν ἀρετήν. νενόμισται γὰρ δὴ
ἡμῖν, ἐάν τις ἐθέλῃ τινὰ θεραπεύειν | ἡγούμενος δι'
ἐκεῖνον ἀμείνων ἔσεσθαι ἢ κατὰ σοφίαν τινὰ ἢ κατὰ
ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν μέρος ἀρετῆς, αὕτη αὖ ἡ ἐθελοδουλεία
οὐκ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι οὐδὲ κολακεία. δεῖ δὴ τὼ νόμω
τούτω συμβαλεῖν εἰς ταὐτόν, τόν τε περὶ τὴν παιδε-
ραστίαν καὶ τὸν περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλ-
d λην ἀρετήν, εἰ μέλλει συμβῆναι καλὸν γενέσθαι τὸ
ἐραστῇ παιδικὰ χαρίσασθαι. ὅταν γὰρ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ
ἔλθωσιν ἐραστής τε καὶ παιδικά, νόμον ἔχων ἑκάτε-
ρος, ὁ μὲν χαρισαμένοις παιδικοῖς | ὑπηρετῶν ὁτιοῦν
δικαίως ἂν ὑπηρετεῖν, ὁ δὲ τῷ ποιοῦντι αὐτὸν σοφόν
τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν δικαίως αὖ ὁτιοῦν ἂν ὑπουργῶν <ὑπουρ-
γεῖν>, καὶ ὁ μὲν δυνάμενος εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἄλ-
e λην ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι, ὁ δὲ δεόμενος εἰς παίδευ-
σιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν κτᾶσθαι, τότε δὴ τούτων
συνιόντων εἰς ταὐτὸν τῶν νόμων μοναχοῦ ἐνταῦθα
συμπίπτει τὸ καλὸν εἶναι παιδικὰ ἐραστῇ χαρίσα-
σθαι, ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ. ἐπὶ | τούτῳ καὶ ἐξαπατηθῆ-
ναι οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι καὶ ἐξ-
185 απατωμένῳ αἰσχύνην φέρει καὶ μή. εἰ γάρ τις ἐραστῇ
ὡς πλουσίῳ πλούτου ἕνεκα χαρισάμενος ἐξαπατηθείη

For we have a convention, just as it was possible for lovers
to carry out voluntarily any servile acts whatever for their
loved one without it being regarded as flattery or worthy
of reproach, so there is left also only one other kind of c
voluntary enslavement that is irreproachable: this is en-
slavement which relates to excellence.[46] For we take the
view that, if one wishes to cultivate someone with the idea
that through that person he will be better either in terms
of some kind of wisdom, or any other aspect whatever of
excellence, then this voluntary servitude is neither shame-
ful nor is it flattery. We must then combine these two
conventions into one: the one concerning loving of boys
and the other concerning love of wisdom and other kinds
of excellence, if it is to turn out that it is a fine thing for a d
beloved to gratify his lover. For when a lover and his be-
loved come together, each with his own rule, the one be-
lieving that in serving in whatever way the beloved who
has granted him his favor, he is right to serve, and the other
who thinks that submitting to the person making him wise
and good, he is right to submit in any way whatsoever, the
one being able to contribute to his good judgment and his
excellence in general, and the other wanting to acquire it e
for his education and wisdom in general: then it is when
these principles come together into one, and here alone,
that it turns out to be fine for a beloved to gratify his lover;
otherwise in no other circumstances. And in this situation
even to have been misled is nothing to be ashamed of: but
in all other instances it brings shame upon someone
whether one has been misled or not. For if someone were 185
to gratify his lover in the belief that he's rich, for the sake

46 "Excellence" or "virtue" = *aretē*.

καὶ μὴ λάβοι χρήματα, ἀναφανέντος τοῦ ἐραστοῦ πένητος, οὐδὲν ἧττον αἰσχρόν· δοκεῖ γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος τό γε αὑτοῦ ἐπιδεῖξαι, ὅτι ἕνεκα χρημάτων ὁτιοῦν ἂν ὁτῳοῦν ὑπηρετοῖ, | τοῦτο δὲ οὐ καλόν. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ λόγον κἂν εἴ τις ὡς ἀγαθῷ χαρισάμενος καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς ἀμείνων ἐσόμενος διὰ τὴν φιλίαν ἐραστοῦ ἐξαπατηθείη, ἀναφανέντος ἐκείνου κακοῦ καὶ οὐ κεκτημένου
b *ἀρετήν, ὅμως καλὴ ἡ ἀπάτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ αὖ καὶ οὗτος τὸ καθ' αὑτὸν δεδηλωκέναι, ὅτι ἀρετῆς γ' ἕνεκα καὶ τοῦ βελτίων γενέσθαι πᾶν ἂν παντὶ προθυμηθείη, τοῦτο δὲ αὖ πάντων κάλλιστον· οὕτω πᾶν πάντως γε καλὸν | ἀρετῆς γ' ἕνεκα χαρίζεσθαι. οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τῆς οὐρανίας θεοῦ ἔρως καὶ οὐράνιος καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξιος καὶ πόλει καὶ ἰδιώταις, πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀναγκάζων ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν τόν τε ἐρῶντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ*
c *καὶ τὸν ἐρώμενον· οἱ δ' ἕτεροι πάντες τῆς ἑτέρας, τῆς πανδήμου. ταῦτά σοι, ἔφη, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα, ὦ Φαῖδρε, περὶ Ἔρωτος συμβάλλομαι.*

Παυσανίου δὲ παυσαμένου—διδάσκουσι γάρ με ἴσα λέγειν | οὑτωσὶ οἱ σοφοί—ἔφη ὁ Ἀριστόδημος

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[47] The two words *Pausaniou . . . pausamenou* (When Pausanias had paused) balance as two similar-sounding four-syllable words. The narrator, Apollodorus, speaking in his own person (and incidentally reminding us that he is still recounting the whole event to his companion as they walk toward Athens), refers by implication to Pausanias' somewhat convoluted style and the

of his money, and was misled and received none when his lover was revealed to be poor, it would be no less shameful. For such a person seems to be showing himself up for what he is, in that he would do any service whatever for anyone whatever for the sake of money, and this would not be a fine thing. By the same argument, even if one were to grant favors to an apparently good man, in order to be a better person oneself through the affection of the lover, and were to be deceived when that man had been exposed as bad and not in possession of any virtue, nevertheless the deception would be a fine thing. For this person too in his b
turn seems to have revealed his own character, that for the sake of excellence and becoming a better person he would be eager to do anything for anyone and that, moreover, would be the finest motive of all. Therefore it is entirely fine to grant every favor in all circumstances, provided that it is for the sake of excellence. This is the love of the heavenly goddess, itself heavenly and of great value both to the state and to individuals, compelling both the lover to take every care of himself with regard to his virtue, and the loved one also. But as for all the rest they belong to c
the other goddess, the common love. This then, he said, is what I am contributing to you, on the spur of the moment, Phaedrus, on the subject of Love."

When Pausanias had paused—you see the experts teach me to speak in this balanced manner[47]—Aristode-

highly wrought rhetoric practiced by the "experts," the sophists, undercutting, incidentally, Pausanias' claim to be speaking "on the spur of the moment" [c3]).

δεῖν μὲν Ἀριστοφάνη λέγειν, τυχεῖν δὲ αὐτῷ τινα ἢ
ὑπὸ πλησμονῆς ἢ ὑπό τινος ἄλλου λύγγα ἐπιπεπτω-
κυῖαν καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰπεῖν αὐτόν—
ἐν τῇ κάτω γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸν ἰατρὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον κατα-
d κεῖσθαι—"Ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, δίκαιος εἶ ἢ παῦσαί με τῆς
λυγγὸς ἢ λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ, ἕως ἂν ἐγὼ παύσωμαι."
καὶ τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον εἰπεῖν "Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ἀμφότερα
ταῦτα· | ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἐρῶ ἐν τῷ σῷ μέρει, σὺ δ᾽ ἐπει-
δὰν παύσῃ, ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ. ἐν ᾧ δ᾽ ἂν ἐγὼ λέγω, ἐὰν μέν
σοι ἐθέλῃ ἀπνευστὶ ἔχοντι πολὺν χρόνον παύεσθαι ἡ
e λύγξ· εἰ δὲ μή, ὕδατι ἀνακογχυλίασον. εἰ δ᾽ ἄρα πάνυ
ἰσχυρά ἐστιν, ἀναλαβών τι τοιοῦτον οἵῳ κινήσαις ἂν
τὴν ῥῖνα, πτάρε· καὶ ἐὰν τοῦτο ποιήσῃς ἅπαξ ἢ δίς,
καὶ εἰ πάνυ ἰσχυρά ἐστι, παύσεται." "Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις
λέγων," φάναι τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη· "ἐγὼ | δὲ ταῦτα ποι-
ήσω."

Εἰπεῖν δὴ τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον:

Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ Παυσα-
νίας ὁρμήσας ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον καλῶς οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἀπε-
τέλεσε, δεῖν ἐμὲ πειρᾶσθαι τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τῷ λόγῳ.
186 τὸ μὲν γὰρ διπλοῦν εἶναι τὸν Ἔρωτα δοκεῖ μοι καλῶς
διελέσθαι· ὅτι δὲ οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν
ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα
πολλὰ | καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς τε σώμασι τῶν πάν-
των ζῴων καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ γῇ φυομένοις καὶ ὡς ἔπος
εἰπεῖν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσι, καθεωρακέναι μοι δοκῶ ἐκ

mus said that it was Aristophanes' turn to speak, but it happened that either from eating too much or from some other cause he had an attack of the hiccups and not being able to make his speech, he said: "Eryximachus"—the doctor Eryximachus was lying on the couch below him—"you're just the right man either to stop my hiccups, d
or speak in my place until I can stop them myself." And Eryximachus said, "Well, I shall do both of these things: I shall speak in your place, and when you stop, you can speak in mine. And while I'm speaking, if you hold your breath for a long time, your hiccups may be inclined to stop; but if not, gargle with some water. But if they actually e
take a strong hold of you, take something you can tickle your nose with and sneeze; and if you do this once or twice, even if they are quite persistent, they will stop." "So the sooner you start speaking the better" said Aristophanes, "and I shall do what you advise."

The Speech of Eryximachus

So Eryximachus began to speak:

"I think it's incumbent upon me, since Pausanias embarked on his speech well, but didn't bring it to a satisfactory conclusion, to attempt to round off what he said. That 186
Love has a double aspect seems to me to show good discernment: but that it's not only in the souls of men reacting to those who are beautiful, but also in relation to many other things and in other things, the bodies of all animals and the things that grow in the earth and, so to speak, in all that exists, this I think I have observed from medical

b τῆς ἰατρικῆς, τῆς ἡμετέρας τέχνης, ὡς μέγας καὶ θαυμαστὸς καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει καὶ κατ' ἀνθρώπινα καὶ κατὰ θεῖα πράγματα. ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς λέγων, ἵνα καὶ πρεσβεύωμεν τὴν τέχνην. ἡ γὰρ φύσις τῶν σωμάτων τὸν διπλοῦν Ἔρωτα τοῦτον ἔχει· | τὸ γὰρ ὑγιὲς τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὸ νοσοῦν ὁμολογουμένως ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀνόμοιον ἀνομοίων ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ἐρᾷ. ἄλλος μὲν οὖν ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὑγιεινῷ ἔρως, ἄλλος δὲ ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ νοσώδει. ἔστιν δή, ὥσπερ ἄρτι Παυσανίας ἔλεγεν τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς καλὸν χαρίζεσθαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τοῖς δ' ἀκολάστοις
c αἰσχρόν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς σώμασιν τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ἑκάστου τοῦ σώματος καὶ ὑγιεινοῖς καλὸν χαρίζεσθαι καὶ δεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ᾧ ὄνομα τὸ ἰατρικόν, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς καὶ νοσώδεσιν αἰσχρόν τε καὶ δεῖ ἀχαριστεῖν, | εἰ μέλλει τις τεχνικὸς εἶναι. ἔστι γὰρ ἰατρική, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, ἐπιστήμη τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐρωτικῶν πρὸς πλησμονὴν καὶ κένωσιν, καὶ ὁ διαγιγνώσκων ἐν τούτοις τὸν καλόν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν
d ἔρωτα, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἰατρικώτατος, καὶ ὁ μεταβάλλειν ποιῶν, ὥστε ἀντὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἔρωτος τὸν ἕτερον κτᾶσθαι, καὶ οἷς μὴ ἔνεστιν ἔρως, δεῖ δ' ἐγγενέσθαι, ἐπιστάμενος ἐμποιῆσαι καὶ ἐνόντα ἐξελεῖν, ἀγαθὸς ἂν

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[48] For Eros (Love) as a cosmic force, and its opposing counterpart, Eris (Strife), see the Pre-Socratic philosopher Empedocles (DK 31B17, Waterfield, 147–48).

practice, my profession, seeing how the god, great and b
marvelous, reaches into everything, the affairs of men and gods alike.[48] I shall begin my speech from medicine so that we may also give pride of place to that profession. You see it is the nature of our bodies to have this double Love; for the healthy part of the body and the sick part are by common agreement separate and unlike each other, and the unlike craves for and loves what is unlike.[49] So love in the one who is healthy is one thing and love in the sick is another. Indeed just as Pausanias was saying just now, that it is fine to gratify those among men who are good, and shameful to gratify those who are licentious, so too in bod- c
ies themselves it is fine to gratify the good and healthy parts of each body, and one should do so, and this is what the term medical expertise relates to; but indulging those parts which are bad and sickly is shameful, and they must not be favored if one is going to be proficient. For the art of medicine, to put it concisely, is the understanding of the erotic desires of the body in respect of repletion and depletion,[50] and the one who distinguishes in these the fine love and the shameful love, that man is supremely expert d
in medicine, and the one who brings about changes so as to obtain one kind of love in place of the other, and needs to generate it where there is no love, knowing how to implant it, and remove it when it is present, would be a

49 For appetites in the sick and the healthy body, see the Hippocratic *On Ancient Medicine* 20.

50 "Repletion and depletion": the idea of health as a balance of elements in the body by the careful operation of *plēsmonē* and *kenōsis* and the right balance of opposites (see d6–e1) was a basic assumption of Greek medical theory.

εἴη | δημιουργός. δεῖ γὰρ δὴ τὰ ἔχθιστα ὄντα ἐν τῷ
σώματι φίλα οἷόν τ' εἶναι ποιεῖν καὶ ἐρᾶν ἀλλήλων.
ἔστι δὲ ἔχθιστα τὰ ἐναντιώτατα, ψυχρὸν θερμῷ, πι-
e κρὸν γλυκεῖ, ξηρὸν ὑγρῷ, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· τούτοις
ἐπιστηθεὶς ἔρωτα ἐμποιῆσαι καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ὁ ἡμέτερος
πρόγονος Ἀσκληπιός, ὥς φασιν οἵδε οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ
ἐγὼ πείθομαι, συνέστησεν τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην. ἥ τε
οὖν ἰατρική, ὥσπερ λέγω, πᾶσα διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τούτου
κυβερνᾶται, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ γυμναστικὴ καὶ γεωρ-
187 γία· μουσικὴ δὲ καὶ παντὶ κατάδηλος τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν
προσέχοντι τὸν νοῦν ὅτι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει τούτοις,
ὥσπερ ἴσως καὶ Ἡράκλειτος βούλεται λέγειν, ἐπεὶ
τοῖς γε ῥήμασιν οὐ καλῶς λέγει. τὸ | ἓν γάρ φησι
"διαφερόμενον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ συμφέρεσθαι," "ὥσπερ ἁρ-
μονίαν τόξου τε καὶ λύρας." ἔστι δὲ πολλὴ ἀλογία
ἁρμονίαν φάναι διαφέρεσθαι ἢ ἐκ διαφερομένων ἔτι
εἶναι. ἀλλὰ ἴσως τόδε ἐβούλετο λέγειν, ὅτι ἐκ δια-
φερομένων πρότερον τοῦ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, ἔπειτα
ὕστερον ὁμολογησάντων γέγονεν ὑπὸ τῆς μουσικῆς
b τέχνης. οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐκ διαφερομένων γε ἔτι τοῦ
ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος ἁρμονία ἂν εἴη· ἡ γὰρ ἁρμονία συμ-
φωνία ἐστίν, συμφωνία δὲ ὁμολογία | τις—ὁμολογίαν
δὲ ἐκ διαφερομένων, |ἕως ἂν διαφέρωνται, ἀδύνατον
εἶναι· διαφερόμενον δὲ αὖ καὶ μὴ ὁμολογοῦν ἀδύνατον

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[51] The legendary founder of medicine. "These poets here" include Agathon and Aristophanes.

good practitioner. For what he must do is to make the most
hostile elements in the body benign and love each other.
The most hostile are the most opposite: cold to hot, bitter
to sweet, dry to wet: all such things. With his understand- e
ing of implanting love and harmony in these elements, our
ancestor Asclepius established our profession, as these
poets here say and as I am persuaded.[51] Therefore, as I
say, all medicine is guided by means of this god, and, in
the same sort of way, so are gymnastics and agriculture.
It's clear to everyone too, even if they are paying little at- 187
tention, that music belongs with these on the same prin-
ciples, just as perhaps Heraclitus also means when he ex-
presses it, though by his actual wording not very well. You
see he says that the one 'being at variance with itself is in
agreement,' 'just like the harmony of a bow and a lyre.'[52]
It is quite illogical to say that a harmony is at variance, or
it still exists when being drawn in different directions. But
perhaps what he meant to say was this, that it came to be
from the high and the low note, being previously drawn
apart, then brought into agreement later by the art of
music. For surely there could not be harmony from the b
high and low when they are still drawn apart. For harmony
is a sounding together, and sounding together is a kind of
agreement—and it's impossible for agreement to come
from elements which are at variance for as long as they are
at variance, and again, impossible to harmonize that which
is being drawn apart and is not in agreement—just as

[52] Heraclitus, DK B51 (Waterfield 40). Heraclitus (early 5th century) was notorious for the obscurity of his language, and his theory of the tension between opposites was generally misunderstood, as it certainly is by Eryximachus here.

ἁρμόσαι—ὥσπερ γε καὶ ὁ ῥυθμὸς ἐκ τοῦ ταχέος καὶ βραδέος, ἐκ διενηνεγμένων πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ ὁμο-
c *λογησάντων γέγονε. τὴν δὲ ὁμολογίαν πᾶσι τούτοις, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἡ ἰατρική, ἐνταῦθα ἡ μουσικὴ ἐντίθησιν, ἔρωτα καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἀλλήλων ἐμποιήσασα· καὶ ἔστιν αὖ μουσικὴ περὶ | ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἐρωτικῶν ἐπιστήμη. καὶ ἐν μέν γε αὐτῇ τῇ συστάσει ἁρμονίας τε καὶ ῥυθμοῦ οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν τὰ ἐρωτικὰ διαγιγνώσκειν, οὐδὲ ὁ διπλοῦς ἔρως ἐνταῦθά πω ἔστιν· ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὰν δέῃ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καταχρῆσθαι ῥυθμῷ τε καὶ*
d *ἁρμονίᾳ ἢ ποιοῦντα, ὃ δὴ μελοποιίαν καλοῦσιν, ἢ χρώμενον ὀρθῶς τοῖς πεποιημένοις μέλεσί τε καὶ μέτροις, ὃ δὴ παιδεία ἐκλήθη, ἐνταῦθα δὴ καὶ χαλεπὸν καὶ ἀγαθοῦ δημιουργοῦ δεῖ. πάλιν γὰρ ἥκει ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν | κοσμίοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὡς ἂν κοσμιώτεροι γίγνοιντο οἱ μήπω ὄντες, δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ φυλάττειν τὸν τούτων ἔρωτα, καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ καλός, ὁ οὐράνιος, ὁ τῆς Οὐρανίας μούσης Ἔρως·*
e *ὁ δὲ Πολυμνίας ὁ πάνδημος, ὃν δεῖ εὐλαβούμενον προσφέρειν οἷς ἂν προσφέρῃ, ὅπως ἂν τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν αὐτοῦ καρπώσηται, ἀκολασίαν δὲ μηδεμίαν ἐμποιήσῃ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ μέγα ἔργον ταῖς περὶ τὴν ὀψοποιικὴν | τέχνην ἐπιθυμίαις καλῶς χρῆσθαι, ὥστ᾽ ἄνευ νόσου τὴν ἡδονὴν καρπώσασθαι. καὶ ἐν μουσικῇ δὴ καὶ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι*

rhythm too, comes about from the quick and the slow, elements having been at variance previously, coming later into agreement. So agreement in all these things, just as c in the previous example medicine, is supplied here by music, by putting in them love and unanimity with each other. Music is, in its turn, the understanding of the elements of love in relation to harmony and rhythm. And there is no difficulty in distinguishing the element of love in the structure of both harmony and rhythm itself, nor does twofold love yet exist here. But when it is necessary to apply both rhythm and harmony to human beings, either by creating it, which they call composing music, or d using correctly tunes and rhythms already composed, which is called education, this is really where it is difficult and needs a good practitioner. For the same argument as before returns, that it is to the people who are orderly[53] that one must grant favors, and in such a way that those who are not yet so may become more orderly, and one must protect the love of these people. This is the beautiful Love, the heavenly one, the Love which comes from the heavenly Muse. But the commonplace Love is from e Polymnia,[54] and he should be applied with care to those to whom one applies him, so that the pleasure coming from him may be enjoyed, but that he may not implant any intemperance, just as in our profession it is a big task to deal well with the desires relating to cookery, so that the pleasure may be enjoyed without sickness. Both in music, then, and in medicine and in all the other human and di-

[53] "Orderly" = *kosmios*, that is, having the right balance of elements. [54] The name suggests multiplicity. Polymnia is listed by Hesiod as one of the Muses (*Theogony* 75–79).

*καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρωπείοις καὶ τοῖς θείοις, καθ' ὅσον παρεί-
κει, φυλακτέον ἑκάτερον τὸν Ἔρωτα· ἔνεστον γάρ.
188 ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ τῶν ὡρῶν τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ σύστασις μεστή
ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, καὶ ἐπειδὰν μὲν πρὸς ἄλ-
ληλα τοῦ κοσμίου τύχῃ ἔρωτος ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον,
τά τε θερμὰ καὶ τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ ξηρὰ καὶ ὑγρά, καὶ
ἁρμονίαν καὶ κρᾶσιν λάβῃ | σώφρονα, ἥκει φέροντα
εὐετηρίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
ζῴοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἠδίκησεν· ὅταν δὲ ὁ
μετὰ τῆς ὕβρεως Ἔρως ἐγκρατέστερος περὶ τὰς τοῦ
ἐνιαυτοῦ ὥρας γένηται, διέφθειρέν τε πολλὰ καὶ ἠδί-
b κησεν. οἵ τε γὰρ λοιμοὶ φιλοῦσι γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν
τοιούτων καὶ ἄλλα ἀνόμοια πολλὰ νοσήματα καὶ τοῖς
θηρίοις καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς· καὶ γὰρ πάχναι καὶ χάλαζαι
καὶ ἐρυσῖβαι ἐκ πλεονεξίας καὶ ἀκοσμίας περὶ ἄλ-
ληλα τῶν τοιούτων γίγνεται | ἐρωτικῶν, ὧν ἐπιστήμη
περὶ ἄστρων τε φορὰς καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν ὥρας ἀστρονομία
καλεῖται. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ αἱ θυσίαι πᾶσαι καὶ οἷς μαν-
τικὴ ἐπιστατεῖ—ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ θεούς τε καὶ
c ἀνθρώπους πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία—οὐ περὶ ἄλλο
τί ἐστιν ἢ περὶ Ἔρωτος φυλακήν τε καὶ ἴασιν. πᾶσα
γὰρ ἀσέβεια φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἐὰν μή τις τῷ κοσμίῳ
Ἔρωτι χαρίζηται μηδὲ τιμᾷ τε αὐτὸν καὶ πρεσβεύῃ
ἐν παντὶ ἔργῳ, | ἀλλὰ τὸν ἕτερον, καὶ περὶ γονέας
καὶ ζῶντας καὶ τετελευτηκότας καὶ περὶ θεούς· ἃ δὴ
προστέτακται τῇ μαντικῇ ἐπισκοπεῖν τοὺς ἐρῶντας
d καὶ ἰατρεύειν, καὶ ἔστιν αὖ ἡ μαντικὴ φιλίας θεῶν καὶ
ἀνθρώπων δημιουργὸς τῷ ἐπίστασθαι τὰ κατὰ ἀν-*

vine pursuits, as far as circumstances permit, we must look
out for each kind of Love. For both are present. Take note 188
that even the seasons of the year are in their composition full of both of these Loves, and when those elements I was talking about just now, hot and cold, dry and wet, come together under the influence of the orderly love and take on a temperate harmony and combination, they come bringing prosperity and health to men and other animals and plants, and do no harm. But when the Love combined with violence becomes more powerful in relation to the seasons of the year, he destroys and damages a great deal.
For plagues usually come about as a result of such things, b
as do many other kinds of abnormal illness, afflicting both animals and plants. For frost and hail and blight come about as a result of excess and disorderliness among such kinds of erotic influences in relation to each other, the understanding of which, relating to the courses of the stars and the seasons of the year is called astronomy. There again, all sacrifices and those things divination has control over—that is the association of gods and men with each
other—are about nothing other than what relates to the c
guarding and the healing power relating to Love. For all impiety usually occurs if one does not gratify the orderly Love and does not honor him and give him precedence in every action, but favors the other one, both as regards parents, alive or dead, and the gods. This is what has been ordained for divination, to oversee lovers and heal them,
and again divination is a worker for friendship between d
gods and men through its understanding of the affairs of

θρώπους ἐρωτικά, ὅσα τείνει πρὸς θέμιν καὶ εὐσέ-
βειαν.[5]

Οὕτω πολλὴν καὶ μεγάλην, μᾶλλον δὲ πᾶσαν δύ-
ναμιν ἔχει | συλλήβδην μὲν ὁ πᾶς Ἔρως, ὁ δὲ περὶ
τἀγαθὰ μετὰ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀποτε-
λούμενος καὶ παρ᾿ ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς, οὗτος τὴν
μεγίστην δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ πᾶσαν ἡμῖν εὐδαιμονίαν
παρασκευάζει καὶ ἀλλήλοις δυναμένους ὁμιλεῖν καὶ
e φίλους εἶναι καὶ τοῖς κρείττοσιν ἡμῶν θεοῖς. ἴσως μὲν
οὖν καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Ἔρωτα ἐπαινῶν πολλὰ παραλείπω,
οὐ μέντοι ἑκών γε. ἀλλ᾿ εἴ τι ἐξέλιπον, σὸν ἔργον, ὦ
Ἀριστόφανες, ἀναπληρῶσαι· ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως ἐν νῷ
ἔχεις ἐγκωμιάζειν τὸν θεόν, ἐγκωμίαζε, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῆς
λυγγὸς πέπαυσαι.

189 Ἐκδεξάμενον οὖν ἔφη εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη ὅτι
Καὶ μάλ᾿ ἐπαύσατο, οὐ μέντοι πρίν γε τὸν πταρμὸν
προσενεχθῆναι αὐτῇ, ὥστε με θαυμάζειν εἰ τὸ κό-
σμιον τοῦ σώματος ἐπιθυμεῖ τοιούτων ψόφων καὶ
γαργαλισμῶν, οἷον καὶ ὁ πταρμός | ἐστιν· πάνυ γὰρ
εὐθὺς ἐπαύσατο, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ τὸν πταρμὸν προσ-
ήνεγκα.

Καὶ τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, Ὠγαθέ, φάναι, Ἀριστόφανες,
ὅρα τί ποιεῖς. γελωτοποιεῖς μέλλων λέγειν, καὶ φύ-

[5] εὐσέβειαν Stobaeus: ἀσέβειαν BTW

human love as far as they tend toward right and reverence.[55]

"Love has so much and such great power, or rather total power taken as a whole, but the Love which is concerned with the good and accomplished with moderation and justice both among us and among the gods—this is the one that has the greatest power and provides all happiness for us and enables us to get along with each other and be friends, and so too with those greater than us, the gods.
Now, perhaps I too have left out a great deal in my praise e
of Love; certainly however, I've not done it deliberately. But if I have left something out, then it's your job, Aristophanes, to fill in the gap; or if you intend to praise the god in some other way, then praise him, since you have stopped hiccupping."

So then, he said, Aristophanes took over and said: "the 189
hiccups certainly have stopped, though not before applying the sneeze cure to them, which leaves me amazed that it's the orderly part of the body which is keen on such noises and ticklings, such as the sneeze actually is.[56] You see they stopped straight away when I applied the sneeze to it."

And Eryximachus said: "My dear Aristophanes, look at what you're doing: in getting ready to speak you're raising

[55] Right = *themis*, "good order, sanction" (personified as a goddess in Hesiod, *Theogony* 135 as daughter of Gaia and Ouranos). Reverence = *eusebeia* (the MSS have a variant *asebeia* = "impiety" [see textual note], which would also fit the context).

[56] "The orderly part" = *to kosmion*: a sly dig at Eryximachus' speech (cf. 187d5).

λακά με τοῦ λόγου ἀναγκάζεις γίγνεσθαι τοῦ σεαυτοῦ, ἐάν τι γελοῖον εἴπῃς, ἐξόν σοι ἐν εἰρήνῃ λέγειν.

b Καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη γελάσαντα εἰπεῖν Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, καί μοι ἔστω ἄρρητα τὰ εἰρημένα. ἀλλὰ μή με | φύλαττε, ὡς ἐγὼ φοβοῦμαι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ῥηθήσεσθαι, οὔ τι μὴ γελοῖα εἴπω—τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἂν κέρδος εἴη καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας μούσης ἐπιχώριον—ἀλλὰ μὴ καταγέλαστα.

Βαλών γε, φάναι, ὦ Ἀριστόφανες, οἴει ἐκφεύξεσθαι· ἀλλὰ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν καὶ οὕτως λέγε ὡς δώσων λόγον. ἴσως μέντοι, ἂν δόξῃ μοι, ἀφήσω σε.

c Καὶ μήν, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη, ἄλλῃ γέ πῃ ἐν νῷ ἔχω λέγειν ᾗ ᾗ σύ τε καὶ Παυσανίας εἰπέτην. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι παντάπασι τὴν τοῦ ἔρωτος | δύναμιν οὐκ ᾐσθῆσθαι, ἐπεὶ αἰσθανόμενοί γε μέγιστ᾽ ἂν αὐτοῦ ἱερὰ κατασκευάσαι καὶ βωμούς, καὶ θυσίας ἂν ποιεῖν μεγίστας, οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν τούτων οὐδὲν γίγνεται περὶ αὐτόν, δέον πάντων μάλι-
d στα γίγνεσθαι. ἔστι γὰρ θεῶν φιλανθρωπότατος, ἐπίκουρός τε ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἰατρὸς τούτων ὧν ἰαθέντων μεγίστη εὐδαιμονία ἂν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ γένει εἴη. ἐγὼ οὖν πειράσομαι ὑμῖν εἰσηγήσασθαι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι ἔσεσθε. | δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ὑμᾶς μαθεῖν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν καὶ τὰ παθήματα αὐτῆς. ἡ γὰρ πάλαι ἡμῶν φύσις

a laugh and forcing me to keep an eye on your speech in case you say something ridiculous when you could speak in peace."

Aristophanes laughed and said: "You're right, Eryximachus; let what I've said be unsaid. But don't keep an eye on me, because my fear of what I'm about to say is not that I say something humorous—for this would be to my advantage and in the territory of my Muse—but in case I shall say something ridiculous." b

"Aristophanes," he replied, "you fired away at me, and think you're going to get away with it! Well, pay attention and talk as if you're going to be held to account. You never know, perhaps I'll let you off, if I feel like it."

The Speech of Aristophanes

"Well now, Eryximachus," said Aristophanes, "I do intend c
to speak differently from the way both you and Pausanias spoke. You see it seems to me that people have completely failed to perceive the power of love, since if they had realized it, they would have built the biggest temples and altars in his name, and performed the biggest sacrifices, not as now when none of these is done for him, though he deserves it most of all. For he is the most benevolent of
gods, being man's ally and healer of those ills which, when d
cured, would be the source of the greatest happiness for the human race. Therefore I shall try to explain his power to you, and you shall be the teachers of others. First you must understand the nature of human beings and what has happened to it. For once upon a time our natural form was

οὐχ αὐτὴ ἦν ἥπερ νῦν, ἀλλ' ἀλλοία. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ
τρία ἦν τὰ γένη τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν
e δύο, ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρίτον προσῆν κοινὸν
ὂν ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, οὗ νῦν ὄνομα λοιπόν, αὐτὸ δὲ
ἠφάνισται· ἀνδρόγυνον γὰρ ἓν τότε μὲν ἦν καὶ εἶδος
καὶ ὄνομα ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων κοινὸν τοῦ τε ἄρρενος καὶ
θήλεος, νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐν ὀνείδει | ὄνομα
κείμενον. ἔπειτα ὅλον ἦν ἑκάστου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ
εἶδος στρογγύλον, νῶτον καὶ πλευρὰς κύκλῳ ἔχον,
χεῖρας δὲ τέτταρας εἶχε, καὶ σκέλη τὰ ἴσα ταῖς χερ-
σίν, καὶ πρόσωπα δύ' ἐπ' αὐχένι κυκλοτερεῖ, ὅμοια
190 πάντῃ· κεφαλὴν δ' ἐπ' ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς προσώποις
ἐναντίοις κειμένοις μίαν, καὶ ὦτα τέτταρα, καὶ αἰδοῖα
δύο, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὡς ἀπὸ τούτων ἄν τις εἰκάσειεν.
ἐπορεύετο δὲ καὶ ὀρθὸν ὥσπερ | νῦν, ὁποτέρωσε βου-
ληθείη· καὶ ὁπότε ταχὺ ὁρμήσειεν θεῖν, ὥσπερ οἱ
κυβιστῶντες καὶ εἰς ὀρθὸν τὰ σκέλη περιφερόμενοι
κυβιστῶσι κύκλῳ, ὀκτὼ τότε οὖσι τοῖς μέλεσιν ἀπ-
b ερειδόμενοι ταχὺ ἐφέροντο κύκλῳ. ἦν δὲ διὰ ταῦτα
τρία τὰ γένη καὶ τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἄρρεν ἦν τοῦ
ἡλίου τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔκγονον, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ τῆς γῆς, τὸ δὲ
ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον τῆς σελήνης, ὅτι καὶ ἡ σελήνη
ἀμφοτέρων μετέχει· περιφερῆ δὲ δὴ ἦν καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ
ἡ πορεία αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ τοῖς γονεῦσιν | ὅμοια εἶναι. ἦν
οὖν τὴν ἰσχὺν δεινὰ καὶ τὴν ῥώμην, καὶ τὰ φρονή-
ματα μεγάλα εἶχον, ἐπεχείρησαν δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ ὃ
λέγει Ὅμηρος περὶ Ἐφιάλτου τε καὶ Ὤτου, περὶ ἐκεί-
νων λέγεται, τὸ εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάβασιν ἐπιχειρεῖν

not the same as we have now, but different. First of all
there were three kinds of human being, not two as now,
male and female, but in addition there was a third one e
which combined the nature of both of these, whose name
still exists, but the kind itself has disappeared. For at that
time there was one kind which was androgynous in form
and had a name common to both male and female, but the
name no longer exists except as a term of reproach. Sec-
ondly the form of each human being was completely
round, its back and sides being formed in a circle, and it
had four hands and the same number of legs as hands, and
two faces, alike in every way, on a circular neck; a single 190
head for the two faces which faced in opposite directions,
and four ears, and two sets of genitals and all the rest as
you might guess from all this. It walked upright, as now,
in whichever direction was required; and when it started
to run quickly, just as tumblers bringing their legs round
upright turn head over heels in a circle, they were quickly
carried round in circular motion, supporting themselves
on what were then eight limbs. The reason that there were b
three kinds and of this sort, was that the male was origi-
nally a descendant of the sun, the female of the earth, and
the one which shared both was from the moon, because
the moon also shares in both kinds. They themselves and
the way they moved were circular owing to their resem-
blance to their parents. Now in their strength and power
they were formidable and they had big ideas; they made
an attempt on the gods, and what Homer says about Ephi-
altes and Otus is said about them, that they tried to make

c ποιεῖν, ὡς ἐπιθησομένων τοῖς θεοῖς. ὁ οὖν Ζεὺς καὶ
οἱ ἄλλοι θεοὶ ἐβουλεύοντο ὅτι χρὴ αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι,
καὶ ἠπόρουν· οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως ἀποκτείναιεν εἶχον καὶ
ὥσπερ τοὺς γίγαντας κεραυνώσαντες τὸ γένος ἀφα-
νίσαιεν—αἱ τιμαὶ | γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἱερὰ τὰ παρὰ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων ἠφανίζετο—οὔτε ὅπως ἐῷεν ἀσελγαίνειν.
μόγις δὴ ὁ Ζεὺς ἐννοήσας λέγει ὅτι "Δοκῶ μοι," ἔφη,
"ἔχειν μηχανήν, ὡς ἂν εἶέν τε ἄνθρωποι καὶ παύ-
d σαιντο τῆς ἀκολασίας ἀσθενέστεροι γενόμενοι. νῦν
μὲν γὰρ αὐτούς, ἔφη, διατεμῶ δίχα ἕκαστον, καὶ ἅμα
μὲν ἀσθενέστεροι ἔσονται, ἅμα δὲ χρησιμώτεροι ἡμῖν
διὰ τὸ πλείους τὸν ἀριθμὸν γεγονέναι· καὶ βαδιοῦνται
ὀρθοὶ ἐπὶ δυοῖν σκελοῖν. ἐὰν δ' ἔτι δοκῶσιν ἀσελγαί-
νειν | καὶ μὴ 'θέλωσιν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, πάλιν αὖ, ἔφη,
τεμῶ δίχα, ὥστ' ἐφ' ἑνὸς πορεύσονται σκέλους ἀσκω-
λιάζοντες." ταῦτα εἰπὼν ἔτεμνε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δίχα,
ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ ὄα τέμνοντες καὶ μέλλοντες ταριχεύειν,
e ἢ ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ ᾠὰ ταῖς θριξίν· ὅντινα δὲ τέμοι, τὸν
Ἀπόλλω ἐκέλευεν τό τε πρόσωπον μεταστρέφειν καὶ
τὸ τοῦ αὐχένος ἥμισυ πρὸς τὴν τομήν, ἵνα θεώμενος
τὴν αὑτοῦ τμῆσιν κοσμιώτερος | εἴη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ
τἆλλα ἰᾶσθαι ἐκέλευεν. ὁ δὲ τό τε πρόσωπον μετ-
έστρεφε, καὶ συνέλκων πανταχόθεν τὸ δέρμα ἐπὶ τὴν
γαστέρα νῦν καλουμένην, ὥσπερ τὰ σύσπαστα βαλ-
λάντια, ἓν στόμα ποιῶν ἀπέδει κατὰ μέσην τὴν γα-
191 στέρα, ὃ δὴ τὸν ὀμφαλὸν καλοῦσι. καὶ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας
ῥυτίδας τὰς πολλὰς ἐξελέαινε καὶ τὰ στήθη διήρθρου,
ἔχων τι τοιοῦτον ὄργανον οἷον οἱ σκυτοτόμοι περὶ τὸν

a path up to the sky in order to attack the gods.[57] Zeus c
therefore and the rest of the gods took counsel on what to
do with them and were at a loss, for they had no way of
killing them and destroying their race with thunderbolts,
as they had done with the giants—for the honors and sac-
rifices they received from humans would disappear—nor
could they allow them to behave outrageously. After some
difficult reflection Zeus spoke and said: 'I think I have a
scheme for humans to exist and cease from their wanton
behavior by making them weaker. For now, he said, I shall d
cut each of them in half with the result that they will be
weaker, and at the same time they will become more use-
ful to us on account of there being more of them, and they
will walk upright on two legs. And if they still appear to be
acting wantonly and unwilling to hold their peace, then I'll
cut them in half again,' he said, 'so that they'll go around
hopping on one leg.' Having said this he proceeded to cut
the humans in half, like people who cut up sorb apples
intending to preserve them, or like those who cut up eggs
with hairs. For each one he cut he ordered Apollo to turn e
the face and the half of the neck round toward the cut so
that the person when looking at his own cut might act in
a more orderly fashion, and he ordered him to heal their
other wounds. Apollo then turned the face around and
drew the skin together from all sides to what is now called
the belly, like purses with drawstrings, and making one
opening he fastened it off over the middle of the belly,
which they call the navel. He smoothed out the many 191
other wrinkles and constructed the chest using the sort of
tool shoemakers use for smoothing out wrinkles in the

[57] Homer, *Iliad* 5.385ff.; *Odyssey* 11.307–20.

καλάποδα λεαίνοντες τὰς τῶν σκυτῶν ῥυτίδας· ὀλίγας
δὲ κατέλιπε, τὰς περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν γαστέρα καὶ τὸν ὀμ-
φαλόν, μνημεῖον | εἶναι τοῦ παλαιοῦ πάθους. ἐπειδὴ
οὖν ἡ φύσις δίχα ἐτμήθη, ποθοῦν ἕκαστον τὸ ἥμισυ
τὸ αὑτοῦ συνῄει, καὶ περιβάλλοντες τὰς χεῖρας καὶ
συμπλεκόμενοι ἀλλήλοις, ἐπιθυμοῦντες συμφῦναι,
ἀπέθνῃσκον ὑπὸ λιμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀργίας διὰ τὸ
b μηδὲν ἐθέλειν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ποιεῖν. καὶ ὁπότε τι
ἀποθάνοι τῶν ἡμίσεων, τὸ δὲ λειφθείη, τὸ λειφθὲν
ἄλλο ἐζήτει καὶ συνεπλέκετο, εἴτε γυναικὸς τῆς ὅλης
ἐντύχοι ἡμίσει—ὃ δὴ νῦν γυναῖκα καλοῦμεν—εἴτε |
ἀνδρός· καὶ οὕτως ἀπώλλυντο. ἐλεήσας δὲ ὁ Ζεὺς ἄλ-
λην μηχανὴν πορίζεται, καὶ μετατίθησιν αὐτῶν τὰ
αἰδοῖα εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν—τέως γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ἐκτὸς εἶ-
χον, καὶ ἐγέννων καὶ ἔτικτον οὐκ εἰς ἀλλήλους ἀλλ᾽
c εἰς γῆν, ὥσπερ οἱ τέττιγες—μετέθηκέ τε οὖν οὕτω
αὐτῶν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν καὶ διὰ τούτων τὴν γένεσιν ἐν
ἀλλήλοις ἐποίησεν, διὰ τοῦ ἄρρενος ἐν τῷ θήλει,
τῶνδε ἕνεκα, ἵνα ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ | ἅμα μὲν εἰ ἀνὴρ
γυναικὶ ἐντύχοι, γεννῷεν καὶ γίγνοιτο τὸ γένος, ἅμα
δ᾽ εἰ καὶ ἄρρην ἄρρενι, πλησμονὴ γοῦν γίγνοιτο τῆς
συνουσίας καὶ διαπαύοιντο καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα τρέποιντο
d καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου βίου ἐπιμελοῖντο. ἔστι δὴ οὖν ἐκ τόσου
ὁ ἔρως ἔμφυτος ἀλλήλων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τῆς ἀρ-
χαίας φύσεως συναγωγεὺς καὶ ἐπιχειρῶν ποιῆσαι ἓν
ἐκ δυοῖν καὶ ἰάσασθαι τὴν φύσιν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην.
ἕκαστος οὖν ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου σύμβολον, ἅτε

hides on their last, but he left a few behind, those in the area around the belly itself, that is the navel, to be a reminder of what they went through long ago. So when their original form had been cut in half, each half came together in longing for its respective half, and throwing their arms around each other they embraced in their yearning to grow together, and died of hunger and general inactivity because they were unwilling to do anything separated
from each other. Whenever one of the halves died and the b
other was left behind, the one left behind sought and embraced another one, whether it encountered half of what had been wholly woman—that is what we now call a woman—or man. And so they perished. Out of pity Zeus devised another scheme and moved their genitals to the front—for until then they had these too on the outside and they conceived and gave birth not by the penetration of the one into the another but in the ground like cica-
das[58]—and thus he moved the genitals to the front and by c
this means caused their reproduction inside each other through the male being inside the female, for this reason: that if a man and a woman came together in intercourse, they would reproduce and the race would continue. And at the same time even if a male met up with a male, at any rate they would have the satisfaction of their intercourse and take a rest and turn to their work and look after the
other aspects of their life. So it is that from that far back d
in time love of one another has been innate in human beings and is what restores our old natural state and attempts to make one out of two and to heal our human nature. Thus each of us is a token of a human being in as much as

[58] On the reproductive habits of cicadas, see Dover, n. ad loc.

τετμημένος ὥσπερ αἱ ψῆτται, | ἐξ ἑνὸς δύο· ζητεῖ δὴ ἀεὶ τὸ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστος σύμβολον. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῦ κοινοῦ τμῆμά εἰσιν, ὃ δὴ τότε ἀνδρόγυνον ἐκαλεῖτο, φιλογύναικές τέ εἰσι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν μοιχῶν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ γένους γεγόνασιν, καὶ ὅσαι αὖ γυναῖκες φίλανδροί τε καὶ μοιχεύτριαι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ
e γένους γίγνονται. ὅσαι δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν γυναικὸς τμῆμά εἰσιν, οὐ πάνυ αὗται τοῖς ἀνδράσι τὸν νοῦν προσέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰς γυναῖκας τετραμμέναι | εἰσί, καὶ αἱ ἑταιρίστριαι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ γένους γίγνονται. ὅσοι δὲ ἄρρενος τμῆμά εἰσι, τὰ ἄρρενα διώκουσι, καὶ τέως μὲν ἂν παῖδες ὦσιν, ἅτε τεμάχια ὄντα τοῦ ἄρρενος, φιλοῦσι τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ χαίρουσι συγκατακείμενοι καὶ συμπεπλεγμένοι τοῖς
192 ἀνδράσι, καί εἰσιν οὗτοι βέλτιστοι τῶν παίδων καὶ μειρακίων, ἅτε ἀνδρειότατοι ὄντες φύσει. φασὶ δὲ δή τινες αὐτοὺς ἀναισχύντους εἶναι, ψευδόμενοι· οὐ γὰρ ὑπ᾽ ἀναισχυντίας τοῦτο δρῶσιν ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ θάρρους καὶ ἀνδρείας | καὶ ἀρρενωπίας, τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτοῖς ἀσπαζόμενοι. μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον· καὶ γὰρ τελεωθέντες μόνοι ἀποβαίνουσιν εἰς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἄνδρες οἱ τοιοῦτοι.
b ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀνδρωθῶσι, παιδεραστοῦσι καὶ πρὸς γάμους καὶ παιδοποιίας οὐ προσέχουσι τὸν νοῦν φύσει, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἀναγκάζονται· ἀλλ᾽ ἐξαρκεῖ αὐτοῖς μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων καταζῆν ἀγάμοις. πάντως μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος παιδεραστής τε καὶ φιλεραστὴς γίγνεται, | ἀεὶ τὸ συγγενὲς ἀσπαζόμενος. ὅταν μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ ἐντύχῃ τῷ αὑτοῦ ἡμίσει καὶ ὁ παιδεραστὴς καὶ

he has been split like flatfish, two out of one. Each is then constantly looking for his matching token. Moreover those men who are a segment of the shared gender which was called androgynous at that time, are lovers of women and the majority of adulterers come from this kind, and in turn those women who are lovers of men and adulteresses come from this kind. Such women, on the other hand, as e
are a segment of the wholly woman don't pay much attention to men, but are oriented rather toward women, and females loving females come from this kind. Those who are a segment of the male pursue the male, and while they are boys, in that they are segments of the male, they are affectionate toward men and enjoy intercourse with men and embracing them, and these are the best of boys and 192
youths in that they are naturally the most manly. Indeed some say these are shameless, but this is a lie; for they do this not out of shamelessness, but out of courage and bravery and manliness, embracing that which is of their kind. There is significant proof of this: for such men are indeed the only ones who, on reaching maturity, turn out to be the real men in politics. When they reach manhood they b
become lovers of boys, and pay attention to marriage and the fathering of children not by nature, but they are compelled to by convention; but it's sufficient for them to live their lives out with each other unmarried. So, in short, such a person becomes a lover of boys and, as a boy fond of lovers, always welcoming his own kind. Now whenever the lover of boys, and anyone else, encounters that actual

ἄλλος πᾶς, τότε καὶ θαυμαστὰ ἐκπλήττονται φιλίᾳ τε
c καὶ οἰκειότητι καὶ ἔρωτι, οὐκ ἐθέλοντες ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν
χωρίζεσθαι ἀλλήλων οὐδὲ σμικρὸν χρόνον. καὶ οἱ
διατελοῦντες μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων διὰ βίου οὗτοί εἰσιν, οἳ
οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἔχοιεν εἰπεῖν ὅτι βούλονται σφίσι παρ᾽ ἀλλή-
λων γίγνεσθαι. οὐδενὶ | γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι ἡ
τῶν ἀφροδισίων συνουσία, ὡς ἄρα τούτου ἕνεκα ἕτε-
ρος ἑτέρῳ χαίρει συνὼν οὕτως ἐπὶ μεγάλης σπουδῆς·
d ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλο τι βουλομένη ἑκατέρου ἡ ψυχὴ δήλη ἐστίν,
ὃ οὐ δύναται εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ μαντεύεται ὃ βούλεται, καὶ
αἰνίττεται. καὶ εἰ αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κατακειμένοις
ἐπιστὰς ὁ Ἥφαιστος, ἔχων τὰ ὄργανα, ἔροιτο· "Τί
ἔσθ᾽ ὃ βούλεσθε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὑμῖν παρ᾽ ἀλλήλων
γενέσθαι;" | καὶ εἰ ἀποροῦντας αὐτοὺς πάλιν ἔροιτο·
"Ἆρά γε τοῦδε ἐπιθυμεῖτε, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γενέσθαι ὅτι
μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις, ὥστε καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν μὴ
ἀπολείπεσθαι ἀλλήλων; εἰ γὰρ τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖτε,
θέλω ὑμᾶς συντῆξαι καὶ συμφυσῆσαι εἰς τὸ αὐτό,
e ὥστε δύ᾽ ὄντας ἕνα γεγονέναι καὶ ἕως τ᾽ ἂν ζῆτε, ὡς
ἕνα ὄντα, κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρους ζῆν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀπο-
θάνητε, ἐκεῖ αὖ ἐν Ἅιδου ἀντὶ δυοῖν ἕνα εἶναι κοινῇ
τεθνεῶτε· ἀλλ᾽ ὁρᾶτε εἰ τούτου ἐρᾶτε καὶ | ἐξαρκεῖ ὑμῖν
ἂν τούτου τύχητε·" ταῦτ᾽ ἀκούσας ἴσμεν ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἂν
εἷς ἐξαρνηθείη οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο τι ἂν φανείη βουλόμενος,
ἀλλ᾽ ἀτεχνῶς οἴοιτ᾽ ἂν ἀκηκοέναι τοῦτο ὃ πάλαι ἄρα
ἐπεθύμει, συνελθὼν καὶ συντακεὶς τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἐκ δυ-

other half of his, both of them are struck in an extraordinary way with affection, belonging[59] and love, in a word, c
unwilling to be separated from one another even for a short time. These then are the ones who spend the rest of their lives with each other, though they would be unable even to say what they want for themselves from each other. For no one would think it was just for making love, that it was because of this that each enjoys being with the other with such great enthusiasm. But clearly it is something d
else that the soul of each wants which it cannot express, but it intuitively grasps and hints at what it wants. And if Hephaestus were to stand over them as they lie together his tools at the ready and ask: 'What is it, you people, that you want for yourselves from each other?' And if they were stuck for an answer and he were to ask again: 'Is this then what you are after, to be together with each other as much as you possibly can, so you will not be left without each other night and day? If this is what you are keen to have, I am willing to melt you down and weld you together so e
that the two of you become one and pass your life so long as you live sharing with each other as a single being, and when you die, down there in Hades too you will be one instead of two, having died together. Well, consider whether this is what you desire and whether it will satisfy you if you achieve this.' We know that on hearing this not a single person would refuse nor would it become apparent that they wanted anything else, but would simply think that he had heard what he had all along been yearning for, to come together and be fused with his loved one, from

59 "Belonging" = *oikeiotēs* (as a key element in the love relationship, see esp. *Lysis*, 221dff.).

οἶν εἷς γενέσθαι. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον, ὅτι ἡ ἀρ-
χαία φύσις | ἡμῶν ἦν αὕτη καὶ ἦμεν ὅλοι· τοῦ ὅλου
193 οὖν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ διώξει ἔρως ὄνομα. καὶ πρὸ τοῦ,
ὥσπερ λέγω, ἓν ἦμεν, νυνὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἀδικίαν διῳκί-
σθημεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, καθάπερ Ἀρκάδες ὑπὸ Λακεδαι-
μονίων· φόβος οὖν ἔστιν, ἐὰν μὴ κόσμιοι ὦμεν πρὸς
τοὺς θεούς, ὅπως μὴ καὶ αὖθις | διασχισθησόμεθα,
καὶ περίιμεν ἔχοντες ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς στήλαις κατα-
γραφὴν ἐκτετυπωμένοι, διαπεπρισμένοι κατὰ τὰς ῥῖ-
νας, γεγονότες ὥσπερ λίσπαι. ἀλλὰ τούτων ἕνεκα
πάντ᾽ ἄνδρα χρὴ ἅπαντα παρακελεύεσθαι εὐσεβεῖν
περὶ θεούς, ἵνα τὰ μὲν ἐκφύγωμεν, τῶν δὲ τύχωμεν,
b ὡς ὁ Ἔρως ἡμῖν ἡγεμὼν καὶ στρατηγός. ᾧ μηδεὶς
ἐναντία πραττέτω—πράττει δ᾽ ἐναντία ὅστις θεοῖς
ἀπεχθάνεται—φίλοι γὰρ γενόμενοι καὶ διαλλαγέντες
τῷ θεῷ ἐξευρήσομέν τε καὶ | ἐντευξόμεθα τοῖς παιδι-
κοῖς τοῖς ἡμετέροις αὐτῶν, ὃ τῶν νῦν ὀλίγοι ποιοῦσι.
καὶ μή μοι ὑπολάβῃ Ἐρυξίμαχος, κωμῳδῶν τὸν λό-
γον, ὡς Παυσανίαν καὶ Ἀγάθωνα λέγω—ἴσως μὲν
γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι τούτων τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες καί εἰσιν
c ἀμφότεροι τὴν φύσιν ἄρρενες—λέγω δὲ οὖν ἔγωγε
καθ᾽ ἁπάντων καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν, ὅτι οὕτως ἂν
ἡμῶν τὸ γένος εὔδαιμον γένοιτο, εἰ ἐκτελέσαιμεν τὸν
ἔρωτα καὶ τῶν παιδικῶν τῶν | αὑτοῦ ἕκαστος τύχοι εἰς
τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἀπελθὼν φύσιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄριστον,

[60] Most probably an anachronistic reference to the Spartan

two beings into one. You see this is the cause, that our original nature was like this and we were wholes. So the desire and pursuit of the whole has the name of love.
Before this, as I say, we were one, but now because of our 193
wrongdoing we have been dispersed by the god just as the Arcadians were by the Lacedaemonians.[60] Our fear therefore is if we do not behave in an orderly fashion toward the gods, we may be cut in two again, and go around just like those who have been carved in profile on gravestones sawn in half down the nose, ending up like dice cut in half.[61] Well, for these reasons every man must encourage reverence in relation to the gods in all things in order to avoid the one fate and achieve the other, according as
Love is our leader and commander. Let no one oppose b
him in this—he does the opposite of this who is hateful to the gods—for having become friends and having reconciled ourselves with the god, we shall discover and meet a loved one who is our own, which few of those around today achieve. And I hope Eryximachus isn't going to come back at me and treat my speech as a comedy on the grounds that I mean Pausanias and Agathon—for perhaps it may well be that they really are among these and are both male
by nature—what *I'm* saying is with reference to all, both c
men and women, that the way to happiness for our race would be this: if we find love in the end, and each of us finds his own beloved, reverting to our original nature. If this is best, then what is nearest to this, given our current

dispersal of the Mantineans in Arcadia in 385 (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.2.5–7). See Introduction, Appendix.

61 See 191d4. *Lispai* = "dice cut in two by friends . . . each of whom kept half as a tally" (LSJ).

ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῶν νῦν παρόντων τὸ τούτου ἐγγυτάτω ἄριστον εἶναι· τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ παιδικῶν τυχεῖν κατὰ νοῦν αὐτῷ πεφυκότων· οὗ δὴ τὸν αἴτιον θεὸν ὑμνοῦν-
d τες δικαίως ἂν ὑμνοῖμεν Ἔρωτα, ὃς ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι ἡμᾶς πλεῖστα ὀνίνησιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἄγων, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ἐλπίδας μεγίστας παρέχεται, ἡμῶν παρεχομένων πρὸς θεοὺς εὐσέβειαν, καταστήσας ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν καὶ | ἰασάμενος μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας ποιῆσαι.

Οὗτος, ἔφη, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος ἐστὶ περὶ Ἔρωτος, ἀλλοῖος ἢ ὁ σός. ὥσπερ οὖν ἐδεήθην σου, μὴ κωμῳδήσῃς αὐτόν, ἵνα καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀκούσωμεν
e τί ἕκαστος ἐρεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ τί ἑκάτερος· Ἀγάθων γὰρ καὶ Σωκράτης λοιποί.

Ἀλλὰ πείσομαί σοι, ἔφη φάναι τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον· καὶ γάρ μοι ὁ λόγος ἡδέως ἐρρήθη. καὶ εἰ μὴ συνῄδη Σωκράτει | τε καὶ Ἀγάθωνι δεινοῖς οὖσι περὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά, πάνυ ἂν ἐφοβούμην μὴ ἀπορήσωσι λόγων διὰ τὸ πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ εἰρῆσθαι· νῦν δὲ ὅμως θαρρῶ.

194 Τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη εἰπεῖν Καλῶς γὰρ αὐτὸς ἠγώνισαι, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε· εἰ δὲ γένοιο οὗ νῦν ἐγώ εἰμι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἴσως οὗ ἔσομαι ἐπειδὰν καὶ Ἀγάθων εἴπῃ εὖ, καὶ μάλ᾽ ἂν φοβοῖο καὶ ἐν παντὶ εἴης ὥσπερ ἐγὼ νῦν.|

Φαρμάττειν βούλει με, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀγάθωνα, ἵνα θορυβηθῶ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι τὸ θέατρον προσδοκίαν μεγάλην ἔχειν ὡς εὖ ἐροῦντος ἐμοῦ.

circumstances, must also be best. And this is to meet up with a beloved who is in his way of thinking congenial to oneself. Indeed in singing the praises of the god who is the cause of this, we would rightly sing the praises of Love who in the present circumstances benefits us the most by d
leading us to what belongs to us, and gives us the greatest expectations for the future, that if we offer reverence toward the gods, having established us in our original nature and having healed us, he will make us blessed and happy.

"This, Eryximachus, he said, is my speech about Love, of a different kind from yours. Therefore, as I asked you, don't make fun of it in order that we may hear what each of those who are left will say, or rather what each of the two will say. For Agathon and Socrates are the ones left."[62] e

"Well I shall obey you," he said Eryximachus replied. "For indeed I enjoyed the speech. And if I didn't know full well that Socrates and Agathon are experts in matters of love, I'd be very much afraid they would be stuck for words because much has been said in all sorts of ways. But as it is I am confident nevertheless."

So Socrates said: "Yes, because you yourself have com- 194
peted well, Eryximachus. If you were where I am now, or rather perhaps where I shall be when Agathon too makes a good speech, you'd be as terrified and at your wits end as I am now."

"You want to put the evil eye on me, Socrates, said Agathon, to throw me into confusion at the thought that the spectators have high expectations that I shall make a good speech."

62 It is actually the turn of Aristodemus, lying with Eryximachus (cf. 175a4–5), but he leaves himself out.

Ἐπιλήσμων μεντἂν εἴην, ὦ Ἀγάθων, εἰπεῖν τὸν
b Σωκράτη, εἰ ἰδὼν τὴν σὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνην ἀναβαίνοντος ἐπὶ τὸν ὀκρίβαντα μετὰ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν, καὶ βλέψαντος ἐναντία τοσούτῳ θεάτρῳ, μέλλοντος ἐπιδείξεσθαι σαυτοῦ λόγους, καὶ οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν ἐκπλαγέντος, νῦν | οἰηθείην σε θορυβήσεσθαι ἕνεκα ἡμῶν ὀλίγων ἀνθρώπων.

Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; τὸν Ἀγάθωνα φάναι, οὐ δήπου με οὕτω θεάτρου μεστὸν ἡγῇ ὥστε καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι νοῦν ἔχοντι ὀλίγοι ἔμφρονες πολλῶν ἀφρόνων φοβερώτεροι;

c Οὐ μεντἂν καλῶς ποιοίην, φάναι, ὦ Ἀγάθων, περὶ σοῦ τι ἐγὼ ἄγροικον δοξάζων· ἀλλ᾽ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι εἴ τισιν ἐντύχοις οὓς ἡγοῖο σοφούς, μᾶλλον ἂν αὐτῶν φροντίζοις ἢ τῶν πολλῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὗτοι ἡμεῖς ὦμεν—ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ | καὶ ἐκεῖ παρῆμεν καὶ ἦμεν τῶν πολλῶν—εἰ δὲ ἄλλοις ἐντύχοις σοφοῖς, τάχ᾽ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο αὐτούς, εἴ τι ἴσως οἴοιο αἰσχρὸν ὂν ποιεῖν· ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι.

Τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο εἴ τι οἴοιο αἰσχρὸν ποιεῖν; |

d Καὶ τὸν Φαῖδρον ἔφη ὑπολαβόντα εἰπεῖν Ὦ φίλε Ἀγάθων, ἐὰν ἀποκρίνῃ Σωκράτει, οὐδὲν ἔτι διοίσει

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63 Socrates is referring to the *Proagaon*, the occasion in advance of the performance when plays were advertised. He is here

"Yes, but Agathon," said Socrates, "I'd have to be forgetful if, on seeing your confidence and self-assurance when you mounted the platform with the actors, and looked such a large audience straight in the eye, not the slightest bit panic-stricken as you prepared to deliver your compositions, I should now think you are about to be thrown into confusion on account a few people like us."[63] b

"What, Socrates?" said Agathon, "surely you don't think, do you, that I'm so crammed full of the theater that I'm unaware that for a man of intelligence, a few sensible people are more intimidating than the many who are senseless?"

"I would of course not be behaving well, Agathon," he said, "if I entertained any boorish thoughts about *you*, but I am well aware that if you came across any people you considered to be wise, you would hold them in higher esteem than the general public. But maybe we're not these people—for we were there and were part of the mass—but if you were to meet others who are wise, maybe you would be ashamed in their presence if you thought perhaps you were doing something that is shameful. Or what do you say?" c

"What you say is true," he said.

"But you wouldn't be ashamed in front of the general public if you thought you were doing something shameful?"

Now Phaedrus, he said, interrupted and said: "Agathon, my friend, if you answer Socrates' question, after that it d

"setting up" Agathon, in advance of his speech, as a public theatrical performer (see above, 175e5, and for the context see Introduction, §2(iv)).

αὐτῷ ὁπῃοῦν τῶν ἐνθάδε ὁτιοῦν γίγνεσθαι, ἐὰν μόνον ἔχῃ ὅτῳ διαλέγηται, ἄλλως τε καὶ καλῷ. ἐγὼ δὲ ἡδέως μὲν ἀκούω | Σωκράτους διαλεγομένου, ἀναγκαῖον δέ μοι ἐπιμεληθῆναι τοῦ ἐγκωμίου τῷ Ἔρωτι καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι παρ᾽ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου ὑμῶν τὸν λόγον· ἀποδοὺς οὖν ἑκάτερος τῷ θεῷ οὕτως ἤδη διαλεγέσθω.

e Ἀλλὰ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Φαῖδρε, φάναι τὸν Ἀγάθωνα, καὶ οὐδέν με κωλύει λέγειν· Σωκράτει γὰρ καὶ αὖθις ἔσται πολλάκις διαλέγεσθαι.

Ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ βούλομαι πρῶτον μὲν εἰπεῖν ὡς χρή με εἰπεῖν, | ἔπειτα εἰπεῖν. δοκοῦσι γάρ μοι πάντες οἱ πρόσθεν εἰρηκότες οὐ τὸν θεὸν ἐγκωμιάζειν ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εὐδαιμονίζειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὧν ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς αἴτιος· ὁποῖος δέ τις αὐτὸς ὢν ταῦτα ἐδωρή-
195 σατο, οὐδεὶς εἴρηκεν. εἷς δὲ τρόπος ὀρθὸς παντὸς ἐπαίνου περὶ παντός, λόγῳ διελθεῖν οἷος οἵων αἴτιος ὢν τυγχάνει περὶ οὗ ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ. οὕτω δὴ τὸν Ἔρωτα καὶ ἡμᾶς δίκαιον ἐπαινέσαι πρῶτον αὐτὸν οἷός ἐστιν, ἔπειτα | τὰς δόσεις. φημὶ οὖν ἐγὼ πάντων θεῶν εὐδαιμόνων ὄντων Ἔρωτα, εἰ θέμις καὶ ἀνεμέσητον εἰπεῖν, εὐδαιμονέστατον εἶναι αὐτῶν, κάλλιστον ὄντα καὶ ἄριστον. ἔστι δὲ κάλλιστος ὢν τοιόσδε. πρῶτον μὲν νεώτατος θεῶν, ὦ Φαῖδρε. μέγα δὲ

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64 "Happy" = *eudaimōn* (see above, n. 9).

won't matter to him one bit how what is going on here will end up, as long as he has someone to discuss it with, especially if he's good-looking. I'm happy to hear Socrates in discussion, but I must keep my mind on the praise of Love and get a speech out of each one of you. Therefore only after each of you two has paid his due to the god, *then* you can have your discussion."

"Quite right, Phaedrus," said Agathon, "and there's e
nothing to stop me speaking. Why, Socrates will have plenty of chances to have the discussion another time.

The Speech of Agathon

"Now first I want to say how I ought to speak, and then make my speech. For all those who have spoken already seem to me not to be praising the god, but to show how fortunate people are to have the good things for which the god is responsible. But no one has said what kind of being
he is who has bestowed these gifts upon us. There is one 195
correct way for every kind of praise on any topic: to explain in the speech, whoever the speech is about, what kind of being he really is, and what kind of things he is responsible for. In this way then it is right that we too praise Love himself for what he is and then for his gifts. I therefore claim that while all the gods are happy,[64] Love, if it is right to say this without causing them offense, is the most happy as he is the most beautiful and the best. He's the most beautiful on these grounds: firstly he's the youngest of the gods, Phaedrus.[65] He himself provides substantial proof

[65] Phaedrus claimed Eros was among the oldest of the gods (178a9–b1).

b τεκμήριον τῷ λόγῳ αὐτὸς παρέχεται, φεύγων φυγῇ τὸ γῆρας, ταχὺ ὂν δῆλον ὅτι· θᾶττον γοῦν τοῦ δέοντος ἡμῖν προσέρχεται. ὃ δὴ πέφυκεν Ἔρως μισεῖν καὶ οὐδ᾿ ἐντὸς πολλοῦ πλησιάζειν. μετὰ δὲ νέων ἀεὶ σύνεστί τε καὶ ἔστιν· | ὁ γὰρ παλαιὸς λόγος εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ ἀεὶ πελάζει. ἐγὼ δὲ Φαίδρῳ πολλὰ ἄλλα ὁμολογῶν τοῦτο οὐχ ὁμολογῶ, ὡς Ἔρως Κρόνου καὶ Ἰαπετοῦ ἀρχαιότερός ἐστιν, ἀλλά φημι νεώτατον
c αὐτὸν εἶναι θεῶν καὶ ἀεὶ νέον, τὰ δὲ παλαιὰ πράγματα περὶ θεούς, ἃ Ἡσίοδος καὶ Παρμενίδης λέγουσιν, Ἀνάγκῃ καὶ οὐκ Ἔρωτι γεγονέναι, εἰ ἐκεῖνοι ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκτομαὶ οὐδὲ δεσμοὶ ἀλλήλων ἐγίγνοντο καὶ ἄλλα | πολλὰ καὶ βίαια, εἰ Ἔρως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἦν, ἀλλὰ φιλία καὶ εἰρήνη, ὥσπερ νῦν, ἐξ οὗ Ἔρως τῶν θεῶν βασιλεύει. νέος μὲν οὖν ἐστι, πρὸς δὲ τῷ νέῳ ἁπαλός· ποιητοῦ δ᾿ ἔστιν ἐνδεὴς οἷος
d ἦν Ὅμηρος πρὸς τὸ ἐπιδεῖξαι θεοῦ ἁπαλότητα. Ὅμηρος γὰρ Ἄτην θεόν τέ φησιν εἶναι καὶ ἁπαλήν—τοὺς γοῦν πόδας αὐτῆς ἁπαλοὺς εἶναι—λέγων

τῆς μένθ᾿ ἁπαλοὶ πόδες· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ᾿ οὔδεος |
πίλναται, ἀλλ᾿ ἄρα ἥ γε κατ᾿ ἀνδρῶν κράατα
βαίνει.

καλῷ οὖν δοκεῖ μοι τεκμηρίῳ τὴν ἁπαλότητα ἀποφαίνειν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπὶ σκληροῦ βαίνει, ἀλλ᾿ ἐπὶ μαλθακοῦ. τῷ αὐτῷ δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς χρησόμεθα τεκμηρίῳ περὶ
e Ἔρωτα ὅτι ἁπαλός. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ γῆς βαίνει οὐδ᾿ ἐπὶ κρανίων, ἅ ἐστιν οὐ πάνυ μαλακά, ἀλλ᾿ ἐν τοῖς μαλα-

for what I say: by flight he shuns old age, although that is b clearly swift: at any rate it approaches us quicker than it should. Indeed Love naturally hates it and comes nowhere near it. He always associates with the young, and is young: for the old saying holds true, that like always draws near to like. But while agreeing with Phaedrus on many other points, on this one I do not agree with him, that Love is more ancient than Cronus and Iapetus; on the contrary I claim that he is the youngest of the gods and is always c young, but the old activities involving the gods, which Hesiod and Parmenides speak of, happened through Necessity, not Love, if they were telling the truth: for there would have been no castrations and chaining up of each other and many other violent acts if Love was among them, but there would have been friendship and peace, as now, from the time Love has been ruling the gods. So he's young then and gentle as well as young; but he lacks a poet such as was Homer to demonstrate the gentleness of the god. For Homer says Ate was a goddess and gentle too—at d least her feet were gentle—when he says:

> Yet her feet are gentle, for she does not approach
> Over the ground, but walks upon the heads of men.[66]

So he seems to me to reveal excellent evidence of her gentleness: that she does not walk on something hard, but something soft. We will use the same proof about Love being gentle, for he does not walk on the ground, nor even e on skulls which are not at all soft, but he both walks and

66 Homer, *Iliad* 19.92–93.

κωτάτοις τῶν ὄντων καὶ βαίνει καὶ οἰκεῖ. ἐν γὰρ ἤθεσι καὶ ψυχαῖς θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων τὴν | οἴκησιν ἵδρυται, καὶ οὐκ αὖ ἑξῆς ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ᾗτινι ἂν σκληρὸν ἦθος ἐχούσῃ ἐντύχῃ, ἀπέρχεται, ᾗ δ᾽ ἂν μαλακόν, οἰκίζεται. ἁπτόμενον οὖν ἀεὶ καὶ ποσὶν καὶ πάντῃ ἐν μαλακωτάτοις τῶν μαλακωτάτων, ἁπαλώτα-
196 τον ἀνάγκη εἶναι. νεώτατος μὲν δή ἐστι καὶ ἁπαλώτατος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὑγρὸς τὸ εἶδος. οὐ γὰρ ἂν οἷός τ᾽ ἦν πάντῃ περιπτύσσεσθαι οὐδὲ διὰ πάσης ψυχῆς καὶ εἰσιὼν τὸ πρῶτον λανθάνειν καὶ ἐξιών, εἰ σκληρὸς ἦν. συμμέτρου δὲ καὶ | ὑγρᾶς ἰδέας μέγα τεκμήριον ἡ εὐσχημοσύνη, ὃ δὴ διαφερόντως ἐκ πάντων ὁμολογουμένως Ἔρως ἔχει· ἀσχημοσύνῃ γὰρ καὶ Ἔρωτι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀεὶ πόλεμος. χρόας δὲ κάλλος
b ἡ κατ᾽ ἄνθη δίαιτα τοῦ θεοῦ σημαίνει· ἀνανθεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἀπηνθηκότι καὶ σώματι καὶ ψυχῇ καὶ ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν οὐκ ἐνίζει Ἔρως, οὗ δ᾽ ἂν εὐανθής τε καὶ εὐώδης τόπος ᾖ, ἐνταῦθα δὲ καὶ ἵζει καὶ μένει.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν κάλλους τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ταῦτα ἱκανὰ καὶ ἔτι | πολλὰ λείπεται, περὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς Ἔρωτος μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον, τὸ μὲν μέγιστον ὅτι Ἔρως οὔτ᾽ ἀδικεῖ οὔτ᾽ ἀδικεῖται οὔτε ὑπὸ θεοῦ οὔτε θεόν, οὔτε ὑπ᾽ ἀνθρώπου οὔτε ἄνθρωπον. οὔτε γὰρ αὐτὸς βίᾳ πάσχει, εἴ τι πάσχει—βία γὰρ Ἔρωτος οὐχ ἅπτεται· οὔτε
c ποιῶν ποιεῖ—πᾶς γὰρ ἑκὼν Ἔρωτι πᾶν ὑπηρετεῖ, ἃ δ᾽ ἂν ἑκὼν ἑκόντι ὁμολογήσῃ, φασὶν "οἱ πόλεως βα-

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[67] "Virtue" here translates *aretē* (see above, n. 32).

dwells in the softest things. For he has fixed his dwelling place among the characters and souls of gods and men, and again not in all souls one after another, but when he comes upon one with a hard character, he steers away from it and finds his home in one that is soft. Therefore always fastening himself onto the softest of their softest parts, both with his feet and all over, he is necessarily the most gentle. He is, then, the youngest and the most gentle and, 196
in addition to these he is fluid in form. You see, he would not be able to wind himself around someone completely nor would he be able to enter through the whole soul first, then leave it without our noticing it, if he were hard. Substantial proof of his well-proportioned and supple form is his gracefulness, in which indeed Love is by common consent outstanding, for there is always conflict between gracelessness and Love. The dwelling of the god among flowers shows beauty of complexion; for Love does not b
settle in a body, in a soul or in anything else whatever that is without flower and has not bloomed, but wherever there is a place full of blossom and perfume, there he settles and remains.

"On the beauty of the god this then will be enough, even though there still remains a lot to be said. But following this we must talk about the virtue[67] of Love. The most important point is that Love neither does any wrong to any god or any human being, nor is he wronged by any god or any human being. You see if anything is done to him he does not himself suffer violence—for violence does not touch Love; nor in his dealings does he commit any violence—for everyone willingly serves Love in all things: c
whatever terms one party willingly agrees with another,

σιλῆς νόμοι" δίκαια εἶναι. πρὸς δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ σωφροσύνης πλείστης μετέχει. εἶναι γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται σωφροσύνη | τὸ κρατεῖν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, Ἔρω*τος δὲ μηδεμίαν ἡδονὴν κρείττω εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἥττους, κρατοῖντ' ἂν ὑπὸ* Ἔρωτος, *ὁ δὲ κρατοῖ, κρατῶν δὲ ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὁ* Ἔρως *διαφερόντως ἂν σωφρονοῖ. καὶ μὴν εἴς γε ἀνδρείαν* Ἔρωτι *"οὐδ'* Ἄρης

d *ἀνθίσταται." οὐ γὰρ ἔχει* Ἔρωτα Ἄρης, *ἀλλ'* Ἔρως Ἄρη—Ἀφροδίτης, *ὥς λόγος—κρείττων δὲ ὁ ἔχων τοῦ ἐχομένου· τοῦ δ' ἀνδρειοτάτου τῶν ἄλλων κρατῶν πάντων ἂν ἀνδρειότατος εἴη. περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης | καὶ ἀνδρείας τοῦ θεοῦ εἴρηται, περὶ δὲ σοφίας λείπεται· ὅσον οὖν δυνατόν, πειρατέον μὴ ἐλλείπειν. καὶ πρῶτον μέν, ἵν' αὖ καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην τιμήσω ὥσπερ* Ἐρυξίμαχος *τὴν αὑτοῦ,*

e *ποιητὴς ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς οὕτως ὥστε καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι· πᾶς γοῦν ποιητὴς γίγνεται, "κἂν ἄμουσος ᾖ τὸ πρίν," οὗ ἂν* Ἔρως *ἅψηται. ᾧ δὴ πρέπει ἡμᾶς μαρτυρίῳ χρῆσθαι, ὅτι ποιητὴς ὁ* Ἔρως *ἀγαθὸς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ | πᾶσαν ποίησιν τὴν κατὰ μουσικήν· ἃ γάρ τις ἢ μὴ ἔχει ἢ μὴ οἶδεν, οὔτ' ἂν ἑτέρῳ δοίη οὔτ' ἂν ἄλλον*

197 *διδάξειεν. καὶ μὲν δὴ τήν γε τῶν ζῴων ποίησιν πάντων τίς ἐναντιώσεται μὴ οὐχὶ* Ἔρωτος *εἶναι σοφίαν, ᾗ γίγνεταί τε καὶ φύεται πάντα τὰ ζῷα; ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν*

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68 Sophocles fr. 235 Nauck².

69 A probable allusion to Homer, *Odyssey* 8.266–366, in which the god Hephaestus traps Ares and Aphrodite when they are making love.

'the kings of the city, the laws,' say are just. In addition to justice he has a very great measure of moderation. For it is agreed that moderation is the control of pleasures and desires; and that no pleasure is greater than Love. But if they are weaker, they will be controlled by Love and he will control them, and in controlling pleasures and desires Love will be supreme in moderation. Furthermore, regarding courage, 'not even Ares offers resistance' to
Love.[68] For Ares does not possess Love, but Love pos- d
sesses Ares—lover of Aphrodite, so the story goes[69]—he who possesses is stronger than the one who is being possessed, and he who masters the one who is the bravest out of the rest would be the bravest of them all. So now that we have spoken about the justice, moderation and courage of the god, it remains to speak of his wisdom; so as far as possible we must try not to fall short. Firstly then, in order that I too pay tribute to my craft, as Eryximachus did to
his, the god is so skilled a poet as to make another a poet e
also; for in truth everyone whom Love gets in his grasp becomes a poet, 'even if he were uninspired by the Muse before.'[70] Indeed the evidence it is right for us to use is that, in short, Love is a good creator in all creation associated with the arts:[71] for one could not pass on to someone else, nor teach another what one doesn't have or know.
Now as for the creation of all living creatures, who will 197
argue against the idea that it is the wisdom of Love by which all living creatures come into being and are born?

70 Euripides fr. 663 Nauck² (*Stheneboea*).

71 "Creator" = *poiētēs* ("creation" = *poiēsis*). "The arts," translates the wide range of *mousikē* (all activity associated with the Muses).

τεχνῶν δημιουργίαν οὐκ ἴσμεν, ὅτι οὗ μὲν ἂν ὁ θεὸς οὗτος διδάσκαλος γένηται, | ἐλλόγιμος καὶ φανὸς ἀπέβη, οὗ δ' ἂν Ἔρως μὴ ἐφάψηται, σκοτεινός; τοξικήν γε μὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ μαντικὴν Ἀπόλλων ἀνηῦρεν ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἔρωτος ἡγεμονεύσαντος, ὥστε
b καὶ οὗτος Ἔρωτος ἂν εἴη μαθητής, καὶ Μοῦσαι μουσικῆς καὶ Ἥφαιστος χαλκείας καὶ Ἀθηνᾶ ἱστουργίας καὶ "Ζεὺς κυβερνᾶν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων." ὅθεν δὴ καὶ κατεσκευάσθη τῶν θεῶν τὰ πράγματα Ἔρωτος ἐγγενομένου, | δῆλον ὅτι κάλλους—αἴσχει γὰρ οὐκ ἔπι ἔρως—πρὸ τοῦ δέ, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶπον, πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ θεοῖς ἐγίγνετο, ὡς λέγεται, διὰ τὴν τῆς Ἀνάγκης βασιλείαν· ἐπειδὴ δ' ὁ θεὸς οὗτος ἔφυ, ἐκ τοῦ ἐρᾶν τῶν καλῶν πάντ' ἀγαθὰ γέγονεν καὶ θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις.

c Οὕτως ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, Ἔρως πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὢν κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος μετὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄλλων τοιούτων αἴτιος εἶναι. ἐπέρχεται δέ μοί τι καὶ ἔμμετρον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν |

εἰρήνην μὲν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, πελάγει δὲ γαλήνην
νηνεμίαν, ἀνέμων κοίτην ὕπνον τ' ἐνὶ κήδει.

d οὗτος δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀλλοτριότητος μὲν κενοῖ, οἰκειότητος δὲ πληροῖ, τὰς τοιάσδε συνόδους μετ' ἀλλήλων πάσας τιθεὶς συνιέναι, ἐν ἑορταῖς, ἐν χοροῖς, ἐν θυσίαισι

As for the skill of handicrafts, do we not know that of whoever this god becomes the teacher, he will turn out with a high reputation and distinction, but whoever Love does not lay his hands on will be obscure? Moreover Apollo invented archery, medicine and prophecy under the guidance of desire and love, so that he too will be a pupil of Love, and the Muses in the arts, Hephaestus in b
metalwork, and Athene in weaving and 'Zeus in the government of both gods and men.'[72] Hence then the activities of the gods were actually established after Love had been born among them, love of beauty, clearly—for there is no love for ugliness—but before this, as I said at the beginning, many terrible things happened among the gods, so it is said, on account of the rule of Necessity. But when this god was born, from his love of the beautiful all good things came into being for gods and men.

"Thus I think, Phaedrus, Love, being himself the first c
to be most beautiful and best, after this was the cause of other such things for others. I feel the urge coming over me to say something in verse: that he is the one who creates

Peace among men and a windless calm upon the sea
A lulling of the winds and sleep in anxiety.[73]

This is he who empties us of our estrangement and fills us d
with a sense of belonging together, having ordained that we come together at all gatherings such as this, becoming our leader at festivals, dances and sacrifices; giving us

[72] A quotation, possibly from Aeschylus, from Agathon's own work or made up by Plato.

[73] Source unknown, possibly by Agathon himself or by Plato.

γιγνόμενος ἡγεμών· πρᾳότητα μὲν πορίζων, ἀγριό-
τητα δ᾽ ἐξορίζων· φιλόδωρος | εὐμενείας, ἄδωρος δυσ-
μενείας· ἵλεως ἀγαθός· θεατὸς σοφοῖς, ἀγαστὸς θεοῖς·
ζηλωτὸς ἀμοίροις, κτητὸς εὐμοίροις· τρυφῆς, ἁβρότη-
τος, χλιδῆς, χαρίτων, ἱμέρου, πόθου πατήρ· ἐπιμελὴς
ἀγαθῶν, ἀμελὴς κακῶν· ἐν πόνῳ, ἐν φόβῳ, ἐν πόθῳ,
e ἐν λόγῳ κυβερνήτης, ἐπιβάτης, παραστάτης τε καὶ
σωτὴρ ἄριστος, συμπάντων τε θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων
κόσμος, ἡγεμὼν κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος, ᾧ χρὴ
ἕπεσθαι πάντα ἄνδρα ἐφυμνοῦντα καλῶς, ᾠδῆς μετ-
έχοντα ἣν ᾄδει θέλγων πάντων θεῶν | τε καὶ ἀνθρώ-
πων νόημα.

Οὗτος, ἔφη, ὁ παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ λόγος, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῷ θεῷ
ἀνακείσθω, τὰ μὲν παιδιᾶς, τὰ δὲ σπουδῆς μετρίας,
καθ᾽ ὅσον ἐγὼ δύναμαι, μετέχων.

198 Εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ Ἀγάθωνος πάντας ἔφη ὁ Ἀριστό-
δημος ἀναθορυβῆσαι τοὺς παρόντας, ὡς πρεπόντως
τοῦ νεανίσκου εἰρηκότος καὶ αὑτῷ καὶ τῷ θεῷ. τὸν οὖν
Σωκράτη εἰπεῖν βλέψαντα εἰς τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, Ἆρά
σοι δοκῶ, φάναι, ὦ | παῖ Ἀκουμενοῦ, ἀδεὲς πάλαι δέος
δεδιέναι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μαντικῶς ἃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι
Ἀγάθων θαυμαστῶς ἐροῖ, ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἀπορήσοιμι;

Τὸ μὲν ἕτερον, φάναι τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, μαντικῶς
μοι δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι, ὅτι Ἀγάθων εὖ ἐρεῖ· τὸ δὲ σὲ
ἀπορήσειν, | οὐκ οἶμαι.

gentleness, banishing fierceness, a generous giver of goodwill, no giver of ill will; graciously kind, to be gazed at by the wise, admired by the gods, to be envied by those who do not have a share of him, a treasured possession for those who have a generous share; the father of delicacy, luxuriousness, daintiness, charms, longing, yearning; one to take care of good things, to be uncaring of bad things; in toil, in fear, in yearning, in argument he is the best helmsman, defender, comrade in arms, lifesaver; orna- e
ment of all gods and men, finest and best leader whom everyone must follow, singing his praises well, taking part in the songs which he sings, enchanting the minds of all gods and men.[74]

"Let this speech of mine, Phaedrus, be dedicated to the god with its share on the one hand of play and on the other of a measure of seriousness, as far as I am able."

When Agathon had said this, all those present, said 198
Aristodemus, broke into thunderous applause as the young man had spoken so appropriately for himself and the god. Then Socrates looked across at Eryximachus and said: "Do you think, son of Acumenus, that the fear I expressed before was groundless, or was what I said a while ago not prophetically spoken, that Agathon would give a wonderful speech and I would be left stranded?"

"On the one point," said Eryximachus, "I think you spoke prophetically saying that Agathon would make a good speech, but on the other, that you would left stranded, I don't think so."

[74] 197dff. with balanced opposing clauses and absence of connectives is an obvious parody of the style of Gorgias, cf. Socrates' ironic comment on this passage in particular at 198b4–5.

b Καὶ πῶς, ὦ μακάριε, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, οὐ μέλλω
ἀπορεῖν καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν, μέλλων λέξειν
μετὰ καλὸν οὕτω καὶ παντοδαπὸν λόγον ῥηθέντα; καὶ
τὰ μὲν ἄλλα οὐχ ὁμοίως μὲν θαυμαστά· τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ
τελευτῆς τοῦ κάλλους | τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων
τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐξεπλάγη ἀκούων; ἐπεὶ ἔγωγε ἐνθυμούμε-
νος ὅτι αὐτὸς οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι οὐδ' ἐγγὺς τούτων
οὐδὲν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ὑπ' αἰσχύνης ὀλίγου ἀποδρὰς
c ᾠχόμην, εἴ πῃ εἶχον. καὶ γάρ με Γοργίου ὁ λόγος
ἀνεμίμνῃσκεν, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἐπε-
πόνθη· ἐφοβούμην μή μοι τελευτῶν ὁ Ἀγάθων Γορ-
γίου κεφαλὴν δεινοῦ λέγειν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὸν ἐμὸν
λόγον πέμψας αὐτόν | με λίθον τῇ ἀφωνίᾳ ποιήσειεν.
καὶ ἐνενόησα τότε ἄρα καταγέλαστος ὤν, ἡνίκα ὑμῖν
ὡμολόγουν ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθ' ὑμῶν ἐγκωμιάσεσθαι τὸν
d Ἔρωτα καὶ ἔφην εἶναι δεινὸς τὰ ἐρωτικά, οὐδὲν εἰδὼς
ἄρα τοῦ πράγματος, ὡς ἔδει ἐγκωμιάζειν ὁτιοῦν. ἐγὼ
μὲν γὰρ ὑπ' ἀβελτερίας ᾤμην δεῖν τἀληθῆ λέγειν
περὶ ἑκάστου τοῦ ἐγκωμιαζομένου, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν |
ὑπάρχειν, ἐξ αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰ κάλλιστα ἐκλεγομέ-
νους ὡς εὐπρεπέστατα τιθέναι· καὶ πάνυ δὴ μέγα
ἐφρόνουν ὡς εὖ ἐρῶν, ὡς εἰδὼς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ
ἐπαινεῖν ὁτιοῦν. τὸ δὲ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐ τοῦτο ἦν τὸ
καλῶς ἐπαινεῖν ὁτιοῦν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡς μέγιστα ἀνατιθέ-

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[75] See the previous note. Here Socrates is punning on the similar sound of Gorgias and Gorgon, the Gorgon Medusa, a dreadful monster the sight of whose gaze turned the looker to

"And how, my good fellow," said Socrates, "am I and b
anyone else not going to be left at a loss when I'm about to speak after a speech that has been delivered so beautifully and in so rich and varied a manner? The rest was not quite as amazing, but toward the end who would not have been astounded on hearing the beauty of the words and expressions? Since I was thinking that I myself will not be able to say anything anywhere near as fine as this, I almost ran away out of shame, and was gone, if I'd had anywhere
to go. You see, the speech reminded me of Gorgias, that c
what Homer described had really happened to me: I was afraid that as he brought his speech to an end, Agathon would send me the head of Gorgias the clever speaker to deliver his speech against my speech and turn me to stone and render me speechless.[75] And it was then I actually realized I was being very silly when I agreed to sing the
praises of Love, taking my turn with you all, saying that I d
was an expert on the subject of love, given that I actually knew nothing of the subject, how one ought to praise anything whatever. You see, in my simplemindedness I thought I had to tell the truth about everything which was being praised, and that was the basis, and from that we had to choose the best of these aspects and set them out in the most fitting way possible; and indeed I was really very confident that I would speak well, as I assumed I knew the true way to praise anything whatsoever. But the fact is, so it seems, that this was not the way to praise anything whatsoever well, but to ascribe the greatest and finest details

stone. (Pindar, *Pythian Ode* 10.44–48). The Homeric reference: in the *Odyssey* (11.633–35), Odysseus quits Hades in fear that if he stayed he might encounter a monster such as the Gorgon.

ναι τῷ πράγματι καὶ ὡς κάλλιστα, ἐάν τε ᾖ οὕτως
e *ἔχοντα ἐάν τε μή· εἰ δὲ ψευδῆ, οὐδὲν ἄρ' ἦν πρᾶγμα.*
προυρρήθη γάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅπως ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τὸν
Ἔρωτα ἐγκωμιάζειν δόξει, οὐχ ὅπως ἐγκωμιάσεται.
διὰ ταῦτα δὴ | οἶμαι πάντα λόγον κινοῦντες ἀνατίθετε
τῷ Ἔρωτι, καί φατε αὐτὸν τοιοῦτόν τε εἶναι καὶ τοσ-
ούτων αἴτιον, ὅπως ἂν φαίνηται ὡς κάλλιστος καὶ
199 *ἄριστος, δῆλον ὅτι τοῖς μὴ γιγνώσκουσιν—οὐ γὰρ*
δήπου τοῖς γε εἰδόσιν—καὶ καλῶς γ' ἔχει καὶ σεμνῶς
ὁ ἔπαινος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐγὼ οὐκ ᾔδη ἄρα τὸν τρόπον τοῦ
ἐπαίνου, οὐ δ' εἰδὼς ὑμῖν ὡμολόγησα καὶ αὐτὸς | ἐν
τῷ μέρει ἐπαινέσεσθαι. “ἡ γλῶσσα οὖν ὑπέσχετο, ἡ
δὲ φρὴν οὔ·” χαιρέτω δή. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐγκωμιάζω τοῦτον
τὸν τρόπον—οὐ γὰρ ἂν δυναίμην—οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τά
b *γε ἀληθῆ, εἰ βούλεσθε, ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν κατ' ἐμαυτόν, οὐ*
πρὸς τοὺς ὑμετέρους λόγους, ἵνα μὴ γέλωτα ὄφλω.
ὅρα οὖν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἴ τι καὶ τοιούτου λόγου δέῃ, περὶ
Ἔρωτος τἀληθῆ λεγόμενα ἀκούειν, ὀνομάσει δὲ καὶ
θέσει ῥημάτων τοιαύτῃ ὁποία δἄν | τις τύχῃ ἐπελ-
θοῦσα.

Τὸν οὖν Φαῖδρον ἔφη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κελεύειν λέγειν, ὅπῃ αὐτὸς οἴοιτο δεῖν εἰπεῖν, ταύτῃ.

Ἔτι τοίνυν, φάναι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, πάρες μοι Ἀγάθωνα

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76 Euripides, *Hippolytus* 612.

77 Plato's Socrates also makes this claim of spontaneity at the beginning of his own trial speech in *Apology* (17c). See also the same claim made by Pausanias on his speech at 185c3.

possible to the subject, whether they are really like this or
not. But if they are false, then it's no matter. For it seems e
it's been proposed how each of us should give the appearance of praising Love, not how we should actually praise him. For these reasons then I think you are digging up everything you can say and ascribing it to Love, and you claim that he is of such a kind and responsible for so many things in order that he may appear to be the finest and the
best possible, obviously for people who do not know 199
him—for it surely couldn't be for those who do—and the eulogy is certainly delivered in a fine and impressive manner. But you see I was not actually aware of the method of the eulogy and in my ignorance I agreed with you that I too would praise him when it came to my turn. 'My tongue therefore made the promise, but not my mind.'[76] So much for that! You see I'm not making another eulogy in that style—well I couldn't—but all the same the truth I am willing, if you wish, to speak, in accordance with my own
principles, not in reply to your speeches, so that I don't b
incur ridicule. So, Phaedrus, consider whether there really is any need for such a speech as well, and to hear the truth spoken about Love with such wording and arrangement of phrases as might happen to come to mind."[77]

Accordingly, Aristodemus said, Phaedrus and the others told him to speak in whatever way he thought he ought to.

"In that case, Phaedrus," he said, "let me ask Agathon just a few little questions, so when I've got his agreement

σμίκρ᾽ ἄττα ἐρέσθαι, ἵνα ἀνομολογησάμενος παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ οὕτως ἤδη | λέγω.

c Ἀλλὰ παρίημι, φάναι τὸν Φαῖδρον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐρώτα. μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ τὸν Σωκράτη ἔφη ἐνθένδε ποθὲν ἄρξασθαι.

Καὶ μήν, ὦ φίλε Ἀγάθων, καλῶς μοι ἔδοξας καθηγήσασθαι τοῦ λόγου, λέγων ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν δέοι αὐτὸν ἐπιδεῖξαι | ὁποῖός τίς ἐστιν ὁ Ἔρως, ὕστερον δὲ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ. ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν πάνυ ἄγαμαι. ἴθι οὖν μοι περὶ Ἔρωτος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τἆλλα καλῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς διῆλθες οἷός ἐστι, καὶ τόδε εἰπέ· πότερόν ἐστι τοιοῦτος οἷος εἶναί τινος ὁ Ἔρως ἔρως, ἢ
d οὐδενός; ἐρωτῶ δ᾽ οὐκ εἰ μητρός τινος ἢ πατρός ἐστιν—γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐρώτημα εἰ Ἔρως ἐστὶν ἔρως μητρὸς ἢ πατρός—ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα | ἠρώτων, ἆρα ὁ πατήρ ἐστι πατήρ τινος ἢ οὔ; εἶπες ἂν δήπου μοι, εἰ ἐβούλου καλῶς ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι ἔστιν ὑέος γε ἢ θυγατρὸς ὁ πατὴρ πατήρ· ἢ οὔ;

Πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν Ἀγάθωνα.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ὡσαύτως; Ὁμολογεῖσθαι καὶ
e τοῦτο. Ἔτι τοίνυν, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀπόκριναι ὀλίγῳ πλείω, ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθῃς ὃ βούλομαι. εἰ γὰρ ἐροίμην, "Τί δέ; ἀδελφός, αὐτὸ τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ ἔστιν, ἔστι τινὸς ἀδελφὸς ἢ οὔ;" Φάναι εἶναι. |

Οὐκοῦν ἀδελφοῦ ἢ ἀδελφῆς; Ὁμολογεῖν.

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[78] For ironic admiration and self-deprecation followed by a

I can then go ahead and then make my speech on that basis."[78]

"Well I'll let you do that," said Phaedrus; "go on and ask him." After this, Aristodemus said, Socrates began from some point such as this: c

"Well now, my dear Agathon, I thought you started off your speech well when you said one should show first what sort of being Love is, and after this his achievements. I very much admire an opening such as that. So, on the subject of Love, since you explained what sort he is in other respects in a fine and splendid way, come on then and tell me this too: is Love of the sort to be love of something or of nothing? I'm not asking if he's (born) of some d mother or father—for it would be absurd to ask if Love is of a mother or father in that sense—but just as if I were asking that same question about a father: is the father a father of someone or not? I'm sure you'd tell me, if you wanted to give me the right answer that the father is father of a son or a daughter. Isn't that so?"

"Certainly," said Agathon.

"And therefore the same with the mother?" He agreed with this too. "Going on then," said Socrates, "answer a e few more questions, so you may understand better what I mean. If I were to ask: What about this point? A brother, in so far as he is so, is he brother of someone, or not?" He said he was.

"That is, of a brother or a sister?" He agreed.

disarming request to answer "a few little questions" as a prelude to a rigorous Socratic *elenchus* (examination of beliefs for purposes of refutation), see also *Protagoras* 328dff.

Πειρῶ δή, φάναι, καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα εἰπεῖν. ὁ Ἔρως ἔρως ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔστιν.

200 Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, φύλαξον παρὰ σαυτῷ μεμνημένος ὅτου· τοσόνδε δὲ εἰπέ, πότερον ὁ Ἔρως ἐκείνου οὗ ἔστιν ἔρως, ἐπιθυμεῖ αὐτοῦ ἢ οὔ;

Πάνυ γε, φάναι. |

Πότερον ἔχων αὐτὸ οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καὶ ἐρᾷ, εἶτα ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καὶ ἐρᾷ, ἢ οὐκ ἔχων;

Οὐκ ἔχων, ὡς τὸ εἰκός γε, φάναι.

Σκόπει δή, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰκότος εἰ ἀνάγκη οὕτως, τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἐπιθυμεῖν οὗ ἐνδεές
b ἐστιν, ἢ μὴ ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ἐνδεὲς ᾖ; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ θαυμαστῶς δοκεῖ, ὦ Ἀγάθων, ὡς ἀνάγκη εἶναι· σοὶ δὲ πῶς;

Κἀμοί, φάναι, δοκεῖ.

Καλῶς λέγεις. ἆρ᾽ οὖν βούλοιτ᾽ ἄν τις μέγας ὢν μέγας | εἶναι, ἢ ἰσχυρὸς ὢν ἰσχυρός;

Ἀδύνατον ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων.

Οὐ γάρ που ἐνδεὴς ἂν εἴη τούτων ὅ γε ὤν.

Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ὢν βούλοιτο ἰσχυρὸς εἶναι, φάναι τὸν | Σωκράτη, καὶ ταχὺς ὢν ταχύς, καὶ ὑγιὴς ὢν ὑγιής—ἴσως γὰρ ἄν τις ταῦτα οἰηθείη καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς ὄντας τε τοιούτους καὶ ἔχοντας ταῦτα
c τούτων ἅπερ ἔχουσι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἵν᾽ οὖν μὴ ἐξαπατηθῶμεν, τούτου ἕνεκα λέγω—τούτοις γάρ, ὦ Ἀγά-

"Then try," he said, "and apply this to love also. Is Love love of nothing or of something?"

"Of something, certainly."

"Well then," said Socrates, "keep this in mind and re- 200
member what it is the love of.[79] Tell me this much: does Love desire that which he is the love of, or not?"

"Indeed he does," he replied.

"Does he desire and love what he desires and loves when he has it, or when he doesn't?"

"When he doesn't, as is likely, at least," he said.

"Consider then," said Socrates, "if, instead of that 'likely,' it must necessarily be like this: what desires desires
what it lacks, or if it's not lacking it doesn't desire it? For b
it seems extraordinary to me, Agathon, how compelling that is. How does it look to you?"

"It seems so to me too," he said.

"You're right. Would someone want to be big, if he was big, or strong, if he was strong?"

"It's impossible according to what we have agreed."

"Yes, for presumably he wouldn't be lacking these attributes if he had them."

"You're right."

"Yes, for if he wanted to be strong even when he was strong," said Socrates, "and he wanted to be quick when he was quick, and healthy when he was healthy—for perhaps one might think that in these and in all cases of this sort people who have these sort of qualities also desire
what they have; the reason I mention them is in order that c

[79] Socrates is probably referring to his previous statement (Love is love of something) coupled with Agathon's previous assertions in his speech of the objects of Love (197d).

θων, εἰ ἐννοεῖς, ἔχειν μὲν ἕκαστα τούτων ἐν τῷ παρ-
όντι ἀνάγκη ἃ ἔχουσιν, ἐάντε βούλωνται | ἐάντε μή,
καὶ τούτου γε δήπου τίς ἂν ἐπιθυμήσειεν; ἀλλ' ὅταν
τις λέγῃ ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑγιαίνων βούλομαι καὶ ὑγιαίνειν,
καὶ πλουτῶν βούλομαι καὶ πλουτεῖν, καὶ ἐπιθυμῶ
αὐτῶν τούτων ἃ ἔχω, εἴποιμεν ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι σύ, ὦ ἄν-
θρωπε, πλοῦτον κεκτημένος καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν
βούλει καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ταῦτα κεκτῆσθαι,
d ἐπεὶ ἐν τῷ γε νῦν παρόντι, εἴτε βούλει εἴτε μή, ἔχεις·
σκόπει οὖν, ὅταν τοῦτο λέγῃς, ὅτι ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν παρ-
όντων, εἰ ἄλλο τι λέγεις | ἢ τόδε, ὅτι βούλομαι τὰ νῦν
παρόντα καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον παρεῖναι. ἄλλο τι
ὁμολογοῖ ἄν; Συμφάναι ἔφη τὸν Ἀγάθωνα.

Εἰπεῖν δὴ τὸν Σωκράτη, Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶν
ἐκείνου ἐρᾶν, ὃ οὔπω ἕτοιμον αὐτῷ ἐστιν οὐδὲ ἔχει, τὸ
εἰς τὸν | ἔπειτα χρόνον ταῦτα εἶναι αὐτῷ σῳζόμενα
καὶ παρόντα;

e Πάνυ γε, φάναι.

Καὶ οὗτος ἄρα καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς ὁ ἐπιθυμῶν τοῦ μὴ
ἑτοίμου ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ τοῦ μὴ παρόντος, καὶ ὃ μὴ ἔχει
καὶ ὃ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτὸς καὶ οὗ ἐνδεής ἐστι, τοιαῦτ' ἄττα
ἐστὶν ὧν ἡ ἐπιθυμία | τε καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐστίν;

Πάνυ γ', εἰπεῖν.

Ἴθι δή, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀνομολογησώμεθα τὰ
εἰρημένα. ἄλλο τι ἔστιν ὁ Ἔρως πρῶτον μὲν τινῶν,
ἔπειτα τούτων ὧν ἂν ἔνδεια παρῇ αὐτῷ;

201 Ναί, φάναι.

Ἐπὶ δὴ τούτοις ἀναμνήσθητι τίνων ἔφησθα ἐν τῷ

we should not be misled—you see, if you think about these people, Agathon, they must have each of these attributes that they do have at the present time, whether they want them or not, and I wonder who would desire this? But when someone says 'I am healthy and I wish also to be healthy, and I am rich, and wish to be rich and I desire these things which I have,' we would say to him: 'You, my friend, being in possession of wealth and health and strength, want to possess them for the future as well, since d
you have them now in the present, whether you want them or not.' Therefore consider, when you say 'I desire what I have at the present time,' if you mean something other than this, that 'I want what I have now at the present time to be there in the future too.' Surely he would agree?" Aristodemus said that Agathon assented.

Then Socrates said: "Therefore doesn't this mean to love that thing which is not yet available for him and he doesn't yet have, that is, for these things to be preserved and present for him in the future?"

"Very much so," he said. e

"Then this person and everyone else also who desires, desires what is not available and is not to hand, and what he does not have and what he himself is not and what he is lacking: are these the kinds of thing for which there is desire and love?"

"Very much so," he said.

"Come on then," said Socrates, "let's summarize what we've agreed on. Firstly Love is surely love of certain things, and secondly for those things of which he has a lack?"

"Yes," he said. 201

"This being so, remember what you said in your speech

λόγῳ εἶναι τὸν Ἔρωτα· εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἐγώ σε ἀναμνήσω. οἶμαι γάρ σε οὑτωσί πως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοῖς θεοῖς κατεσκευάσθη τὰ | πράγματα δι᾽ ἔρωτα καλῶν· αἰσχρῶν γὰρ οὐκ εἴη ἔρως. οὐχ οὑτωσί πως ἔλεγες;

Εἶπον γάρ, φάναι τὸν Ἀγάθωνα.

Καὶ ἐπιεικῶς γε λέγεις, ὦ ἑταῖρε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἄλλο τι ὁ Ἔρως κάλλους ἂν εἴη | ἔρως, αἴσχους δὲ οὔ; Ὡμολόγει.

b Οὐκοῦν ὡμολόγηται, οὗ ἐνδεής ἐστι καὶ μὴ ἔχει, τούτου ἐρᾶν;

Ναί, εἰπεῖν.

Ἐνδεὴς ἄρ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἔχει ὁ Ἔρως κάλλος. |

Ἀνάγκη, φάναι.

Τί δέ; τὸ ἐνδεὲς κάλλους καὶ μηδαμῇ κεκτημένον κάλλος ἆρα λέγεις σὺ καλὸν εἶναι;

Οὐ δῆτα.

Ἔτι οὖν ὁμολογεῖς Ἔρωτα καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως | ἔχει;

Καὶ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα εἰπεῖν Κινδυνεύω, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲν εἰδέναι ὧν τότε εἶπον.

c Καὶ μὴν καλῶς γε εἶπες, φάναι, ὦ Ἀγάθων. ἀλλὰ σμικρὸν ἔτι εἰπέ· τἀγαθὰ οὐ καὶ καλὰ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι;

Ἔμοιγε.

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80 See Agathon's speech, 197b.

81 At 200a9–b2.

were the objects of Love; if you wish, I will remind you. You see I think you said something like this: the activities of the gods were established through their love of beautiful things: for there is no love of ugly things.[80] Is this the sort of thing you said?"

"Yes, that's what I said," said Agathon.

"And what you say is quite reasonable, my friend, said Socrates; and if this is the case could Love be anything else but love of beauty, and not of ugliness?" He agreed it was love of beauty.

"Wasn't it then agreed that he loves what he lacks and b doesn't have?"[81]

"Yes," he said.

"Then Love is lacking and does not possess beauty."

"That must be so," he said.

"What? Are you really saying that what lacks beauty and doesn't possess it in any way is beautiful?"

"No, not at all."

"Then do you still agree that Love is beautiful, if this is the case?"

Agathon said: "it rather looks, Socrates, as if I didn't understand anything about what I was saying then."[82]

"And yet you spoke beautifully, Agathon, he said. But c still tell me just a little thing: do you not think good things are also beautiful?"

"I do."

82 Agathon's immediate and total capitulation here is not typical of Plato's interlocutors under pressure, e.g., Protagoras in *Protagoras* 329dff., Thrasymachus in *Republic* 1.337ff. Plato clearly wants his Socrates to get on with the argument.

Εἰ ἄρα ὁ Ἔρως τῶν καλῶν ἐνδεής ἐστι, τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ | καλά, κἂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐνδεὴς εἴη.

Ἐγώ, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοὶ οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως ἐχέτω ὡς σὺ λέγεις.

Οὐ μὲν οὖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, φάναι, ὦ φιλούμενε Ἀγάθων, δύνασαι ἀντιλέγειν, ἐπεὶ Σωκράτει γε οὐδὲν χαλεπόν.

d Καὶ σὲ μέν γε ἤδη ἐάσω· τὸν δὲ λόγον τὸν περὶ τοῦ Ἔρωτος, ὅν ποτ᾽ ἤκουσα γυναικὸς Μαντινικῆς Διοτίμας, ἣ ταῦτά τε σοφὴ ἦν καὶ ἄλλα πολλά—καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ποτὲ θυσαμένοις πρὸ τοῦ λοιμοῦ δέκα ἔτη ἀναβολὴν ἐποίησε τῆς | νόσου, ἣ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἐδίδαξεν—ὃν οὖν ἐκείνη ἔλεγε λόγον, πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διελθεῖν ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἐμοὶ καὶ Ἀγάθωνι, αὐτὸς ἐπ᾽ ἐμαυτοῦ, ὅπως ἂν δύνωμαι. δεῖ δή, ὦ Ἀγάθων, ὥσπερ σὺ διηγήσω, διελθεῖν αὐτὸν πρῶτον, τίς ἐστιν ὁ Ἔρως καὶ ποῖός τις, ἔπειτα τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ.
e δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ῥᾷστον εἶναι οὕτω διελθεῖν, ὥς ποτέ με ἡ ξένη ἀνακρίνουσα διῄει. σχεδὸν γάρ τι καὶ ἐγὼ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἔλεγον οἷάπερ νῦν πρὸς ἐμὲ

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83 Socrates' "little thing," here, the association of "good" and "beautiful" (c2), is a vital link in the chain of argument resurfacing again at 204d–e and relies to some extent on the overlap in Greek between these terms (*agathon* and *kalon*); see Introduction, §3(ii).

"If then Love is lacking in beautiful things, and good things are beautiful, then he would be lacking in good things too."[83]

"I cannot argue against you, Socrates; well then, let it be as you say."

"No," he said, "it is rather the truth that you cannot argue against, my beloved Agathon," said Socrates, "since there's nothing difficult about arguing against Socrates.

The Speech of Socrates

"And now I'm going to let you be. But I want to take up d
the account of Love which I once heard from a woman from Mantinea, Diotima, who was an expert in these and many other matters—once before the plague she caused a ten year delay in the sickness after the Athenians had performed sacrifices, and she it was who also taught me about love—now the account which she gave I shall try to go through with you all on my own in whatever way I can, on the basis of what Agathon and I agreed on.[84] Just as you led the way, Agathon, I myself must first explain about Love himself, who he is and what he is like and then what he does. So it seems to me easiest to go through it in the e
following way, as once the stranger did when she examined me. For I was saying to her other things of pretty well the

[84] For Diotima as an invention of Plato, see Introduction §3(i) and n. 22. There is no clear evidence that the Athenians had reason to fear a plague ten years before it actually happened in 430.

| Ἀγάθων, ὡς εἴη ὁ Ἔρως μέγας θεός, εἴη δὲ τῶν καλῶν· ἤλεγχε δή με τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις οἷσπερ ἐγὼ τοῦτον, ὡς οὔτε καλὸς εἴη κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον οὔτε ἀγαθός.

Καὶ ἐγώ, Πῶς λέγεις, ἔφην, ὦ Διοτίμα; αἰσχρὸς ἄρα ὁ Ἔρως ἐστὶ καὶ κακός; |

Καὶ ἥ, Οὐκ εὐφημήσεις; ἔφη· ἢ οἴει, ὅτι ἂν μὴ καλὸν ᾖ, ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ εἶναι αἰσχρόν;

202 Μάλιστά γε.

Ἦ καὶ ἂν μὴ σοφόν, ἀμαθές; ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι ἔστιν τι μεταξὺ σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας;

Τί τοῦτο; |

Τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι οὐκ οἶσθ', ἔφη, ὅτι οὔτε ἐπίστασθαί ἐστιν—ἄλογον γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη;—οὔτε ἀμαθία—τὸ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος τυγχάνον πῶς ἂν εἴη ἀμαθία;—ἔστι δὲ δήπου τοιοῦτον ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα, μεταξὺ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας. |

Ἀληθῆ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις.

b Μὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκαζε ὃ μὴ καλόν ἐστιν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι, μηδὲ ὃ μὴ ἀγαθόν, κακόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ καλόν, μηδέν τι μᾶλλον οἴου δεῖν αὐτὸν αἰσχρὸν καὶ κακὸν εἶναι, ἀλλά τι | μεταξύ, ἔφη, τούτοιν.

Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁμολογεῖταί γε παρὰ πάντων μέγας θεὸς εἶναι.

sort Agathon said to me just now, how Love was a great god and was love of beautiful things; she examined me with those arguments with which I examined him: that he is neither beautiful according to my argument, nor good.

"So I said: 'What do you mean, Diotima? Is Eros actually ugly and bad?'

"And she said: 'Mind what you say![85] Or do you think that whatever is not beautiful must be ugly?'

"I certainly do. 202

"'Would that mean also that what is not wise is ignorant? Or haven't you realized that there is something between wisdom and ignorance?'

"'What is that?'

"'Do you not know,' she said, 'that to form correct beliefs, but without giving a rational account of them, is neither to have knowledge—for how could something irrational be knowledge? Nor could it be ignorance—for how could chancing upon what is true be ignorance? Correct belief, I suppose, would be the sort of thing which is in between understanding and ignorance.'

"'What you say is true,' I said.

"'Well then, don't insist that what is not beautiful has b
to be ugly, and that what is not good, bad. Thus with Love too, since you yourself admit that he is not good and not beautiful, do not think any more for that reason that he must be ugly and bad, but rather something between those two,' she said.

"'And yet,' I said, 'it's agreed by everyone that he's a great god.'

[85] Literally, "Won't you speak auspicious words?"

Τῶν μὴ εἰδότων, ἔφη, πάντων λέγεις, ἢ καὶ τῶν εἰδότων;

Συμπάντων μὲν οὖν. |

c Καὶ ἣ γελάσασα Καὶ πῶς ἄν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁμολογοῖτο μέγας θεὸς εἶναι παρὰ τούτων, οἵ φασιν αὐτὸν οὐδὲ θεὸν εἶναι;

Τίνες οὗτοι; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Εἷς μέν, ἔφη, σύ, μία δ' ἐγώ. |

Κἀγὼ εἶπον, Πῶς τοῦτο, ἔφην, λέγεις;

Καὶ ἥ, Ῥᾳδίως, ἔφη. λέγε γάρ μοι, οὐ πάντας θεοὺς φῄς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι καὶ καλούς; ἢ τολμήσαις ἄν τινα μὴ φάναι καλόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα θεῶν εἶναι;

Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφην. |

Εὐδαίμονας δὲ δὴ λέγεις οὐ τοὺς τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ κεκτημένους;

Πάνυ γε.

d Ἀλλὰ μὴν Ἔρωτά γε ὡμολόγηκας δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν τούτων ὧν ἐνδεής ἐστιν.

Ὡμολόγηκα γάρ. |

Πῶς ἂν οὖν θεὸς εἴη ὅ γε τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἄμοιρος;

Οὐδαμῶς, ὥς γ' ἔοικεν.

Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι καὶ σὺ Ἔρωτα οὐ θεὸν νομίζεις;

Τί οὖν ἄν, ἔφην, εἴη ὁ Ἔρως; θνητός;

Ἥκιστά γε. |

Ἀλλὰ τί μήν;

"'By everyone you mean by all those who do not know,' she said, 'or do you mean those who are in the know as well?'

"'I mean the whole lot.'

"And laughing she said: 'And how, Socrates, could it be c admitted that he is a great god by those who say he's not a god at all?'

"'Who are these people?' I asked.

"'You're one of them,' she said, 'and I'm another.'

"And I replied: 'How can you say that?'

"'Easily,' she said. 'For instance, tell me, do you not say that all the gods are happy and beautiful? Or would you have the courage to deny that any one of the gods is beautiful and happy?'

"'I certainly would not, by Zeus.'

"'But don't you call happy those who possess what is beautiful and good?'

"'Very much so.'

"'And yet you have agreed that in the case of Love it's d through a lack of good and beautiful things that he desires those very things he's lacking.'

"'Yes, I have agreed that.'

"'Then how could he be a god if he has no share of beautiful and good things?'

"'He can't be in any way, it seems.'

"'So do you see,' she said, 'that you too believe that Love is not a god?'

"'So then,' I said, 'what could Love be? Mortal?'

"'Not at all.'

"'Well what then?'

Ὥσπερ τὰ πρότερα, ἔφη, μεταξὺ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου.

Τί οὖν, ὦ Διοτίμα;

Δαίμων μέγας, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστι θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ.

e Τίνα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δύναμιν ἔχον;

Ἑρμηνεῦον καὶ διαπορθμεῦον θεοῖς τὰ παρ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν, τῶν μὲν τὰς δεήσεις καὶ | θυσίας, τῶν δὲ τὰς ἐπιτάξεις τε καὶ ἀμοιβὰς τῶν θυσιῶν, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ὂν ἀμφοτέρων συμπληροῖ, ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ συνδεδέσθαι. διὰ τούτου καὶ ἡ μαντικὴ πᾶσα χωρεῖ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἱερέων τέχνη τῶν τε περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τελετὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπῳδὰς καὶ τὴν
203 μαντείαν πᾶσαν καὶ γοητείαν. θεὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μείγνυται, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτου πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ὁμιλία καὶ ἡ διάλεκτος θεοῖς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἐγρηγορόσι καὶ καθεύδουσι· καὶ ὁ μὲν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς | δαιμόνιος ἀνήρ, ὁ δὲ ἄλλο τι σοφὸς ὢν ἢ περὶ τέχνας ἢ χειρουργίας τινὰς βάναυσος. οὗτοι δὴ οἱ δαίμονες πολλοὶ καὶ παντοδαποί εἰσιν, εἷς δὲ τούτων ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ Ἔρως.

Πατρὸς δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τίνος ἐστὶ καὶ μητρός;

b Μακρότερον μέν, ἔφη, διηγήσασθαι· ὅμως δέ σοι ἐρῶ. ὅτε γὰρ ἐγένετο ἡ Ἀφροδίτη, ἡστιῶντο οἱ θεοὶ οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Μήτιδος ὑὸς Πόρος. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐδείπνησαν, προσαιτήσουσα οἷον δὴ εὐωχίας οὔσης

"'As in the previous cases,' she said, 'between mortal and immortal.'

"'So what is he, Diotima?'

"'A great spirit,[86] Socrates, for everything concerned with spirits lies between god and mortal.'

"'What function does it have?' I asked. e

"'To interpret and communicate the affairs of men to the gods and from the gods to men, the petitions and sacrifices of the former, and of the latter the commands and favors returned for the sacrifices, and, being in the middle of both, it fills the gap between them, so that the whole is bound together into one. Through this also all divination proceeds, the skill of priests and those engaged in sacrifice and ritual and incantations and the whole of prophecy and
magic. God does not mix with humanity, but by this means 203
all exchange and communication from the gods to humans takes place both when they are awake and when asleep. The man who is wise in these matters is a man inspired spiritually, but he who is experienced in any other way about some kinds of skills and crafts is concerned with the material world.[87] These divine spirits, then, are many and of many different sorts, and one of these is Love.'

"'Who are his father and mother?' I asked.

"'It's rather a long haul to go through it, she said, but b
nevertheless, I shall tell you. For when Aphrodite was born, all the gods celebrated, and among them was Porus the son of Metis. While they were feasting Penia arrived

86 "Spirit" = *daimōn*, a semidivine being, offspring of gods or gods and mortals, who serves as intermediary between gods and mortals.

87 "Concerned with the material world" (materialistic) = *banausos*, someone practicing manual occupations.

ἀφίκετο ἡ Πενία, καὶ | ἦν περὶ τὰς θύρας. ὁ οὖν Πόρος
μεθυσθεὶς τοῦ νέκταρος—οἶνος γὰρ οὔπω ἦν—εἰς τὸν
τοῦ Διὸς κῆπον εἰσελθὼν βεβαρημένος ηὗδεν. ἡ οὖν
Πενία ἐπιβουλεύουσα διὰ τὴν αὑτῆς ἀπορίαν παιδίον
ποιήσασθαι ἐκ τοῦ Πόρου, κατακλίνεταί τε παρ' αὐτῷ
c καὶ ἐκύησε τὸν Ἔρωτα. διὸ δὴ καὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης
ἀκόλουθος καὶ θεράπων γέγονεν ὁ Ἔρως, γεννηθεὶς
ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνης γενεθλίοις, καὶ ἅμα φύσει ἐραστὴς ὢν
περὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης καλῆς οὔσης. | ἅτε
οὖν Πόρου καὶ Πενίας ὑὸς ὢν ὁ Ἔρως ἐν τοιαύτῃ
τύχῃ καθέστηκεν. πρῶτον μὲν πένης ἀεί ἐστι, καὶ
πολλοῦ δεῖ ἁπαλός τε καὶ καλός, οἷον οἱ πολλοὶ οἴον-
ται, ἀλλὰ σκληρὸς καὶ αὐχμηρὸς καὶ ἀνυπόδητος καὶ
d ἄοικος, χαμαιπετὴς ἀεὶ ὢν καὶ ἄστρωτος, ἐπὶ θύραις
καὶ ἐν ὁδοῖς ὑπαίθριος κοιμώμενος, τὴν τῆς μητρὸς
φύσιν ἔχων, ἀεὶ ἐνδείᾳ σύνοικος. κατὰ δὲ αὖ τὸν πα-
τέρα ἐπίβουλός ἐστι τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ τοῖς | ἀγαθοῖς,
ἀνδρεῖος ὢν καὶ ἴτης καὶ σύντονος, θηρευτὴς δεινός,
ἀεί τινας πλέκων μηχανάς, καὶ φρονήσεως ἐπιθυμη-
τὴς καὶ πόριμος, φιλοσοφῶν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου,
e δεινὸς γόης καὶ φαρμακεὺς καὶ σοφιστής· καὶ οὔτε ὡς
ἀθάνατος πέφυκεν οὔτε ὡς θνητός, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν τῆς
αὐτῆς ἡμέρας θάλλει τε καὶ ζῇ, ὅταν εὐπορήσῃ, τοτὲ

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[88] Porus = "Resource," Metis = "Cunning" (according to Hesiod, *Theogony* 886ff., the first wife of Zeus). Penia = "Poverty."

[89] "In relation to," translates the preposition *peri*, a variation on the usual genitive (cf. also 204b3).This usage may be signifi-

begging, as indeed happens when a party is in progress, and was around the doors.[88] Now Porus, drunk on nectar—for wine did not yet exist—had gone into the garden of Zeus and, overcome with drink, was fast asleep. So Penia through her lack of resource contrived a plan to have a child of Porus, and she lay with him and conceived
Love. That is indeed why it was Aphrodite whose atten- c
dant and follower Love became, having been conceived on her birthday, and also because he is naturally a lover in relation to beauty,[89] and Aphrodite is beautiful. Inasmuch as he is the son of Porus and Penia this is the situation Love finds himself in: firstly he is always poor, and is far from being delicate and beautiful as most people think,
but hard and squalid, unshod and homeless; he always d
sleeps on the ground without any bedding, he lies in doorways and by the roadside under the open sky; and, naturally taking after his mother, he lives with constant need. But again, taking after his father, he is a schemer for those things which are beautiful and good, being brave, impetuous and intense, a cunning huntsman, always weaving various schemes, desiring understanding and resourceful at acquiring it, a lover of wisdom all his life, a clever magi-
cian, a sorcerer, and a sophist.[90] And he has the nature e
neither of an immortal nor a mortal, but at one moment within the same day he is alive and flourishing when he's

cant in view of what Diotima goes on to say: Eros is, strictly speaking, not love of the beautiful, but of "giving birth in the beautiful" (206e5).

90 "Sophist" (*sophistēs*) has positive or negative connotations; the name, like "magician, sorcerer," is ambivalent—a force for good or evil.

δὲ ἀποθνῄσκει, πάλιν δὲ ἀναβιώσκεται διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς φύσιν, τὸ δὲ ποριζόμενον ἀεὶ ὑπεκρεῖ, ὥστε οὔτε ἀπορεῖ Ἔρως ποτὲ | οὔτε πλουτεῖ, σοφίας τε αὖ
204 καὶ ἀμαθίας ἐν μέσῳ ἐστίν. ἔχει γὰρ ὧδε. θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ οὐδ᾽ ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι—ἔστι γάρ—οὐδ᾽ εἴ τις ἄλλος σοφός, οὐ φιλοσοφεῖ. οὐδ᾽ αὖ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν οὐδ᾽ ἐπιθυμοῦσι σοφοὶ γενέσθαι· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστι χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ | ὄντα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν μηδὲ φρόνιμον δοκεῖν αὑτῷ εἶναι ἱκανόν. οὔκουν ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ μὴ οἰόμενος ἐνδεὴς εἶναι οὗ ἂν μὴ οἴηται ἐπιδεῖσθαι.

Τίνες οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Διοτίμα, οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες, εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφοὶ μήτε οἱ ἀμαθεῖς;

b Δῆλον δή, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε ἤδη καὶ παιδί, ὅτι οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, ὧν ἂν εἴη καὶ ὁ Ἔρως. ἔστιν γὰρ δὴ τῶν καλλίστων ἡ σοφία, Ἔρως δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἔρως περὶ τὸ καλόν, ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον Ἔρωτα φιλόσοφον εἶναι, φιλόσοφον δὲ | ὄντα μεταξὺ εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ ἀμαθοῦς. αἰτία δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τούτων ἡ γένεσις· πατρὸς μὲν γὰρ σοφοῦ ἐστι καὶ εὐπόρου, μητρὸς δὲ οὐ σοφῆς καὶ ἀπόρου. ἡ μὲν οὖν φύσις τοῦ δαίμονος, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, αὕτη· ὃν δὲ σὺ ᾠήθης Ἔρωτα εἶναι,
c θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν ἔπαθες. ᾠήθης δέ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τεκμαιρομένῃ ἐξ ὧν σὺ λέγεις, τὸ ἐρώμενον Ἔρωτα εἶναι, οὐ τὸ ἐρῶν· διὰ ταῦτά σοι οἶμαι πάγκαλος ἐφαίνετο ὁ Ἔρως. καὶ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ ἐραστὸν τὸ τῷ ὄντι

doing well, at another he dies, but comes to life again because of the nature of his father, but his resources are always slowly ebbing away, so that Love is never without resources at any moment, but neither is he wealthy: again he is in between wisdom and ignorance. You see it's like this: none of the gods is a lover of wisdom and none of 204
them desires to become wise, for they are so: nor, if anyone else is wise, does he love wisdom. Nor again do the ignorant love wisdom or desire to become wise. For this is the real difficulty with ignorance: in not being fine and good nor wise, one thinks oneself quite adequate. So he who does not think he is lacking has no desire for that which he does not think he lacks.'

"'Then who are they, Diotima,' I said, 'who love wisdom, if they are neither the wise nor the ignorant?'

"'Well, that's surely clear by now, she said, even to a b
child, that it's those who are in between both of these groups, of whom Love will be one. For wisdom is one of the most beautiful things, and Love is love in relation to the beautiful, so that it must be that Love is a lover of wisdom, and being a lover of wisdom he is in between wise and ignorant. Again, the reason for this is his birth, for he comes from a father who is wise and resourceful, but from a mother who is not wise and has no resources. This then, my dear Socrates, is the nature of the spirit.[91] But as for whom you thought Love to be, there's nothing surprising in the impression you received. It seems to me, judging by c
what you're telling me, you thought that Love was what is loved, not that which loves. This is the reason I think Love appeared to be most beautiful to you. Indeed it is that

[91] The spirit (*daimōn*) is Love (*Erōs*).

καλὸν καὶ | ἁβρὸν καὶ τέλεον καὶ μακαριστόν· τὸ δέ γε ἐρῶν ἄλλην ἰδέαν τοιαύτην ἔχον, οἵαν ἐγὼ διῆλθον.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Εἶεν δή, ὦ ξένη, καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις· τοιοῦτος ὢν ὁ Ἔρως τίνα χρείαν ἔχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις;

d Τοῦτο δὴ μετὰ ταῦτ᾽, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειράσομαί σε διδάξαι. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ δὴ τοιοῦτος καὶ οὕτω γεγονὼς ὁ Ἔρως, ἔστι δὲ τῶν καλῶν, ὡς σὺ φῄς. εἰ δέ τις ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο· Τί τῶν καλῶν ἐστιν ὁ Ἔρως, ὦ Σώκρατές τε | καὶ Διοτίμα; ὧδε δὲ σαφέστερον· ἐρᾷ ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν· τί ἐρᾷ;

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Γενέσθαι αὑτῷ.

Ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ποθεῖ, ἔφη, ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἐρώτησιν τοιάνδε· Τί ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἂν γένηται τὰ καλά; |

Οὐ πάνυ ἔφην ἔτι ἔχειν ἐγὼ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐρώτησιν προχείρως ἀποκρίνασθαι.

e Ἀλλ᾽, ἔφη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις μεταβαλὼν ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ τῷ ἀγαθῷ χρώμενος πυνθάνοιτο· Φέρε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρᾷ ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν· τί ἐρᾷ;

Γενέσθαι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, αὑτῷ. |

Καὶ τί ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἂν γένηται τἀγαθά;

Τοῦτ᾽ εὐπορώτερον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἔχω ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι εὐδαίμων ἔσται.

205 Κτήσει γάρ, ἔφη, ἀγαθῶν οἱ εὐδαίμονες εὐδαίμονες, καὶ οὐκέτι προσδεῖ ἐρέσθαι Ἵνα τί δὲ βούλεται

which is loved which is in reality beautiful, gentle, perfect and regarded as most blessed, but that which loves has a different form such as I have explained.'

"And I said: 'good enough, my friend, for you are right. But if this is what Love is like, what use is he to human beings?'

"'This is what I shall try to teach you next, Socrates,' d
she said. 'For this is the kind of being Love is and he was born like this. He is, according to you, love of beautiful things. But if someone were to ask us: why is Love of beautiful things, Socrates and Diotima? Or to put it more clearly: the lover of beautiful things loves them; why does he love them?'

"And I said: 'So that he should possess them for himself.'

"'But that answer still requires the following question: what will he who possesses beautiful things gain by it?'

"I said that I didn't yet have a ready answer to this question.

"'Well,' she said, 'it's just as if someone were to make a e
change and instead of the "the beautiful" substituted "the good" and inquired: "Come now, Socrates, the lover loves good things: why does he love them?"'

"'To possess them for himself,' I said.

"'And what will he gain if he possesses good things?'

"'That one is easier,' I said, 'I can answer that: he'll be happy.'[92]

"'Yes,' she said, 'for the happy are happy by their pos- 205
session of good things and there is no longer any further

[92] Being "happy" (*eudaimōn*) is an objective state ("fulfilled"); see above, n. 9.

εὐδαίμων εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενος; ἀλλὰ τέλος δοκεῖ ἔχειν ἡ ἀπόκρισις.

Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, εἶπον ἐγώ. |

Ταύτην δὴ τὴν βούλησιν καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦτον πότερα κοινὸν οἴει εἶναι πάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ πάντας τἀγαθὰ βούλεσθαι αὑτοῖς εἶναι ἀεί, ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

Οὕτως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· κοινὸν εἶναι πάντων.

Τί δὴ οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάντας ἐρᾶν φαμεν, εἴπερ γε πάντες τῶν αὐτῶν ἐρῶσι καὶ ἀεί, ἀλλά τινάς φαμεν ἐρᾶν, τοὺς δ' οὔ;

b Θαυμάζω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ αὐτός.

Ἀλλὰ μὴ θαύμαζ', ἔφη· ἀφελόντες γὰρ ἄρα τοῦ ἔρωτός | τι εἶδος ὀνομάζομεν, τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιτιθέντες ὄνομα, ἔρωτα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλοις καταχρώμεθα ὀνόμασιν.

Ὥσπερ τί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Ὥσπερ τόδε. οἶσθ' ὅτι ποίησίς ἐστί τι πολύ· ἡ γάρ τοι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὂν ἰόντι ὁτῳοῦν αἰτία πᾶσά
c ἐστι ποίησις, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ὑπὸ πάσαις ταῖς τέχναις ἐργασίαι ποιήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ τούτων δημιουργοὶ πάντες ποιηταί.

Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Ἀλλ' ὅμως, ἦ δ' ἥ, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐ καλοῦνται ποιηταὶ ἀλλὰ | ἄλλα ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ἀπὸ δὲ πάσης τῆς ποιήσεως ἓν μόριον ἀφορισθὲν τὸ περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῷ τοῦ ὅλου ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεται. ποί-

need to ask: To what end does he who wishes it wish to be happy? Well, the answer seems to contain the end of the inquiry.'

"'You're right,' I said.

"'Do you think this wish and this love are common to all people, and do they all wish for good things always for themselves, or what do you say?'

"'Just as you say,' I said, 'it's common to everyone.'

"'So, Socrates,' she said 'why then don't we say all people love, at any rate if, that is, they all love the same things and do so all the time, but we say some love and others don't?'

"'I'm wondering about that myself,' I said. b

"'Well don't wonder about it,' she said. 'You see we have actually singled out a particular form of love and give it the name of the whole, love; but for other things we use other names.'

"'For example?' I said.

"'Take this case: you know that creation is a complex thing: for after all, that which is the cause of anything whatsoever, moving from nonbeing into being, is, all of it, creation, so that the procedures in all the crafts are cre- c
ative and all their craftsmen are creators.'[93]

"'You're right.'

"'But nevertheless, she said, you know that they are not called creators (poets), but have other names, and from all creativity one section is separated off: the one that deals with music and verse is referred to by the name of the

93 Diotima's argument depends on Greek having the single word for "creation" and "poetry": "Creation" (poetry) = *poiēsis*; "creators (poets)" = *poiētai*; see also c4–9.

ησις γὰρ τοῦτο μόνον καλεῖται, καὶ οἱ ἔχοντες τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς ποιήσεως ποιηταί. |

Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφην.

d Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα. τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιόν ἐστι πᾶσα ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμία καὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὁ "μέγιστός τε καὶ δολερὸς ἔρως" παντί· ἀλλ᾿ οἱ μὲν ἄλλῃ τρεπόμενοι πολλαχῇ ἐπ᾿ αὐτόν, ἢ κατὰ χρηματισμὸν ἢ κατὰ | φιλογυμναστίαν ἢ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν, οὔτε ἐρᾶν καλοῦνται οὔτε ἐρασταί, οἱ δὲ κατὰ ἕν τι εἶδος ἰόντες τε καὶ ἐσπουδακότες τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ὄνομα ἴσχουσιν, ἔρωτά τε καὶ ἐρᾶν καὶ ἐρασταί.

Κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγειν. |

Καὶ λέγεται μέν γέ τις, ἔφη, λόγος, ὡς οἳ ἂν τὸ
e ἥμισυ ἑαυτῶν ζητῶσιν, οὗτοι ἐρῶσιν· ὁ δ᾿ ἐμὸς λόγος οὔτε ἡμίσεός φησιν εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα οὔτε ὅλου, ἐὰν μὴ τυγχάνῃ γέ που, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀγαθὸν ὄν, ἐπεὶ αὑτῶν γε καὶ πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ἐθέλουσιν ἀποτέμνεσθαι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐὰν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ τὰ | ἑαυτῶν πονηρὰ εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἑαυτῶν οἶμαι ἕκαστοι ἀσπάζονται, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν οἰκεῖον καλεῖ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἀλλότριον· ὡς οὐδέν γε ἄλλο ἐστὶν οὗ ἐρῶσιν ἄνθρωποι ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ σοὶ δοκοῦσιν;

206 Μὰ Δί᾿ οὐκ ἔμοιγε, ἦν δ᾿ ἐγώ.

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[94] A poetic quotation, source unknown. "Treacherous love," possibly because the desire for good things and happiness may be misdirected.

whole. This is part alone is called poetry, and those who are occupied with this section of creativity are called poets.'

"'You're right,' I said.

"'The case is then similar too regarding love. In general d
every desire for good things and to be happy is "the greatest and treacherous love"[94] for everyone. But those who turn to it in all kinds of different ways, either by making money, or by a passion for physical exercise, or by philosophy, are neither said to be in love, nor are they called lovers, but others who pursue one particular form, and do so seriously, keep the terminology of the whole thing: "love," "to love," and "lovers."'

"'You're probably right,' I said.

"'And the story is told,' she said, 'that those who are seeking the other half of themselves are the ones who love;
but my version of the story says love is not of the half, nor e
the whole, unless, my friend, it actually happens to be good, since people are even willing to have their own feet and hands cut off if they think their own are in a bad state. For I don't think that it's that which is their own which either group welcomes unless someone calls "the good" what belongs to him and is his own, and calls "the bad" what does not belong to him, since there is nothing else that people love except the good.[95] Or do you think there is?'

"'Certainly not, by Zeus,' I said. 206

95 This looks like a critical allusion to Aristophanes' speech at 191d–93d (see Aristophanes' recognition of this at 212c4–6).

Ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ἥ, οὕτως ἁπλοῦν ἐστι λέγειν ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι τἀγαθοῦ ἐρῶσιν; |

Ναί, ἔφην.

Τί δέ; οὐ προσθετέον, ἔφη, ὅτι καὶ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὑτοῖς ἐρῶσιν;

Προσθετέον.

Ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ οὐ μόνον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ εἶναι; |

Καὶ τοῦτο προσθετέον.

Ἔστιν ἄρα συλλήβδην, ἔφη, ὁ ἔρως τοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὑτῷ εἶναι ἀεί.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις.

b Ὅτε δὴ τοῦτο ὁ ἔρως ἐστὶν ἀεί, ἦ δ᾽ ἥ, τῶν τίνα τρόπον διωκόντων αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν τίνι πράξει ἡ σπουδὴ καὶ ἡ σύντασις ἔρως ἂν καλοῖτο; τί τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ ἔργον; ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; |

Οὐ μεντἂν σέ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Διοτίμα, ἐθαύμαζον ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ ἐφοίτων παρὰ σὲ αὐτὰ ταῦτα μαθησόμενος.

Ἀλλὰ ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ. ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τόκος ἐν καλῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν.

Μαντείας, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, δεῖται ὅτι ποτε λέγεις, καὶ οὐ | μανθάνω.

c Ἀλλ᾽ ἐγώ, ἦ δ᾽ ἥ, σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. κυοῦσιν γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἔν τινι ἡλικίᾳ γένωνται, τίκτειν ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ φύσις. τίκτειν δὲ ἐν μὲν αἰσχρῷ οὐ | δύναται, ἐν δὲ τῷ καλῷ. ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς

“‘Can it be as simple as this then, she said, to say that people love what is good?’

“‘Yes,’ I said.

“‘But should we not add, she said, that what they also love is that the good should be theirs?’

“‘Yes, we must add that.’

“‘And not just theirs, but theirs for ever?’

“‘Yes, we must add that too.’

“‘Then putting all that together, she said, love is desire to possess the good for ever.’

“‘You’re absolutely right,’ I said.

“‘Now since this is always what love is,’ she said, ‘in b
what way and in what sphere of activity could the passion and supreme effort of those pursuing it be called love? What actually is this function which it has? Can you tell me?’

“‘Well if I could, I assure you I wouldn’t be admiring you for your wisdom, Diotima,’ I said, ‘and I wouldn’t be coming here to see you to learn these very things.’

“‘Well then I’ll tell you, she said. For this activity is giving birth in the beautiful in respect of both the body and the soul.’

“‘Whatever you can possibly mean, I said, needs divination and I don’t understand.’

“‘Well then, she said, I will speak more clearly. You see, c
Socrates, she said, all human beings are pregnant both in body and in soul, and when we get to a certain age our nature is to yearn to produce offspring. But to give birth in what is ugly is not possible, but it is in what is beautiful.

καὶ γυναικὸς συνουσία τόκος ἐστίν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο
θεῖον τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τοῦτο ἐν θνητῷ ὄντι τῷ ζῴῳ
ἀθάνατον ἔνεστιν, ἡ κύησις καὶ ἡ γέννησις. τὰ δὲ ἐν
τῷ ἀναρμόστῳ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. ἀνάρμοστον δ᾽
ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν παντὶ τῷ θείῳ, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἁρμότ-
d τον. Μοῖρα οὖν καὶ Εἰλείθυια ἡ Καλλονή ἐστι τῇ γε-
νέσει. διὰ ταῦτα ὅταν μὲν καλῷ προσπελάζῃ τὸ κυ-
οῦν, ἵλεών τε γίγνεται καὶ εὐφραινόμενον διαχεῖται |
καὶ τίκτει τε καὶ γεννᾷ· ὅταν δὲ αἰσχρῷ, σκυθρωπόν
τε καὶ λυπούμενον συσπειρᾶται καὶ ἀποτρέπεται καὶ
ἀνείλλεται καὶ οὐ γεννᾷ, ἀλλὰ ἴσχον τὸ κύημα χαλε-
πῶς φέρει. ὅθεν δὴ τῷ κυοῦντί τε καὶ ἤδη σπαργῶντι
πολλὴ ἡ πτοίησις γέγονε περὶ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ μεγά-
e λης ὠδῖνος ἀπολύειν τὸν ἔχοντα. ἔστιν γάρ, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες, ἔφη, οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ὁ ἔρως, ὡς σὺ οἴει.

Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; |

Τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τί δὴ οὖν τῆς γεννήσεως; ὅτι
ἀειγενές ἐστι καὶ ἀθάνατον ὡς θνητῷ ἡ γέννησις.
207 ἀθανασίας δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐπιθυμεῖν μετὰ ἀγαθοῦ ἐκ
τῶν ὡμολογημένων, εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι ἀεὶ

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[96] Eileithyia was the goddess who oversaw childbirth, with Moira (Fate) attending, here personified as Beauty (*Kallonē*).

For the intercourse between a man and a woman is a giv-
ing birth. This is a divine process, this pregnancy and pro-
creation, and this is an immortal element in the living
creature, despite its mortality. It is impossible for this to
happen where there is discord. And what is in discord with
everything divine is what is ugly; but beauty is in harmony
with it. Now in the process of generation Beauty is Moira d
and Eileithyia.[96] For these reasons whenever what is preg-
nant approaches the beautiful, it becomes gracious and
melts[97] with gladness, gives birth and procreates. But
when it comes near the ugly it contracts, sullen and dis-
tressed, turns away and shrivels up. It does not give birth
and, holding back the fetus, is much upset. Hence for the
one who is pregnant and already full to bursting, there
comes about much excitement around the beautiful be-
cause he who possesses it will release the pregnant one
from the great pangs of childbirth. For love, Socrates, she e
said is not love of the beautiful, as you think.'

"'But what is it then?'

"'It's of procreation and giving birth in the beautiful.'

"'That may well be so,' I said.

"'Yes it certainly is so,' she said. 'Why then is the object
of love procreation? Because procreation is something
eternal and immortal, as far as can be the case for a mortal.
From what has been agreed[98] there must be a desire for 207
immortality along with the good, if love is always about

[97] Or "is poured out" (*diacheitai*); in the passage as a whole, Diotima appears to be putting emphasis on the reactions of the male or the female (or both) to sexual stimulus. See further Sheffield, "Psychic Pregnancy and Platonic Epistemology."

[98] At 206a9–13.

ἔρως ἐστίν. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας τὸν ἔρωτα εἶναι. |

Ταῦτά τε οὖν πάντα ἐδίδασκέ με, ὁπότε περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγους ποιοῖτο, καί ποτε ἤρετο Τί οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες, αἴτιον εἶναι τούτου τοῦ ἔρωτος καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ ὡς δεινῶς διατίθεται πάντα τὰ θηρία ἐπειδὰν γεννᾶν ἐπιθυμήσῃ, καὶ τὰ πεζὰ καὶ τὰ πτηνά, νοσοῦντά τε πάντα καὶ ἐρωτικῶς διατιθέμενα,
b πρῶτον μὲν περὶ τὸ συμμιγῆναι ἀλλήλοις, ἔπειτα περὶ τὴν τροφὴν τοῦ γενομένου, καὶ ἕτοιμά ἐστιν ὑπὲρ τούτων καὶ διαμάχεσθαι τὰ ἀσθενέστατα τοῖς ἰσχυροτάτοις καὶ ὑπεραποθνῄσκειν, καὶ αὐτὰ τῷ | λιμῷ παρατεινόμενα ὥστ᾽ ἐκεῖνα ἐκτρέφειν, καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ποιοῦντα. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους, ἔφη, οἴοιτ᾽ ἄν τις ἐκ λογισμοῦ ταῦτα ποιεῖν· τὰ δὲ θηρία τίς αἰτία οὕτως
c ἐρωτικῶς διατίθεσθαι; ἔχεις λέγειν;

Καὶ ἐγὼ αὖ ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐκ εἰδείην· ἡ δ᾽ εἶπεν, Διανοῇ οὖν δεινός ποτε γενήσεσθαι τὰ ἐρωτικά, ἐὰν ταῦτα μὴ ἐννοῇς; |

Ἀλλὰ διὰ ταῦτά τοι, ὦ Διοτίμα, ὅπερ νυνδὴ εἶπον, παρὰ σὲ ἥκω, γνοὺς ὅτι διδασκάλων δέομαι. ἀλλά μοι λέγε καὶ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν περὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά.

Εἰ τοίνυν, ἔφη, πιστεύεις ἐκείνου εἶναι φύσει τὸν ἔρωτα, οὗ πολλάκις ὡμολογήκαμεν, μὴ θαύμαζε. ἐν-
d ταῦθα γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ λόγον ἡ θνητὴ φύσις ζητεῖ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀεί τε εἶναι καὶ ἀθάνατος. δύ-

possession of the good for oneself. Indeed from this argument love must also be love of the eternal.'[99]

"So she taught me all this whenever she held a discussion about matters of love, and once she asked: 'What do you think, Socrates, is the cause of this love and this desire? Or don't you see how terribly all wild animals, both land animals and birds, are affected when they desire to
procreate; all are sick and disposed to feel love, firstly b
when they copulate with each other, and secondly over the feeding of their offspring; and they're prepared to fight it out in defense of them, even the weakest against the strongest, and to die for them, and themselves be worn out with hunger so that they can feed them, and do everything else they have to. One might assume that humans do this, she said, by reasoning, but what is the cause of wild animals
becoming affected by love in such a way? Can you tell me?' c

"Again I was saying I didn't know, but she said: 'Do you then consider one day becoming expert on the subject of love, if you don't think about these things?'

"'Well, that's the very reason, Diotima, as I was saying just now, that I have come to you, knowing that I need teachers. But tell me the reason for this and everything else on the subject of love.'

"'If then, she said, you believe love is by nature the love of that which we have often agreed on,[100] don't be sur-
prised. For here, by the same argument as before,[101] our d
mortal nature seeks as far as it's possible to exist for ever

99 In this passage Diotima appears to be advancing the thesis that "immortality" occurs through reproduction and *kleos* ([immortal] "fame"); see also 212a6–7.

100 For example, at 206e3–7a4.

101 That is, as in the animal world (207a7–c1 above).

ναται δὲ ταύτῃ μόνον, τῇ γενέσει, ὅτι ἀεὶ καταλείπει
ἕτερον νέον ἀντὶ τοῦ παλαιοῦ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἓν ἕκα-
στον τῶν ζῴων ζῆν καλεῖται καὶ εἶναι | τὸ αὐτό—οἷον
ἐκ παιδαρίου ὁ αὐτὸς λέγεται ἕως ἂν πρεσβύτης γέ-
νηται· οὗτος μέντοι οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχων ἐν αὑτῷ
ὅμως ὁ αὐτὸς καλεῖται, ἀλλὰ νέος ἀεὶ γιγνόμενος, τὰ
δὲ ἀπολλύς, καὶ κατὰ τὰς τρίχας καὶ σάρκα καὶ ὀστᾶ
e καὶ αἷμα καὶ σύμπαν τὸ σῶμα. καὶ μὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὸ
σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ τρόποι, τὰ ἤθη,
δόξαι, ἐπιθυμίαι, ἡδοναί, λῦπαι, φόβοι, τούτων ἕκα-
στα οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ πάρεστιν ἑκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν
γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀπόλλυται. | πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἀτοπώτε-
ρον ἔτι, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι μὴ ὅτι αἱ μὲν γίγνονται,
208 αἱ δὲ ἀπόλλυνται ἡμῖν, καὶ οὐδέποτε οἱ αὐτοί ἐσμεν
οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μία ἑκάστη τῶν
ἐπιστημῶν ταὐτὸν πάσχει. ὃ γὰρ καλεῖται μελετᾶν,
ὡς ἐξιούσης ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης· λήθη γὰρ | ἐπιστή-
μης ἔξοδος, μελέτη δὲ πάλιν καινὴν ἐμποιοῦσα ἀντὶ
τῆς ἀπιούσης μνήμην σῴζει τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥστε τὴν
αὐτὴν δοκεῖν εἶναι. τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ τρόπῳ πᾶν τὸ θνη-
τὸν σῴζεται, οὐ τῷ παντάπασιν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι
b ὥσπερ τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸ ἀπιὸν καὶ παλαιούμενον
ἕτερον νέον ἐγκαταλείπειν οἷον αὐτὸ ἦν. ταύτῃ τῇ μη-
χανῇ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, θνητὸν ἀθανασίας μετέχει,
καὶ σῶμα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα· ἀθάνατον δὲ ἄλλῃ. μὴ
οὖν θαύμαζε εἰ τὸ αὑτοῦ | ἀποβλάστημα φύσει πᾶν
τιμᾷ· ἀθανασίας γὰρ χάριν παντὶ αὕτη ἡ σπουδὴ καὶ
ὁ ἔρως ἕπεται.

and be immortal. It's only possible by the following means:
by generation, because it always leaves behind something
else new in place of the old, since even during the time
when each living creature is said to exist and to be the
same—for example one is said to be the same person from
childhood until becoming an old man; this individual is
nevertheless called the same person despite never having
the same properties in him, but always coming into new
being and losing what he had: in his hair, his flesh, his
bones, his blood and the whole of his body. And don't sup- e
pose that this happens just in his body, but in his soul also,
his ways, habits, beliefs, desires, pleasures, pains, fears:
each of these is never present in each individual as the
same, but some come into being and others pass away. It's
still much stranger than this with our items of knowledge:
it's not only that some come into being, and some pass
away, and we are never the same, not even in what we 208
know, but also each one of the things we know undergoes
the same process. For what is known as practice is so be-
cause knowledge leaves us: for forgetting is a departure of
knowledge, and practice, bringing back a fresh recollec-
tion in place of what is going away, preserves our knowl-
edge so that it appears to be the same. For in this way
everything mortal is preserved, not by always being the
same in every respect, like the divine, but by that which is b
departing and aging leaving behind something else new of
the same kind as was there before. By this means, Socra-
tes,' she said, 'the mortal has share of the immortal, both
body and everything else, but what is immortal does so by
other means. Then don't be surprised if in nature every-
thing values its own offspring, for it is for the sake of im-
mortality that this passion and love attends on everything.'

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας τὸν λόγον ἐθαύμασά τε καὶ εἶπον Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ σοφωτάτη Διοτίμα, ταῦτα ὡς ἀληθῶς οὕτως ἔχει;

c Καὶ ἥ, ὥσπερ οἱ τέλεοι σοφισταί, Εὖ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπεί γε καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰ ἐθέλεις εἰς τὴν φιλοτιμίαν βλέψαι, θαυμάζοις ἂν τῆς ἀλογίας περὶ ἃ ἐγὼ εἴρηκα εἰ μὴ ἐννοεῖς, ἐνθυμηθεὶς ὡς δεινῶς διάκεινται ἔρωτι | τοῦ ὀνομαστοὶ γενέσθαι "καὶ κλέος ἐς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ἀθάνατον καταθέσθαι," καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτου κινδύνους τε κινδυνεύειν ἕτοιμοί εἰσι πάντας ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὲρ τῶν παίδων, καὶ χρήματα ἀναλίσκειν καὶ πόνους πονεῖν οὑστινασοῦν καὶ ὑπεραπο-
d θνῄσκειν. ἐπεὶ οἴει σύ, ἔφη, Ἄλκηστιν ὑπὲρ Ἀδμήτου ἀποθανεῖν ἄν, ἢ Ἀχιλλέα Πατρόκλῳ ἐπαποθανεῖν, ἢ προαποθανεῖν τὸν ὑμέτερον Κόδρον ὑπὲρ τῆς | βασιλείας τῶν παίδων, μὴ οἰομένους ἀθάνατον μνήμην ἀρετῆς πέρι ἑαυτῶν ἔσεσθαι, ἣν νῦν ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἔφη, ἀλλ' οἶμαι ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ τοιαύτης δόξης εὐκλεοῦς πάντες πάντα ποιοῦσιν,
e ὅσῳ ἂν ἀμείνους ὦσι, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον· τοῦ γὰρ ἀθανάτου ἐρῶσιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐγκύμονες, ἔφη, κατὰ τὰ σώματα ὄντες πρὸς τὰς γυναῖκας μᾶλλον τρέπονται

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102 "Accomplished" (*teleios* = "perfect") in the authoritative tone of her reply, typical, Plato suggests, of sophists, though probably not entirely without the Socratic irony often surrounding this term. 103 Source unknown.

104 "Valor" = *aretē* (also "immortal virtue," below at d7). Di-

"And when I heard this account I was surprised and I replied: 'Really, I said, most wise Diotima; are things truly like this?'

"And she, like the accomplished sophists, said:[102] 'rest c assured they are, Socrates: with humans too, if in fact you want to examine their love of honor, you would be surprised at their irrationality regarding what I've mentioned, unless you bear in mind, having thought about it, how strangely they are disposed by their love of becoming famous and "of establishing immortal fame for all of time,"[103] and for the sake of this are prepared to risk all dangers even more than in defense of their children, and to spend money and endure any suffering whatsoever and die for it. Do you imagine, she said, that Alcestis would have died d on behalf of Admetus, that Achilles would have followed Patroclus to his death, or your Codrus would have died an early death for the sake of his sons' succession to the kingship, unless they thought that the memory of their own valor would be immortal, which is how we regard it now?[104] Far from it in fact,' she said. 'But I think all do everything for the sake of immortal virtue and this sort of glorious reputation, and the better they are, the more they do this: you see, they are in love with what is immortal. So e those who are pregnant in body,' she said, 'turn rather to

otima (Socrates) implicitly corrects or extends Phaedrus' examples of Alcestis and Achilles (see 179d6–80a1) with reference to their motives for sacrificing their lives for a loved one. Codrus, a mythical king of Athens (Diotima speaks as an outsider), was said to have died to save his city from Dorian invaders, in order to fulfill an oracle that stated that they would only take Athens if they failed to kill the king.

*καὶ ταύτῃ ἐρωτικοί εἰσιν, διὰ παιδογονίας ἀθανασίαν
καὶ μνήμην καὶ εὐδαιμονίαν, ὡς οἴονται, αὑτοῖς | εἰς
209 τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον πάντα πορίζόμενοι· οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν
ψυχήν—εἰσὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, οἳ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κυοῦσιν
ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, ἃ ψυχῇ προσήκει καὶ
κυῆσαι καὶ τεκεῖν· τί οὖν προσήκει; φρόνησίν τε καὶ
τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν—ὧν δή εἰσι καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πάντες
γεννήτορες καὶ | τῶν δημιουργῶν ὅσοι λέγονται εὑρε-
τικοὶ εἶναι· πολὺ δὲ μεγίστη, ἔφη, καὶ καλλίστη τῆς
φρονήσεως ἡ περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεών τε καὶ οἰκήσεων
διακόσμησις, ᾗ δὴ ὄνομά ἐστι σωφροσύνη τε καὶ
δικαιοσύνη—τούτων δ' αὖ ὅταν τις ἐκ νέου ἐγκύμων
b ᾖ τὴν ψυχήν, ἤθεος[6] ὢν καὶ ἡκούσης τῆς ἡλικίας,
τίκτειν τε καὶ γεννᾶν ἤδη ἐπιθυμῇ, ζητεῖ δὴ οἶμαι καὶ
οὗτος περιιὼν τὸ καλὸν ἐν ᾧ ἂν γεννήσειεν· ἐν τῷ γὰρ
αἰσχρῷ οὐδέποτε γεννήσει. τά τε οὖν σώματα τὰ |
καλὰ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχρὰ ἀσπάζεται ἅτε κυῶν, καὶ
ἂν ἐντύχῃ ψυχῇ καλῇ καὶ γενναίᾳ καὶ εὐφυεῖ, πάνυ
δὴ ἀσπάζεται τὸ συναμφότερον, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν
ἄνθρωπον εὐθὺς εὐπορεῖ λόγων περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ
οἷον χρὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἃ ἐπιτηδεύ-*

6 *ἤθεος* Parmentier: *θεῖος* BTW *P.Oxy.*

105 "Virtue" = *aretē.* Diotima's commendation of poets in a4 appears rather different from Plato's well-documented view of poetry in general (see *Apology* 22a–c; *Republic* 2, 3, and 10). She may be contrasting, by implication, present company with Homer and Hesiod and "the rest of the good poets" who leave "immortal"

women and engage in lovemaking in this way to provide, so they think, immortality and memory and happiness for themselves for all future time through the production of children. But those who are pregnant in their souls—for 209
indeed there are those,' she said, 'who are pregnant in their souls even more than in their bodies with the things which it is appropriate for the soul to conceive and give birth to. So what is "appropriate"? Practical wisdom and the rest of virtue—of which poets are all indeed procreators,[105] and those craftsmen who are said to be inventive. But by far the greatest and finest kind of wisdom,' she said, 'is that concerned with the regulation of cities and households, which has the name moderation and justice—moreover when someone is pregnant with these things in his soul from an early age, being unmarried[106] and just at the b
right age and is now eager to give birth and produce children, he too, I think, goes round searching for what is beautiful in which to procreate, for he will never do it in what is ugly. So he welcomes beautiful bodies rather than ugly ones, given that he is pregnant, and if he comes upon a soul that is beautiful, noble and gifted, he very much welcomes the combination of body and soul, and immediately he has an abundance of things to say to this individual about virtue and about what sort of thing the good man should be concerned with, and what pursuits he must

works (209d1–4), or intending "an ironic compliment to Agathon and Aristophanes," Rowe, n. ad loc.

106 Or, on the MSS reading, "divinely inspired" (see textual note). Burnet (OCT) accepts the modern emendation; both readings are possible, the MSS reading being perhaps more appropriate to the context that follows.

c ειν, καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖ παιδεύειν. ἁπτόμενος γὰρ οἶμαι τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ὁμιλῶν αὐτῷ, ἃ πάλαι ἐκύει τίκτει καὶ γεννᾷ, καὶ παρὼν καὶ ἀπὼν μεμνημένος, καὶ τὸ γεννηθὲν συνεκτρέφει κοινῇ μετ᾽ ἐκείνου, | ὥστε πολὺ μείζω κοινωνίαν τῆς τῶν παίδων πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἴσχουσι καὶ φιλίαν βεβαιοτέραν, ἅτε καλλιόνων καὶ ἀθανατωτέρων παίδων κεκοινωνηκότες. καὶ πᾶς ἂν δέξαιτο ἑαυτῷ τοιούτους παῖδας μᾶλλον γεγο-
d νέναι ἢ τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους, καὶ εἰς Ὅμηρον ἀποβλέψας καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητὰς τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ζηλῶν, οἷα ἔκγονα ἑαυτῶν καταλείπουσιν, ἃ ἐκείνοις ἀθάνατον κλέος καὶ μνήμην παρέχεται αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα ὄντα· εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἔφη, οἵους Λυκοῦργος | παῖδας κατελίπετο ἐν Λακεδαίμονι σωτῆρας τῆς Λακεδαίμονος καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τῆς Ἑλλάδος. τίμιος δὲ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν καὶ Σόλων διὰ τὴν τῶν νόμων γέννησιν, καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ ἄνδρες, καὶ ἐν Ἕλλησι καὶ
e ἐν βαρβάροις, πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἀποφηνάμενοι ἔργα, γεννήσαντες παντοίαν ἀρετήν· ὧν καὶ ἱερὰ πολλὰ ἤδη γέγονε διὰ τοὺς τοιούτους παῖδας, διὰ δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους οὐδενός πω. |

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἂν

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107 Lycurgus, a semilegendary figure, was celebrated as the creator of Spartan laws and institutions, his "immortal children." The Spartans (and so, by implication, the laws, Lycurgus' "children") might be said to have "saved Greece" by playing a major part in its defense against the invading Persians in the first quarter of the fifth century.

follow, and he tries to educate him. For I think in attaching c
himself to what is beautiful and associating with it he con-
ceives and brings forth that with which he has long been
pregnant, and when he is both with him and mindful of
him when absent, he joins the other in bringing up the
offspring together, so that such people have a much
greater partnership with each other than the one that
comes from children, and a firmer friendship in that they
share more beautiful and more immortal children. And
everyone would prefer to have given birth to such off-
spring as these for himself rather than human ones, look- d
ing with envy at Homer and Hesiod and the rest of the
good poets, and the kind of offspring that they have left
behind them, which bring them immortal fame and a me-
morial, in that they are themselves such [i.e. immortal].
And if you like,' she said, 'think of the kind of children
Lycurgus left behind in Lacedaemon [Sparta], who were
saviors of Lacedaemon and, so to speak, of Greece.[107]
Among you, Solon too is respected on account of his pro-
creation of your laws,[108] and many other men in other
places everywhere, both in Greece and among foreigners,
who displayed many fine deeds and gave birth to all kinds e
of virtue, for whom many shrines have been built because
of such children, but none as yet on account of human
children.

"'Now into these rites of love, Socrates, perhaps you

[108] Solon, an Athenian legislator of the early sixth century, reshaped the Athenian constitution and remained a central figure in Athenian social and political tradition.

210 σὺ μυηθείης· τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά, ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ
ταῦτα ἔστιν, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς μετίῃ, οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ οἷός τ'
ἂν εἴης. ἐρῶ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἐγὼ καὶ προθυμίας οὐδὲν
ἀπολείψω· πειρῶ δὲ ἕπεσθαι, ἂν οἷός τε ᾖς. δεῖ γάρ,
ἔφη, τὸν ὀρθῶς | ἰόντα ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ἄρχεσθαι
μὲν νέον ὄντα ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ πρῶτον
μέν, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς ἡγῆται ὁ ἡγούμενος, ἑνὸς αὐτὸν σώ-
ματος ἐρᾶν καὶ ἐνταῦθα γεννᾶν λόγους καλούς, ἔπειτα
δὲ αὐτὸν κατανοῆσαι ὅτι τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ ὁτῳοῦν
b σώματι τῷ ἐπὶ ἑτέρῳ σώματι ἀδελφόν ἐστι, καὶ εἰ δεῖ
διώκειν τὸ ἐπ' εἴδει καλόν, πολλὴ ἄνοια μὴ οὐχ ἕν τε
καὶ ταὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς σώμασι κάλ-
λος· τοῦτο δ' ἐννοήσαντα καταστῆναι πάντων τῶν
καλῶν σωμάτων | ἐραστήν, ἑνὸς δὲ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο
χαλάσαι καταφρονήσαντα καὶ σμικρὸν ἡγησάμενον·
μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κάλλος τιμιώτερον
ἡγήσασθαι τοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι, ὥστε καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιεικὴς
c ὢν τὴν ψυχήν τις κἂν σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ, ἐξαρκεῖν
αὐτῷ καὶ ἐρᾶν καὶ κήδεσθαι καὶ τίκτειν λόγους τοι-
ούτους καὶ ζητεῖν, οἵτινες ποιήσουσι βελτίους τοὺς
νέους, ἵνα ἀναγκασθῇ αὖ θεάσασθαι τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐπι-
τηδεύμασι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καλὸν καὶ τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ὅτι
πᾶν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ | συγγενές ἐστιν, ἵνα τὸ περὶ τὸ σῶμα
καλὸν σμικρόν τι ἡγήσηται εἶναι· μετὰ δὲ τὰ ἐπιτη-
δεύματα ἐπὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀγαγεῖν, ἵνα ἴδῃ αὖ ἐπι-

too could be initiated. But into the final mysteries and 210
revelations, for which that foundation exists, if one approaches them in the right way, I don't know if you could be initiated. Well now, she said, I will tell you, and I'll spare no effort: you try and follow, if you can.[109] You see,' she said, 'it's necessary for the one who is approaching this undertaking in the right way to begin by turning to beautiful bodies when he's young and firstly, if his guide is leading him in the right way, he must love one body and with it procreate fine words, and then he must realize for himself that the beauty that is in any body whatever is akin
to that in any other body, and if he is to pursue beauty in b
appearance it would be very foolish not to think that the beauty in all bodies is one and the same. With this in mind he must make himself a lover of all beautiful bodies and relax this intense feeling for the one, scorning it and regarding it as of no importance. Following this, he must consider beauty in souls as of greater value than that in the body, so that if someone is decent in his soul even though
his physical bloom is slight, it is enough for him to love c
that person and care for him and give birth to and seek out such words that will make young men better, in order that he may in turn be compelled to view the beauty in pursuits and laws, and perceive that all of this is interrelated, so that he may consider that the beauty of the body is something trivial. After these pursuits his guide must lead him toward types of knowledge so that he can further contemplate the beauty of its various branches

[109] Socrates/Diotima here uses the imagery of the Eleusinian Mysteries; the "highest mysteries" represent the final step for the initiate—the revelation of sacred objects.

d στημῶν κάλλος, καὶ βλέπων πρὸς πολὺ ἤδη τὸ καλὸν
μηκέτι τὸ παρ᾽ ἑνί, ὥσπερ οἰκέτης, ἀγαπῶν παιδαρίου
κάλλος ἢ ἀνθρώπου τινὸς ἢ ἐπιτηδεύματος ἑνός, δου-
λεύων φαῦλος ᾖ καὶ σμικρολόγος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ
πέλαγος τετραμμένος τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ θεωρῶν πολλοὺς
| καὶ καλοὺς λόγους καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τίκτῃ καὶ δια-
νοήματα ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ, ἕως ἂν ἐνταῦθα ῥω-
σθεὶς καὶ αὐξηθεὶς κατίδῃ τινὰ ἐπιστήμην μίαν τοι-
e αύτην, ἥ ἐστι καλοῦ τοιοῦδε. πειρῶ δέ μοι, ἔφη, τὸν
νοῦν προσέχειν ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα. ὃς γὰρ ἂν μέχρι
ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτικὰ παιδαγωγηθῇ, θεώμενος
ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς τὰ καλά, πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἰὼν τῶν
ἐρωτικῶν ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί τι θαυμαστὸν | τὴν φύ-
σιν καλόν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗ δὴ ἕνεκεν καὶ
οἱ ἔμπροσθεν πάντες πόνοι ἦσαν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀεὶ ὂν
211 καὶ οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον, οὔτε αὐξανό-
μενον οὔτε φθίνον, ἔπειτα οὐ τῇ μὲν καλόν, τῇ δ᾽ αἰ-
σχρόν, οὐδὲ τοτὲ μέν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ
καλόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, οὐδ᾽ ἔνθα μὲν καλόν, ἔνθα
δὲ αἰσχρόν, ὡς | τισὶ μὲν ὂν καλόν, τισὶ δὲ αἰσχρόν·
οὐδ᾽ αὖ φαντασθήσεται αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν οἷον πρόσω-
πόν τι οὐδὲ χεῖρες οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὧν σῶμα μετέχει,
οὐδέ τις λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη, οὐδέ που ὂν ἐν
ἑτέρῳ τινι, οἷον ἐν ζώῳ ἢ ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἢ ἔν τῳ
b ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μεθ᾽ αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ
ὄν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα τρόπον

and, in looking at beauty now in its many forms, he may d
no longer, like a slave, fix on beauty in one thing, loving
the beauty of a boy, or some individual, or a particular
pursuit, worthless and small-minded in his slavery; but
having turned to the great ocean of beauty and contem-
plating it may engender many fine and indeed magnificent
words and thoughts in an unlimited love of wisdom, until
there, strengthened and increased in growth, he may catch
sight of a single kind of knowledge which is of a sort of
beauty I shall now describe. Try then,' she said, 'to pay e
attention as carefully as you can. For whoever has been
educated to this point in the subject of love by looking at
beautiful things in order and in the right way, will now
approach the final goal in matters of love, and will sud-
denly behold a beauty marvelous in its nature, that very
thing, Socrates, for the sake of which all previous efforts
were undertaken: firstly, being eternal, it neither comes
into being nor passes away, it does not increase, nor does 211
it diminish; secondly, it is not beautiful in one respect and
ugly in another; it is not beautiful at one moment and ugly
at another; nor beautiful by one standard and by another
ugly; nor is it beautiful here and ugly there because it is
beautiful to some, ugly to others. Again beauty will not
appear to him like a face or hands or anything else that a
body has a share of, nor like any discourse or piece of
knowledge. Nor do I think it exists in anything else, such
as in a living being either on the ground or in the sky, or
in any other thing, but alone by itself with itself it is an b
eternal single form,[110] but all other beautiful things share

[110] A characteristic Platonic description of the Beautiful and other Forms (see, e.g., *Phaedo* 78d–e).

τινὰ τοιοῦτον, οἷον γιγνομένων τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ
ἀπολλυμένων μηδὲν ἐκεῖνο μήτε τι πλέον μήτε ἔλατ-
τον γίγνεσθαι μηδὲ | πάσχειν μηδέν. ὅταν δή τις ἀπὸ
τῶνδε διὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς παιδεραστεῖν ἐπανιὼν ἐκεῖνο τὸ
καλὸν ἄρχηται καθορᾶν, σχεδὸν ἄν τι ἅπτοιτο τοῦ
τέλους. τοῦτο γὰρ δή ἐστι τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐπὶ τὰ ἐρωτικὰ
c ἰέναι ἢ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου ἄγεσθαι, ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῶνδε τῶν
καλῶν ἐκείνου ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ ἀεὶ ἐπανιέναι, ὥσπερ
ἐπαναβασμοῖς χρώμενον, ἀπὸ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ δύο καὶ ἀπὸ
δυοῖν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν
| σωμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν
ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ μαθήματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν
μαθημάτων ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνο τὸ μάθημα τελευτῆσαι, ὅ ἐστιν
οὐκ ἄλλου ἢ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα, καὶ
d γνῷ αὐτὸ τελευτῶν ὃ ἔστι καλόν. ἐνταῦθα τοῦ βίου,
ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, ἔφη ἡ Μαντινικὴ ξένη, εἴπερ που
ἄλλοθι, βιωτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, θεωμένῳ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν. ὃ
ἐάν ποτε ἴδῃς, οὐ κατὰ χρυσίον τε καὶ ἐσθῆτα καὶ
τοὺς καλοὺς παῖδάς τε καὶ νεανίσκους δόξει σοι | εἶ-
ναι, οὓς νῦν ὁρῶν ἐκπέπληξαι καὶ ἕτοιμος εἶ καὶ σὺ
καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, ὁρῶντες τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ συνόντες
ἀεὶ αὐτοῖς, εἴ πως οἷόν τ᾽ ἦν, μήτ᾽ ἐσθίειν μήτε πίνειν,
ἀλλὰ θεᾶσθαι μόνον καὶ συνεῖναι. τί δῆτα, ἔφη, οἰό-
μεθα, εἴ τῳ γένοιτο αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἰδεῖν εἰλικρινές,
e καθαρόν, ἄμεικτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάπλεων σαρκῶν τε
ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ χρωμάτων καὶ ἄλλης πολλῆς φλυα-
ρίας θνητῆς, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον καλὸν δύναιτο μονο-
212 ειδὲς κατιδεῖν; ἆρ᾽ οἴει, ἔφη, φαῦλον βίον γίγνεσθαι

in it in such a way that, while other things come into being
and pass away, it does not become more or less in any way,
nor is it affected at all. When someone, because he is a
lover of boys in the right way, ascends from these stages
and begins to catch sight of that beauty, he will have al-
most reached his goal. For this is the correct way to ap-
proach the subject of love, or to be led by another, starting c
from these beautiful things here, forever passing upward
for the sake of that beauty, using these as ascending steps
from one to two, and from two to all beautiful bodies, and
from beautiful bodies to beautiful pursuits, and from pur-
suits to beautiful kinds of learning and from learning end-
ing with that form of learning which is the learning of
nothing other than that beauty itself, so that he may finally
know what beauty itself is. In this region of life, if any- d
where, my dear Socrates, said the visitor from Mantinea,
a man should live, contemplating beauty itself. If you ever
see this you will think there is no comparison with gold,
clothing, the beautiful boys and youths who now leave you
transfixed when you look at them, and you are ready, as
are many others, so long as you can see your loved ones
and be with them always, neither to eat nor drink if some-
how it were possible, but only gaze at them and be with
them. What do we think then, she said, if it happened that
someone could see actual beauty, simple, pure, unalloyed,
and not defiled by human flesh and color and all the rest e
of mortal trivia, but he was able to behold divine beauty
itself in its simple form? Do you think, she said, that it's a 212

ἐκεῖσε βλέποντος ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐκεῖνο ᾧ δεῖ θεωμένου καὶ συνόντος αὐτῷ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνθυμῇ, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐνταῦθα αὐτῷ μοναχοῦ γενήσεται, ὁρῶντι ᾧ ὁρατὸν τὸ καλόν, τίκτειν οὐκ εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδώλου ἐφαπτομένῳ, | ἀλλὰ ἀληθῆ, ἅτε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐφαπτομένῳ· τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ θρεψαμένῳ ὑπάρχει θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι, καὶ εἴπέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ;

b Ταῦτα δή, ὦ Φαῖδρέ τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, ἔφη μὲν Διοτίμα, πέπεισμαι δ' ἐγώ· πεπεισμένος δὲ πειρῶμαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πείθειν ὅτι τούτου τοῦ κτήματος τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει συνεργὸν ἀμείνω Ἔρωτος οὐκ ἄν τις ῥᾳδίως λάβοι. διὸ δὴ | ἔγωγέ φημι χρῆναι πάντα ἄνδρα τὸν Ἔρωτα τιμᾶν, καὶ αὐτὸς τιμῶ τὰ ἐρωτικὰ καὶ διαφερόντως ἀσκῶ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρακελεύομαι, καὶ νῦν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ἐγκωμιάζω τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἀν-
c δρείαν τοῦ Ἔρωτος καθ' ὅσον οἷός τ' εἰμί. τοῦτον οὖν τὸν λόγον, ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ὡς ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἔρωτα νόμισον εἰρῆσθαι, εἰ δέ, ὅτι καὶ ὅπῃ χαίρεις ὀνομάζων, τοῦτο ὀνόμαζε.

Εἰπόντος δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ Σωκράτους τοὺς μὲν ἐπαινεῖν, τὸν | δὲ Ἀριστοφάνη λέγειν τι ἐπιχειρεῖν, ὅτι ἐμνήσθη αὐτοῦ λέγων ὁ Σωκράτης περὶ τοῦ λόγου· καὶ ἐξαίφνης τὴν αὔλειον θύραν κρουομένην πολὺν

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[111] That is, the soul (*psyche*) or the mind (*nous*).

[112] See 205d10–e7 and n. 95 above for the indirect reference

worthless life if a man looks in that direction and contemplates it with the part with which he must contemplate it[111] and be in its company? Or do you not conclude, she said, that only there will it become possible for him, seeing beauty with the means that make it visible, to give birth not to images of virtue, in that he is not grasping an image, but to true virtue, because he is grasping the truth, and after bringing forth true virtue and nurturing it, it's possible to become one who is loved by the gods, and for that man too, if possible for any human, to be immortal?'

"This then, Phaedrus, and the rest of you, is what Diotima said, and I am convinced by it. Having been persuaded I try to persuade others too that in acquiring this possession one could not easily gain a better partner for human nature than Love. Therefore I declare that every man must honor Love and I myself respect all that is to do with love and practice it above all else, and I encourage everyone else to do so too; both now and always, I praise the power and courage of Love as much as I can. So, Phaedrus, consider this speech, if you will, delivered as my encomium of Love, or if not, call it whatever and in whatever way you like." b c

When Socrates had finished, Aristodemus said the others were praising him, but Aristophanes tried to say something because in his speech Socrates had made a reference to his own speech.[112] Suddenly a knocking on the court-

to Aristophanes' speech. It would appear from Aristophanes' comment here that Plato intends us (and probably his audience) to assume that what "Diotima" says is basically Socrates' own creation.

ψόφον παρασχεῖν ὡς κωμαστῶν, καὶ αὐλητρίδος φω-
νὴν ἀκούειν. τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα, Παῖδες, φάναι, οὐ
d σκέψεσθε; καὶ ἐὰν μέν τις τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ᾖ, καλεῖτε·
εἰ δὲ μή, λέγετε ὅτι οὐ πίνομεν ἀλλ᾽ ἀναπαυόμεθα
ἤδη.

Καὶ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον Ἀλκιβιάδου τὴν φωνὴν ἀκού-
ειν ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ σφόδρα μεθύοντος καὶ μέγα βοῶντος,
ἐρωτῶντος | ὅπου Ἀγάθων καὶ κελεύοντος ἄγειν παρ᾽
Ἀγάθωνα. ἄγειν οὖν αὐτὸν παρὰ σφᾶς τήν τε αὐλη-
τρίδα ὑπολαβοῦσαν καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς τῶν ἀκολού-
θων, καὶ ἐπιστῆναι ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἐστεφανωμένον
e αὐτὸν κιττοῦ τέ τινι στεφάνῳ δασεῖ καὶ ἴων, καὶ ται-
νίας ἔχοντα ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς πάνυ πολλάς, καὶ εἰπεῖν·
Ἄνδρες, χαίρετε· μεθύοντα ἄνδρα πάνυ σφόδρα δέξε-
σθε συμπότην, ἢ ἀπίωμεν ἀναδήσαντες μόνον Ἀγά-
θωνα, | ἐφ᾽ ᾧπερ ἤλθομεν; ἐγὼ γάρ τοι, φάναι, χθὲς
μὲν οὐχ οἷός τ᾽ ἐγενόμην ἀφικέσθαι, νῦν δὲ ἥκω ἐπὶ
τῇ κεφαλῇ ἔχων τὰς ταινίας, ἵνα ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμῆς κε-
φαλῆς τὴν τοῦ σοφωτάτου καὶ καλλίστου κεφαλὴν
ἐὰν εἴπω οὑτωσί[7] ἀναδήσω. ἆρα καταγελάσεσθέ μου
ὡς μεθύοντος; ἐγὼ δέ, κἂν ὑμεῖς γελᾶτε, ὅμως εὖ οἶδ᾽
213 ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω. ἀλλά μοι λέγετε αὐτόθεν, ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς
εἰσίω ἢ μή; συμπίεσθε ἢ οὔ;

Πάντας οὖν ἀναθορυβῆσαι καὶ κελεύειν εἰσιέναι
καὶ κατακλίνεσθαι, καὶ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα καλεῖν αὐτόν.
καὶ τὸν | ἰέναι ἀγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περι-

[7] *ἐὰν εἴπω οὑτωσὶ* BT *P.Oxy.*: *ἀνειπὼν οὑτωσὶ* Winckelmann

yard door produced a great amount of noise as if there were revelers and they heard the voice of a flute girl. So
Agathon said: "You slaves, won't you go and look? And if d
it's one of our circle, invite him in. And if it isn't, say we're not drinking, but going off to bed right now."

And not much after this they heard the voice of Alcibiades in the courtyard, very drunk and shouting loudly, asking where Agathon was and ordering them to take him to Agathon. So the flute girl who was propping him up, and several others of his attendants led him into the party and he stood by the doors crowned with a thick garland of
ivy and violets and with a large bunch of ribbons on his e
head, and he said: "Greetings gentlemen: will you receive a very very drunken man as your fellow imbiber, or are we to go away after we've just tied a ribbon on Agathon's head, which is the reason we've come? You see, he said, I couldn't make it yesterday, but now I've come with ribbons on my head so that I may take them from my head and adorn the head of the wisest and most beautiful man, if I may speak of him thus.[113] So are you going to laugh at me because I'm drunk? Even if you are laughing, never mind,
I know full well that I'm telling the truth. But tell me here 213
and now, am I to enter on my conditions or not? Will you drink with me or not?"

So everyone burst out shouting and bade him come in and find a place to recline, and Agathon called to him. He came in led by his fellows, and because he was unwinding

113 Translating the MSS (Burnet's OCT). Most editors prefer Winkelmann's amendment (see textual note) "proclaiming him thus."

αιρούμενον ἅμα τὰς ταινίας ὡς ἀναδήσοντα, ἐπίπρο-
σθε τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἔχοντα οὐ κατιδεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη,
ἀλλὰ καθίζεσθαι παρὰ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα ἐν μέσῳ Σωκρά-
τους τε καὶ ἐκείνου· παραχωρῆσαι γὰρ τὸν Σωκράτη
b ὡς ἐκεῖνον κατιδεῖν. παρακαθεζόμενον δὲ αὐτὸν ἀσπά-
ζεσθαί τε τὸν Ἀγάθωνα καὶ ἀναδεῖν.

Εἰπεῖν οὖν τὸν Ἀγάθωνα Ὑπολύετε, παῖδες, Ἀλκι-
βιάδην, | ἵνα ἐκ τρίτων κατακέηται.

Πάνυ γε, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην· ἀλλὰ τίς ἡμῖν ὅδε
τρίτος συμπότης; καὶ ἅμα μεταστρεφόμενον αὐτὸν
ὁρᾶν τὸν Σωκράτη, ἰδόντα δὲ ἀναπηδῆσαι καὶ εἰπεῖν
Ὦ Ἡράκλεις, τουτὶ τί ἦν; Σωκράτης οὗτος; ἐλλοχῶν
αὖ με ἐνταῦθα κατέκεισο, ὥσπερ εἰώθεις ἐξαίφνης
c ἀναφαίνεσθαι ὅπου ἐγὼ ᾤμην ἥκιστά σε ἔσεσθαι. καὶ
νῦν τί ἥκεις; καὶ τί αὖ ἐνταῦθα κατεκλίνης; ὡς οὐ
παρὰ Ἀριστοφάνει οὐδὲ εἴ τις ἄλλος γελοῖος ἔστι τε
καὶ βούλεται, ἀλλὰ διεμηχανήσω ὅπως παρὰ | τῷ
καλλίστῳ τῶν ἔνδον κατακείσῃ.

Καὶ τὸν Σωκράτη, Ἀγάθων, φάναι, ὅρα εἴ μοι
ἐπαμύνεις· ὡς ἐμοὶ ὁ τούτου ἔρως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐ
φαῦλον πρᾶγμα γέγονεν. ἀπ᾿ ἐκείνου γὰρ τοῦ χρόνου,
d ἀφ᾿ οὗ τούτου ἠράσθην, οὐκέτι ἔξεστίν μοι οὔτε
προσβλέψαι οὔτε διαλεχθῆναι καλῷ οὐδ᾿ ἑνί, ἢ οὑτοσὶ
ζηλοτυπῶν με καὶ φθονῶν θαυμαστὰ ἐργάζεται καὶ
λοιδορεῖταί τε καὶ τὼ χεῖρε μόγις ἀπέχεται. ὅρα οὖν
μή τι καὶ νῦν ἐργάσηται, ἀλλὰ διάλλαξον | ἡμᾶς, ἢ
ἐὰν ἐπιχειρῇ βιάζεσθαι, ἐπάμυνε, ὡς ἐγὼ τὴν τούτου
μανίαν τε καὶ φιλεραστίαν πάνυ ὀρρωδῶ.

the ribbons at the same time so he could adorn Agathon
and was holding them in front of his eyes, he didn't notice
Socrates, but sat down next to Agathon in between Socra-
tes and him, for Socrates had moved over when he caught
sight of him. So sitting there beside him he embraced b
Agathon and tied the ribbons on him.

So Agathon said: "Slaves, take Alcibiades' shoes off so he can recline and make a third with us."

"Certainly," said Alcibiades, "but who is this third mem-
ber of our drinking group?" And turning round as he said
this he saw Socrates, and on seeing him he jumped up
and said: "Heracles! What's this? Socrates here? You were
there lying in ambush again, so you could suddenly appear,
as you were accustomed to do, where I least thought you'd
be. So why have you come now? What's more, why are you c
lying here? It wasn't to be next to Aristophanes, nor indeed
anyone else who is laughable and willing to be so, but
you've wangled it so you're reclining next to the best look-
ing of those in the room."[114]

Socrates said: "Agathon, see if you can defend me, as
my love for this fellow has become no light matter. You see
from that time when I fell in love with him it's no longer d
been possible for me to cast a look at or talk to a single
good-looking man at all without this fellow here getting
jealous and resentful, and he does the most extraordinary
things; he abuses me and can hardly keep his hands off
me. See to it then that he doesn't do anything now, but
reconcile us, or if he tries to resort to brute force, keep
him off as I'm really terrified of his madness and passion
for being loved."

114 From this byplay (213a3–d6), we gather that Agathon's couch could hold three people (see also 222e3ff.).

Ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἔστι, φάναι τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ διαλλαγή. ἀλλὰ τούτων μὲν εἰς αὖθίς σε τιμωρήσο-
e μαι· νῦν δέ μοι, Ἀγάθων, φάναι, μετάδος τῶν ταινιῶν, ἵνα ἀναδήσω καὶ τὴν τούτου ταυτηνὶ τὴν θαυμαστὴν κεφαλήν, καὶ μή μοι μέμφηται ὅτι σὲ μὲν ἀνέδησα, αὐτὸν δὲ νικῶντα ἐν λόγοις πάντας ἀνθρώπους, οὐ μόνον πρῴην ὥσπερ σύ, ἀλλ᾿ ἀεί, | ἔπειτα οὐκ ἀνέδησα. καὶ ἅμ᾿ αὐτὸν λαβόντα τῶν ταινιῶν ἀναδεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ κατακλίνεσθαι.

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατεκλίνη, εἰπεῖν· Εἶεν δή, ἄνδρες· δοκεῖτε γάρ μοι νήφειν. οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον οὖν ὑμῖν, ἀλλὰ ποτέον· ὡμολόγηται γὰρ ταῦθ᾿ ἡμῖν. ἄρχοντα οὖν αἱροῦμαι τῆς | πόσεως, ἕως ἂν ὑμεῖς ἱκανῶς πίητε, ἐμαυτόν. ἀλλὰ φερέτω, Ἀγάθων, εἴ τι ἔστιν ἔκπωμα μέγα. μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἀλλὰ φέρε, παῖ, φάναι, τὸν ψυκτῆρα ἐκεῖνον, ἰδόντα αὐτὸν πλέον ἢ ὀκτὼ κο-
214 τύλας χωροῦντα. τοῦτον ἐμπλησάμενον πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸν ἐκπιεῖν, ἔπειτα τῷ Σωκράτει κελεύειν ἐγχεῖν καὶ ἅμα εἰπεῖν· Πρὸς μὲν Σωκράτη, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὸ σόφισμά μοι οὐδέν· ὁπόσον γὰρ ἂν κελεύῃ τις, τοσοῦτον | ἐκπιὼν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον μή ποτε μεθυσθῇ.

Τὸν μὲν οὖν Σωκράτη ἐγχέαντος τοῦ παιδὸς πίνειν· τὸν δ᾿ Ἐρυξίμαχον Πῶς οὖν, φάναι, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη,
b ποιοῦμεν; οὕτως οὔτε τι λέγομεν ἐπὶ τῇ κύλικι οὔτε τι ᾄδομεν, ἀλλ᾿ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ διψῶντες πιόμεθα;

Τὸν οὖν Ἀλκιβιάδην εἰπεῖν Ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, βέλτιστε βελτίστου πατρὸς καὶ σωφρονεστάτου, χαῖρε. |

"Well there's no reconciling me and you, said Alcibiades. But I shall get my revenge on you for this another time; but now, Agathon, give me back some of your rib- e
bons so I can tie some on the wonderful head of this man too. And don't let him reproach me that I tied a ribbon on you, when he defeats all men with words, not only the day before yesterday as you did, but always—and despite that, I didn't crown him." And saying this he took some ribbons and tied them on Socrates and then lay down.

When he had lain down, he said: "Well now gentlemen, you seem to me to be sober. Now this cannot be entrusted to you, but you must drink, for this was what we agreed. I therefore appoint as master of the drinks until you have drunk enough—myself. Well, Agathon, if you've got a large drinking cup, let it be brought out. Better still, there's no need; slave, fetch that wine cooler," he said, seeing that it had room for more than eight measures.[115]
When this had been filled, he first drank it off himself and 214
then told them to fill it up for Socrates and at the same time he said: "Against Socrates, gentlemen, my trick is of no use, for however much anyone tells him to drink, that much he drinks without ever getting more drunk."

So when the slave filled it up, Socrates drank; and
Eryximachus said: "so what are we doing, Alcibiades? Are b
we not talking or singing anything over the wine cup, but are we simply going to drink like men with a thirst?"

At this, Alcibiades said: "Eryximachus! best son of the best and most temperate father, greetings!"

115 Eight *kotulai* (i.e., almost two liters).

Καὶ γὰρ σύ, φάναι τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον· ἀλλὰ τί ποιῶμεν;

Ὅτι ἂν σὺ κελεύῃς. δεῖ γάρ σοι πείθεσθαι·

ἰητρὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πολλῶν ἀντάξιος ἄλλων·

ἐπίταττε οὖν ὅτι βούλει.

Ἄκουσον δή, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον. ἡμῖν πρὶν σὲ | εἰσελθεῖν ἔδοξε χρῆναι ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ἕκαστον ἐν μέρει λόγον περὶ Ἔρωτος εἰπεῖν ὡς δύναιτο κάλλιστον, καὶ
c ἐγκωμιάσαι. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι πάντες ἡμεῖς εἰρήκαμεν· σὺ δ' ἐπειδὴ οὐκ εἴρηκας καὶ ἐκπέπωκας, δίκαιος εἶ εἰπεῖν, εἰπὼν δὲ ἐπιτάξαι Σωκράτει ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ, καὶ τοῦτον τῷ ἐπὶ δεξιὰ καὶ οὕτω | τοὺς ἄλλους.

Ἀλλά, φάναι, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, καλῶς μὲν λέγεις, μεθύοντα δὲ ἄνδρα παρὰ νηφόντων λόγους παραβάλλειν μὴ οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ᾖ. καὶ ἅμα, ὦ
d μακάριε, πείθει τί σε Σωκράτης ὧν ἄρτι εἶπεν; ἢ οἶσθα ὅτι τοὐναντίον ἐστὶ πᾶν ἢ ὃ ἔλεγεν; οὗτος γάρ, ἐάν τινα ἐγὼ ἐπαινέσω τούτου παρόντος ἢ θεὸν ἢ ἄνθρωπον ἄλλον ἢ τοῦτον, οὐκ ἀφέξεταί μου τὼ χεῖρε. |

Οὐκ εὐφημήσεις; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

Μὰ τὸν Ποσειδῶ, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, μηδὲν λέγε πρὸς ταῦτα, ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδ' ἂν ἕνα ἄλλον ἐπαινέσαιμι σοῦ παρόντος.

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116 Homer, *Iliad* 11.514.

117 See above, 201e10 and n. 85.

"And to you too, said Eryximachus, but what are we to do?"

"Whatever you tell us. We must obey you, you know:"

'He who is a doctor is equal in worth to many
others'[116]

So arrange it as you will."

"Listen then, said Eryximachus. Before you arrived, we decided that starting from left to right each of us in turn should make the finest speech he could about Love and praise him. Now all the rest of us have made our speeches. c
But since you haven't spoken and have drained your cup, it's right that you make a speech, and when you've spoken, you can give to Socrates whatever orders you like and he to the next one on his right and so on with the others."

"Well, Eryximachus," said Alcibiades, "that's a great idea, but for a drunken man to match his words with sober men I'm afraid would not be fair. And at the same time, my dear friend, does any of what Socrates has just said convince you? Or do you know that everything is the op- d
posite of what he was saying? For this man, if I praise anyone else in his presence, either a god, or a man other than him, won't refrain from laying his hands on me."

"Watch what you're saying,"[117] said Socrates.

"By Poseidon,"[118] said Alcibiades, "don't argue against me on that, as there really isn't any other person I'd praise in your presence."

118 Swearing by Poseidon is an oath frequently found in comedy, but only here in Plato; there is a suggestion of bullying overtones (see Dover, n. ad loc.).

Ἀλλʼ οὕτω ποίει, φάναι τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, εἰ βούλει· | Σωκράτη ἐπαίνεσον.

e Πῶς λέγεις; εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην· δοκεῖ χρῆναι, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε; ἐπιθῶμαι τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τιμωρήσωμαι ὑμῶν ἐναντίον;

Οὗτος, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, τί ἐν νῷ ἔχεις; ἐπὶ τὰ | γελοιότερά με ἐπαινέσαι; ἢ τί ποιήσεις;

Τἀληθῆ ἐρῶ. ἀλλʼ ὅρα εἰ παρίης.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, φάναι, τά γε ἀληθῆ παρίημι καὶ κελεύω λέγειν.

Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμι, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην. καὶ μέντοι | οὑτωσὶ ποίησον. ἐάν τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, μεταξὺ ἐπιλαβοῦ, ἂν βούλῃ, καὶ εἰπὲ ὅτι τοῦτο ψεύδομαι·
215 ἑκὼν γὰρ εἶναι οὐδὲν ψεύσομαι. ἐὰν μέντοι ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν λέγω, μηδὲν θαυμάσῃς· οὐ γάρ τι ῥᾴδιον τὴν σὴν ἀτοπίαν ὧδʼ ἔχοντι εὐπόρως καὶ ἐφεξῆς καταριθμῆσαι.

Σωκράτη δʼ ἐγὼ ἐπαινεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὕτως ἐπιχειρήσω, | διʼ εἰκόνων. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἴσως οἰήσεται ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα, ἔσται δʼ ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἕνεκα, οὐ τοῦ γελοίου. φημὶ γὰρ δὴ ὁμοιότατον αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῖς σιληνοῖς τούτοις τοῖς ἐν τοῖς ἑρμογλυφείοις καθ-
b ημένοις, οὕστινας ἐργάζονται οἱ δημιουργοὶ σύριγγας ἢ αὐλοὺς ἔχοντας, οἳ διχάδε διοιχθέντες φαίνονται ἔνδοθεν ἀγάλματα ἔχοντες θεῶν. καὶ φημὶ αὖ

"Well do it this way, if you wish," said Eryximachus. "Praise Socrates."

"What do you mean?" said Alcibiades. "Do you think I e
should, Eryximachus? Am I to set about the man and take
my revenge in front of you all?"

"Hey you!" said Socrates, "what do you have in mind? Praise me to make me look even more ridiculous? Or what are you going to do?"

"I shall speak the truth. But see if you'll let me."

"Well, in that case," he replied, "I certainly permit you to tell the truth; indeed I order you to do so."

"I'll start straightaway," said Alcibiades. "Nevertheless
do as follows: if I say something that isn't true, interrupt
me, if you wish, and say that what I'm saying is false. For
I will not knowingly tell a lie. If however in my recollection 215
I speak in a mixed-up fashion, don't be surprised. You see
it's not at all easy for someone in my state to recount the
details of your singular behavior fluently and in the right
order."

The Speech of Alcibiades

"Socrates I shall attempt to praise in the following way, my
friends, by means of images. Possibly he'll think it's to
make him look more ridiculous, but the image will be in
the interests of truth, not ridicule. For I declare that he
most closely resembles those figurines of Silenus that sit
in sculptors' workshops, the sort which the artists make b
holding pipes or *auloi*, and when they are opened out into
two halves they are revealed containing statues of gods

ἐοικέναι αὐτὸν τῷ σατύρῳ τῷ Μαρσύᾳ. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τό
γε | εἶδος ὅμοιος εἶ τούτοις, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς
ἄν που ἀμφισβητήσαις· ὡς δὲ καὶ τἆλλα ἔοικας, μετὰ
τοῦτο ἄκουε. ὑβριστὴς εἶ· ἢ οὔ; ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ ὁμολογῇς,
μάρτυρας παρέξομαι. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ αὐλητής; πολύ γε θαυ-
μασιώτερος ἐκείνου. ὁ μέν γε δι᾽ ὀργάνων ἐκήλει τοὺς
c ἀνθρώπους τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος δυνάμει, καὶ ἔτι νυνὶ
ὃς ἂν τὰ ἐκείνου αὐλῇ—ἃ γὰρ Ὄλυμπος ηὔλει, Μαρ-
σύου λέγω, τούτου διδάξαντος—τὰ οὖν ἐκείνου ἐάντε
ἀγαθὸς αὐλητὴς αὐλῇ ἐάντε φαύλη αὐλητρίς, | μόνα
κατέχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ δηλοῖ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ τε-
λετῶν δεομένους διὰ τὸ θεῖα εἶναι. σὺ δ᾽ ἐκείνου τοσ-
οῦτον μόνον διαφέρεις, ὅτι ἄνευ ὀργάνων ψιλοῖς λό-
d γοις ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖς. ἡμεῖς γοῦν ὅταν μέν του
ἄλλου ἀκούωμεν λέγοντος καὶ πάνυ ἀγαθοῦ ῥήτορος
ἄλλους λόγους, οὐδὲν μέλει ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδενί·
ἐπειδὰν δὲ σοῦ τις ἀκούῃ ἢ τῶν σῶν λόγων ἄλλου
λέγοντος, κἂν πάνυ φαῦλος ᾖ ὁ λέγων, | ἐάντε γυνὴ
ἀκούῃ ἐάντε ἀνὴρ ἐάντε μειράκιον, ἐκπεπληγμένοι
ἐσμὲν καὶ κατεχόμεθα. ἐγὼ γοῦν, ὦ ἄνδρες, εἰ μὴ
ἔμελλον κομιδῇ δόξειν μεθύειν, εἶπον ὀμόσας ἂν ὑμῖν

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119 "Figurines of Silenus" (a7): Silenuses were portrayed in art in a similar way to satyrs, as having snub noses and prominent, bulging eyes, like portraits of Socrates. Marsyas (b4), a satyr (wild naked creature, human, but with animal features), challenged Apollo to a music competition and was flayed alive by the god (Herodotus 7.26.3).

inside. I also claim he resembles the Satyr Marsyas.[119] Now the fact that you resemble these creatures, at any rate in appearance, Socrates, I don't think even you would dispute. But to learn how you are like them in other respects, listen to the following. You treat people with insolence;[120] is that not so? If you don't agree, I'll produce witnesses. But you're not an *aulos* player? Yes, you are, and far more remarkable than Marsyas. For he beguiled people through instruments by the power which came from his mouth, and even now whoever plays his *aulos* tunes—for the c
tunes Olympus used to play I call Marsyas' music, since he taught Olympus[121]—his tunes then, whether it's a good *aulos* player who is playing, or some cheap *aulos* girl, are the only ones which can hold you in their sway and, on account of their being divine, reveal those in need of the gods and their initiation rites. But you differ from him to this extent only, that you achieve this very same effect in plain prose without instruments. At any rate whenever we d
hear someone else, even a very good orator, using words of a different kind, practically none of us cares in the slightest. But whenever someone hears you, or someone else speaking your words, even if he is a very poor speaker, whether it's a woman who hears you, or a man, or a youth, we are stunned and spellbound. At any rate, my friends, if I weren't going to appear to be completely intoxicated, I would tell you on oath the sort of things I myself have

[120] Socrates is "*hybristēs*," that is, he treats people with insolence or outrageously in argument and in other ways, as Alcibiades goes on to claim in his speech.

[121] Olympus (c2–3) was a mythical figure associated with Marsyas as inventing the *aulos* and its music.

οἷα δὴ πέπονθα αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τῶν τούτου λόγων καὶ
e *πάσχω ἔτι καὶ νυνί. ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούω, πολύ μοι μᾶλ-*
λον ἢ τῶν κορυβαντιώντων ἥ τε καρδία πηδᾷ καὶ
δάκρυα ἐκχεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων τῶν τούτου, ὁρῶ δὲ
καὶ ἄλλους παμπόλλους τὰ αὐτὰ πάσχοντας· Περι-
κλέους δὲ ἀκούων καὶ ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν | *ῥητόρων εὖ μὲν*
ἡγούμην λέγειν, τοιοῦτον δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἔπασχον, οὐδ᾽ ἐτε-
θορύβητό μου ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδ᾽ ἠγανάκτει ὡς ἀνδραποδω-
δῶς διακειμένου, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ τουτουῒ τοῦ Μαρσύου πολ-
λάκις δὴ οὕτω διετέθην ὥστε μοι δόξαι μὴ βιωτὸν
216 *εἶναι ἔχοντι ὡς ἔχω. καὶ ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἐρεῖς*
ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. καὶ ἔτι γε νῦν σύνοιδ᾽ ἐμαυτῷ ὅτι εἰ
ἐθέλοιμι παρέχειν τὰ ὦτα, οὐκ ἂν καρτερήσαιμι ἀλλὰ
ταὐτὰ ἂν πάσχοιμι. ἀναγκάζει | *γάρ με ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι*
πολλοῦ ἐνδεὴς ὢν αὐτὸς ἔτι ἐμαυτοῦ μὲν ἀμελῶ, τὰ δ᾽
Ἀθηναίων πράττω. βίᾳ οὖν ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν Σειρήνων
ἐπισχόμενος τὰ ὦτα οἴχομαι φεύγων, ἵνα μὴ αὐτοῦ
καθήμενος παρὰ τούτῳ καταγηράσω. πέπονθα δὲ
b *πρὸς τοῦτον μόνον ἀνθρώπων, ὃ οὐκ ἄν τις οἴοιτο ἐν*
ἐμοὶ ἐνεῖναι, τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι ὁντινοῦν· ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτον
μόνον αἰσχύνομαι. σύνοιδα γὰρ ἐμαυτῷ ἀντιλέγειν
μὲν οὐ δυναμένῳ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ οὗτος κελεύει,
ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀπέλθω, | *ἡττημένῳ τῆς τιμῆς τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν*
πολλῶν. δραπετεύω οὖν αὐτὸν καὶ φεύγω, καὶ ὅταν

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[122] On powerfully emotional music as an element in religious cults, associated with such groups as the Corybantes, originally priests of the Phrygian goddess, Cybele, see *Crito* 54d4–5 and *Ion* 534.

[123] That is, as a politician and a general.

experienced under the influence of that man's words and
that I still experience even now. For whenever I hear him, e
my heart leaps even more than the Corybantes[122] and the
tears flow as a result of his words, and I see countless oth-
ers undergoing the same. When I heard Pericles and other
good orators speaking I thought they spoke well, but I
experienced nothing like this, nor was my soul thrown into
confusion or annoyed at thinking I was in the condition of
a slave; but frequently I was indeed so much in this state
under the influence of this Marsyas here, that it seemed
to me my life was not worth living in the state I'm in. And 216
this, Socrates, you will not deny as the truth. And even now
I am aware that if I were willing to give ear to him, I would
not be resolute, but I would experience the same again.
For he compels me to admit that despite myself lacking in
much it's still myself I neglect, and attend to the affairs of
the Athenians.[123] Therefore I forcibly stop my ears and
run away from him, as if from the Sirens, to prevent my
sitting there and growing old beside him[124] I have experi-
enced this only toward this person, something no one b
would think I had in me, to be made to feel ashamed in
front of somebody, whoever it may be. It's only toward him
I feel this. For I am aware that I cannot argue against him
or deny that I have to do what he tells me to, and that
whenever I leave him I am giving way to my desire for
honor from the mass of the people. Therefore I desert him

124 Just as in Homer, Odysseus' men had to bind Odysseus to the ship's mast as they rowed past the island of the Sirens to prevent him from being seduced and permanently immobilized by the beauty of their song (*Odyssey* 12.177–200), so Alcibiades had to stop his ears to Socrates' seductive words.

ἴδω, αἰσχύνομαι τὰ ὡμολογημένα. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν
c ἡδέως ἂν ἴδοιμι αὐτὸν μὴ ὄντα ἐν ἀνθρώποις· εἰ δ᾽ αὖ
τοῦτο γένοιτο, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι πολὺ μεῖζον ἂν ἀχθοίμην,
ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι χρήσωμαι τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.

Καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν δὴ τῶν αὐλημάτων καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλοι
πολλοὶ | τοιαῦτα πεπόνθασιν ὑπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ σατύρου·
ἄλλα δὲ ἐμοῦ ἀκούσατε ὡς ὅμοιός τ᾽ ἐστὶν οἷς ἐγὼ
ᾔκασα αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ὡς θαυμασίαν ἔχει. εὖ
d γὰρ ἴστε ὅτι οὐδεὶς ὑμῶν τοῦτον γιγνώσκει· ἀλλὰ ἐγὼ
δηλώσω, ἐπείπερ ἠρξάμην. ὁρᾶτε γὰρ ὅτι Σωκράτης
ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀεὶ περὶ τούτους
ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκπέπληκται, καὶ αὖ ἀγνοεῖ πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν
οἶδεν. ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ τοῦτο οὐ σιληνῶδες; | σφό-
δρα γε. τοῦτο γὰρ οὗτος ἔξωθεν περιβέβληται, ὥσπερ
ὁ γεγλυμμένος σιληνός· ἔνδοθεν δὲ ἀνοιχθεὶς πόσης
οἴεσθε γέμει, ὦ ἄνδρες συμπόται, σωφροσύνης; ἴστε
ὅτι οὔτε εἴ τις καλός ἐστι μέλει αὐτῷ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ
e καταφρονεῖ τοσοῦτον ὅσον οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς οἰηθείη, οὔτ᾽ εἴ
τις πλούσιος, οὔτ᾽ εἰ ἄλλην τινὰ τιμὴν ἔχων τῶν ὑπὸ
πλήθους μακαριζομένων· ἡγεῖται δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τὰ
κτήματα οὐδενὸς ἄξια καὶ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν εἶναι—λέγω
ὑμῖν—εἰρωνευόμενος δὲ καὶ παίζων πάντα τὸν | βίον
πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διατελεῖ. σπουδάσαντος δὲ αὐ-
τοῦ καὶ ἀνοιχθέντος οὐκ οἶδα εἴ τις ἑώρακεν τὰ ἐντὸς

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125 On Socrates' "ignorance," see *Apology* 21b–22e.

126 "Feigning ignorance" = *eironeia* ("mock modesty" or simply "deception"; not "irony" in the modern sense). See below

like a runaway slave, and whenever I see him I'm ashamed because of the agreements I made with him. Many times I would gladly see him no longer part of the human race, but again if this were to happen, I know very well that my c grief would be much greater, so that I don't know how to handle this fellow.

"So this is the way both I and many others have been affected by this Satyr as a result of his *aulos* playing. Well, listen to me when I tell you other ways in which he is like those with whom I compared him, and how extraordinary is the power he has. Be well aware that none of you knows this man. But, seeing that I've started, I will show you. For d you see that Socrates has erotic leanings toward handsome young men; he's always around them and is smitten by violent passion, and yet again he is ignorant of everything and knows nothing.[125] As for this appearance of his, isn't this just like Silenus? Every bit of it. You see this is what this man assumes for his outer wrapping, just like the carved Silenus. But inside, once you've opened him up, my fellow drinking partners, can you imagine how full of moderation he is? Let me tell you that if someone is handsome, it matters not a bit to him; on the contrary not a single person can imagine how great is his contempt for it. Nor if someone is wealthy, nor in possession of some other e honor of those through which someone is counted as blessed by the majority of people. He considers all these possessions to be worthless and we are of no account—I'm telling you—and he spends his entire life feigning ignorance and playing with people.[126] But when he's serious and opened up, I don't know if anyone has seen the statues

(218d6) and, e.g., Thrasymachus to Socrates at *Republic* 337a. (See Vlastos, "Socratic Irony," in *Socrates*, 21–44).

*ἀγάλματα· ἀλλ᾿ ἐγὼ ἤδη ποτ᾿ εἶδον, καί μοι ἔδοξεν
οὕτω θεῖα καὶ χρυσᾶ εἶναι καὶ πάγκαλα καὶ θαυ-
μαστά, ὥστε ποιητέον εἶναι ἔμβραχυ ὅτι κελεύοι Σω-*
217 *κράτης. ἡγούμενος δὲ αὐτὸν ἐσπουδακέναι ἐπὶ τῇ ἐμῇ
ὥρᾳ ἕρμαιον ἡγησάμην εἶναι καὶ εὐτύχημα ἐμὸν θαυ-
μαστόν, ὡς ὑπάρχον μοι χαρισαμένῳ Σωκράτει πάντ᾿
| ἀκοῦσαι ὅσαπερ οὗτος ᾔδει· ἐφρόνουν γὰρ δὴ ἐπὶ τῇ
ὥρᾳ θαυμάσιον ὅσον. ταῦτα οὖν διανοηθείς, πρὸ τοῦ
οὐκ εἰωθὼς ἄνευ ἀκολούθου μόνος μετ᾿ αὐτοῦ γίγνε-
σθαι, τότε ἀποπέμπων τὸν ἀκόλουθον μόνος συν-
εγιγνόμην—δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς πάντα τἀληθῆ εἰπεῖν·*
b *ἀλλὰ προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν, καὶ εἰ ψεύδομαι, Σώκρατες,
ἐξέλεγχε—συνεγιγνόμην γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες, μόνος μόνῳ,
καὶ ᾤμην αὐτίκα διαλέξεσθαι αὐτόν μοι ἅπερ ἂν |
ἐραστὴς παιδικοῖς ἐν ἐρημίᾳ διαλεχθείη, καὶ ἔχαιρον.
τούτων δ᾿ οὐ μάλα ἐγίγνετο οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾿ ὥσπερ εἰώθει
διαλεχθεὶς ἄν μοι καὶ συνημερεύσας ᾤχετο ἀπιών.
μετὰ ταῦτα συγγυμνάζεσθαι προυκαλούμην αὐτὸν*
c *καὶ συνεγυμναζόμην, ὥς τι ἐνταῦθα περανῶν. συνε-
γυμνάζετο οὖν μοι καὶ προσεπάλαιεν πολλάκις οὐ-
δενὸς παρόντος· καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν; οὐδὲν γάρ μοι πλέον
ἦν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδαμῇ ταύτῃ ἤνυτον, ἔδοξέ μοι | ἐπιθε-
τέον εἶναι τῷ ἀνδρὶ κατὰ τὸ καρτερὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀνετέον,
ἐπειδήπερ ἐνεκεχειρήκη, ἀλλὰ ἰστέον ἤδη τί ἐστι τὸ
πρᾶγμα. προκαλοῦμαι δὴ αὐτὸν πρὸς τὸ συνδειπνεῖν,
ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἐραστὴς παιδικοῖς ἐπιβουλεύων. καί
μοι οὐδὲ τοῦτο ταχὺ ὑπήκουσεν, ὅμως δ᾿ οὖν χρόνῳ*

within. I did see them once, and it seemed to me they were so divine and golden, so utterly beautiful and marvelous that, in brief, I had to do whatever Socrates told me to.
Thinking he was keen on my youthful beauty I thought 217
this was a godsend, and my remarkably good luck that if I gratified Socrates I could hear everything that he knew. I assure you I was proud of how wonderful my youthful charms were. So with this in mind, whereas before this time I was not in the habit of meeting up with him alone without an attendant, at this point, dismissing the attendant, I started meeting up with him on my own—you see
I must tell you the whole truth; but you all pay attention b
and, if I tell a lie, Socrates, tell me I'm wrong—yes, I was meeting up with him one to one, my friends, and I thought he would immediately talk to me as a lover would talk to his loved one alone, and I was delighted. But none of this happened at all, but he would talk to me as usual and after spending the day together, he went on his way. After this I invited him to go and take exercise with me and I exer-
cised with him hoping to achieve something that way. So c
he exercised and wrestled with me many times with no one else there. And what must I say? I was no further forward. Since I was not getting anywhere this way either, I decided I'd have to go for him by direct assault and not give up, since I'd started things off; I just had to see what the problem was. I invited him to supper with me, just like a lover plotting to get his loved one.[127] And he didn't answer very quickly, yet nevertheless in time he was persuaded to

[127] That is, the reverse of the normal relationship, where the *erastēs* (lover) as the older man takes the initiative with the *paidika* (loved one), the younger.

d ἐπείσθη. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφίκετο τὸ πρῶτον, δειπνήσας ἀπιέναι ἐβούλετο. καὶ τότε μὲν αἰσχυνόμενος ἀφῆκα αὐτόν· αὖθις δ᾽ ἐπιβουλεύσας, ἐπειδὴ ἐδεδειπνήκεμεν διελεγόμην ἀεὶ πόρρω τῶν νυκτῶν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ | ἐβούλετο ἀπιέναι, σκηπτόμενος ὅτι ὀψὲ εἴη, προσηνάγκασα αὐτὸν μένειν. ἀνεπαύετο οὖν ἐν τῇ ἐχομένῃ ἐμοῦ κλίνῃ, ἐν ᾗπερ ἐδείπνει, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι
e ἄλλος καθηῦδεν ἢ ἡμεῖς. μέχρι μὲν οὖν δὴ δεῦρο τοῦ λόγου καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ πρὸς ὁντινοῦν λέγειν· τὸ δ᾽ ἐντεῦθεν οὐκ ἄν μου ἠκούσατε λέγοντος, εἰ μὴ πρῶτον μέν, τὸ λεγόμενον, οἶνος ἄνευ τε παίδων καὶ μετὰ παίδων ἦν ἀληθής, ἔπειτα ἀφανίσαι Σωκράτους | ἔργον ὑπερήφανον εἰς ἔπαινον ἐλθόντα ἄδικόν μοι φαίνεται. ἔτι δὲ τὸ τοῦ δηχθέντος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πάθος κἀμ᾽ ἔχει. φασὶ γάρ πού τινα τοῦτο παθόντα οὐκ ἐθέλειν λέγειν οἷον ἦν πλὴν τοῖς δεδηγμένοις, ὡς μόνοις γνωσομένοις τε καὶ συγγνωσομένοις εἰ πᾶν ἐτόλμα δρᾶν
218 τε καὶ λέγειν ὑπὸ τῆς ὀδύνης. ἐγὼ οὖν δεδηγμένος τε ὑπὸ ἀλγεινοτέρου καὶ τὸ ἀλγεινότατον ὧν ἄν τις δηχθείη—τὴν καρδίαν γὰρ ἢ ψυχὴν ἢ ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸ ὀνομάσαι πληγείς τε καὶ δηχθεὶς | ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων, οἳ ἔχονται ἐχίδνης ἀγριώτερον, νέου ψυχῆς μὴ ἀφυοῦς ὅταν λάβωνται, καὶ ποιοῦσι δρᾶν τε καὶ λέγειν ὁτιοῦν—καὶ ὁρῶν αὖ Φαίδρους, Ἀγάθωνας, Ἐρυξιμάχους, Παυσανίας, Ἀριστοδήμους τε καὶ Ἀριστο-

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[128] An obscure phrase: there was a proverb "truth comes from

come. But when he came the first time, he wanted to leave d
after the meal. On that occasion I let him go out of shame; but I came up with another ruse and when we had eaten dinner I kept talking far into the night, and when he wanted to go I prevailed upon him to stay, on the excuse that it was late. So he prepared to take his rest on the couch next to me where he had taken his meal, and no one
else slept in the room except us. Well up to this point in e
the story it would have been all right to tell it to anyone, no matter who. But you wouldn't have heard me recount what followed, if first of all, as the saying goes, wine didn't reveal the truth, without and with slaves present,[128] and secondly, to me it seems wrong to suppress Socrates' splendidly disdainful treatment, when I've embarked on my praise of him; and what's more, the feeling you have when bitten by a snake has got hold of me. For they say, I think, that someone who has suffered this is unwilling to say what it was like except to those who have been bitten, as they would be the only ones who would understand and excuse him if he brought himself to do and say anything
because of the pain. So for myself, having been bitten by 218
something more painful, and in the most painful place where one can be bitten—for I was struck and bitten in the heart or the soul, or whatever we ought to call it, by words talked about in philosophy which cling much more savagely than a viper when they seize the soul of a young man not lacking in natural talent and make him do and say anything whatever—and moreover seeing people like Phaedrus, Agathon, Eryximachus, Pausanias, Aristode-

wine and children," and Alcibiades may be somehow playing on the double meaning of *pais* ="child" and "slave."

b φάνας· Σωκράτη δὲ αὐτὸν τί δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι; πάντες γὰρ κεκοινωνήκατε τῆς φιλοσόφου μανίας τε καὶ βακχείας—διὸ πάντες ἀκούσεσθε· συγγνώσεσθε γὰρ τοῖς τε | τότε πραχθεῖσι καὶ τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις. οἱ δὲ οἰκέται, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος ἐστὶν βέβηλός τε καὶ ἄγροικος, πύλας πάνυ μεγάλας τοῖς ὠσὶν ἐπίθεσθε.

Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὅ τε λύχνος ἀπεσβήκει
c καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἔξω ἦσαν, ἔδοξέ μοι χρῆναι μηδὲν ποικίλλειν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐλευθέρως εἰπεῖν ἅ μοι ἐδόκει· καὶ εἶπον κινήσας αὐτόν, Σώκρατες, καθεύδεις;

Οὐ δῆτα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. |

Οἶσθα οὖν ἅ μοι δέδοκται;

Τί μάλιστα, ἔφη.

Σὺ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐμοῦ ἐραστὴς ἄξιος γεγονέναι μόνος, καί μοι φαίνῃ ὀκνεῖν μνησθῆναι πρός με. ἐγὼ δὲ οὑτωσὶ ἔχω· πάνυ ἀνόητον ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι σοὶ μὴ οὐ καὶ | τοῦτο χαρίζεσθαι καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἢ τῆς
d οὐσίας τῆς ἐμῆς δέοιο ἢ τῶν φίλων τῶν ἐμῶν. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι πρεσβύτερον τοῦ ὡς ὅτι βέλτιστον ἐμὲ γενέσθαι, τούτου δὲ οἶμαί μοι συλλήπτορα οὐδένα κυριώτερον εἶναι σοῦ. ἐγὼ δὴ τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἂν μὴ χαριζόμενος αἰσχυνοίμην | τοὺς φρονίμους, ἢ χαριζόμενος τούς τε πολλοὺς καὶ ἄφρονας.

Καὶ οὗτος ἀκούσας μάλα εἰρωνικῶς καὶ σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ εἰωθότως ἔλεξεν Ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη, κινδυνεύεις τῷ ὄντι οὐ φαῦλος εἶναι, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ τυγ-

mus and Aristophanes: and do I have to mention Socrates b
himself and the rest of you? For you have all participated in the madness and frenzy of philosophy—so all of you will hear me out, for you will forgive what was done then and what is being said now. But you household slaves, and anyone else uninitiated and vulgar, put pretty large doors over your ears.

"So then, gentlemen, when the lamp had been extinguished and the slave boys were out of the room, I re- c
solved not to try anything fancy with him, but to declare openly what I had decided. I nudged him and said: Socrates, are you asleep?"

"Indeed no," he said.

"So do you know what I have decided?"

"What in particular?" he replied.

I said "I think you are the only lover I've had worthy of me and you appear to be holding back from mentioning it to me. This is where I stand: I think it is very foolish not to grant you this favor, or if there is anything else you need
from my property or that of my friends. For nothing is d
more important to me than for me to become as good as possible, and in this I don't think anyone is a more capable partner for me than you. Indeed I would be much more ashamed in the presence of intelligent people for not granting my favors to such a man as you than I would if I did so in front of the very many people who have no sense."

When he heard this, with his great mock modesty[129] and in his usual manner so very characteristic of him, he said: "my dear Alcibiades, it looks as if in actual fact you

[129] See above, n. 126.

e χάνει ὄντα ἃ λέγεις περὶ ἐμοῦ, καί τις ἔστ᾽ ἐν ἐμοὶ
δύναμις δι᾽ ἧς ἂν σὺ γένοιο ἀμείνων· ἀμήχανόν τοι
κάλλος ὁρῴης ἂν ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ τῆς παρὰ σοὶ εὐμορφίας
πάμπολυ διαφέρον. εἰ δὴ καθορῶν αὐτὸ κοινώσασθαί
τέ μοι ἐπιχειρεῖς καὶ ἀλλάξασθαι κάλλος | ἀντὶ κάλ-
λους, οὐκ ὀλίγῳ μου πλεονεκτεῖν διανοῇ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀντὶ
δόξης ἀλήθειαν καλῶν κτᾶσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καὶ τῷ ὄντι
219 "χρύσεα χαλκείων" διαμείβεσθαι νοεῖς. ἀλλ᾽, ὦ μα-
κάριε, ἄμεινον σκόπει, μή σε λανθάνω οὐδὲν ὤν. ἥ τοι
τῆς διανοίας ὄψις ἄρχεται ὀξὺ βλέπειν ὅταν ἡ τῶν
ὀμμάτων τῆς ἀκμῆς λήγειν ἐπιχειρῇ· σὺ δὲ τούτων ἔτι
πόρρω. |

Κἀγὼ ἀκούσας, Τὰ μὲν παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ, ἔφην, ταῦτά
ἐστιν, ὧν οὐδὲν ἄλλως εἴρηται ἢ ὡς διανοοῦμαι· σὺ δὲ
αὐτὸς οὕτω βουλεύου ὅτι σοί τε ἄριστον καὶ ἐμοὶ
ἡγῇ.

Ἀλλ᾽, ἔφη, τοῦτό γ᾽ εὖ λέγεις· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐπιόντι
χρόνῳ βουλευόμενοι πράξομεν ὃ ἂν φαίνηται νῷν
περί τε τούτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄριστον.

b Ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τε καὶ εἰπών, καὶ ἀφεὶς
ὥσπερ βέλη, τετρῶσθαι αὐτὸν ᾤμην· καὶ ἀναστάς γε,
οὐδ᾽ | ἐπιτρέψας τούτῳ εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἔτι, ἀμφιέσας τὸ
ἱμάτιον τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ τοῦτον—καὶ γὰρ ἦν χειμών—ὑπὸ
τὸν τρίβωνα κατακλινεὶς τὸν τουτουί, περιβαλὼν τὼ
χεῖρε τούτῳ τῷ δαιμονίῳ ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ θαυμαστῷ,

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[130] At Homer, *Iliad* 6.232–36 the Trojan Glaucus gives his

are not worthless if what you're saying about me is actually true, and there is in me some ability to make you better; e
you would see in me an extraordinary beauty, far superior to the beauty of form that you have. If then in looking at this you are attempting to strike a bargain with me and exchange beauty for beauty, you're thinking of gaining the advantage over me in no small way and are trying to obtain truly beautiful things instead of apparent ones, and you have it in mind to make an exchange which is in reality 'gold for bronze.'[130] Well, my dear boy, have a better look 219
in case you haven't noticed that I'm worthless. I tell you, the sight of the mind begins to see distinctly when that of the eyes starts to decline from its high point. But you're still a long way from there."

When I heard this, I said: "these are my feelings; nothing has been said contrary to my purpose; so it's for you yourself to decide what you think is the best way for both you and me."

"Well, you're right there," he said, "for in the future we shall take counsel and do what appears best to us, both in these and in other matters."

When I'd had my say and heard his reply, having let fly b
my arrows, as it were, I thought he had been wounded. I got up and without letting him say another word I wrapped this cloak of mine around him—for it was winter—and laid myself down under the threadbare cloak of this man here, and throwing my arms round this godlike and truly mag-

Greek enemy Diomedes golden armor in exchange for bronze. Socrates is saying that, if he actually did possess the qualities Alcibiades attributes to him, this would be gold in exchange for his possession of Alcibiades' beauty, which would be mere bronze.

c κατεκείμην τὴν νύκτα ὅλην. καὶ οὐδὲ ταῦτα αὖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρεῖς ὅτι ψεύδομαι. ποιήσαντος δὲ δὴ ταῦτα ἐμοῦ οὗτος τοσοῦτον περιεγένετό τε καὶ κατεφρόνησεν καὶ κατεγέλασεν τῆς ἐμῆς ὥρας καὶ | ὕβρισεν—καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνό γε ᾤμην τὶ εἶναι, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί· δικασταὶ γάρ ἐστε τῆς Σωκράτους ὑπερηφανίας—εὖ γὰρ ἴστε μὰ θεούς, μὰ θεάς, οὐδὲν περιττότερον καταδεδαρθηκὼς ἀνέστην μετὰ Σωκράτους, ἢ εἰ μετὰ πατρὸς καθηῦδον ἢ ἀδελφοῦ πρεσβυτέρου.

d Τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο τίνα οἴεσθέ με διάνοιαν ἔχειν, ἡγούμενον μὲν ἠτιμάσθαι, ἀγάμενον δὲ τὴν τούτου φύσιν τε καὶ | σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν, ἐντετυχηκότα ἀνθρώπῳ τοιούτῳ οἵῳ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἂν ᾤμην ποτ᾽ ἐντυχεῖν εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ εἰς καρτερίαν; ὥστε οὔθ᾽ ὅπως οὖν ὀργιζοίμην εἶχον καὶ ἀποστερηθείην τῆς τούτου συνουσίας, οὔτε ὅπῃ προσαγαγοίμην αὐτὸν
e ηὐπόρουν. εὖ γὰρ ᾔδη ὅτι χρήμασί γε πολὺ μᾶλλον ἄτρωτος ἦν πανταχῇ ἢ σιδήρῳ ὁ Αἴας, ᾧ τε ᾤμην αὐτὸν μόνῳ ἁλώσεσθαι, διεπεφεύγει με. ἠπόρουν δή, καταδεδουλωμένος τε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὡς οὐδεὶς ὑπ᾽ οὐδενὸς | ἄλλου περιῇα. ταῦτά τε γάρ μοι ἅπαντα προυγεγόνει, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα στρατεία ἡμῖν εἰς Ποτείδαιαν ἐγένετο κοινὴ καὶ συνεσιτοῦμεν ἐκεῖ. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοῖς πόνοις οὐ μόνον ἐμοῦ περιῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ

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131 In 432–430 (i.e., about sixteen to fourteen years before the dramatic date of the party: Potidaea in Northern Greece was a

nificent man I lay there the whole night through. Now you're not going to say I'm telling lies here either, Socrates. So although I had done this, he so much got the better of me, and scorned and mocked my beauty and treated it outrageously—and in that respect I really thought I was something, you gentlemen of the jury; for you are the judges of Socrates' disdain—for know full well, by the gods and the goddesses, I got up with nothing out of the ordinary having happened after I'd slept with Socrates than if I'd slept with my father or elder brother. c

"As to what came after that, what frame of mind do you think I was in, on the one hand thinking I had been snubbed, but on the other admiring the nature of this man and his self-control and courage, having come upon such a man with such wisdom and steadfastness as I thought I would never meet? The result was that there was no way I could be angry and be deprived of his company, nor could I find a way to win him over. For I knew perfectly well that he was much more completely untouchable by money than Ajax was by the sword and as for the only way by which I thought he would be caught, he had escaped me. Indeed I was at a loss; I went around enslaved by the fellow as no one had been by any other. For after all this had happened to me we went on campaign together to Potidaea and shared the same mess there.[131] Firstly, in putting up with hardships he was superior not only to me d e

key strategic city in the lead-up to the Peloponnesian War). Messing together in this instance seems to have implied personal friendship, as Alcibiades and Socrates were from different Athenian tribes.

τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων—ὁπότ᾽ ἀναγκασθεῖμεν ἀπολη-
φθέντες που, οἷα δὴ ἐπὶ στρατείας, ἀσιτεῖν, οὐδὲν
220 ἦσαν οἱ ἄλλοι πρὸς τὸ καρτερεῖν—ἔν τ᾽ αὖ ταῖς εὐω-
χίαις μόνος ἀπολαύειν οἷός τ᾽ ἦν τά τ᾽ ἄλλα καὶ πί-
νειν οὐκ ἐθέλων, ὁπότε ἀναγκασθείη, πάντας ἐκράτει,
καὶ ὃ πάντων θαυμαστότατον, Σωκράτη μεθύοντα οὐ-
δεὶς πώποτε | ἑώρακεν ἀνθρώπων. τούτου μὲν οὖν μοι
δοκεῖ καὶ αὐτίκα ὁ ἔλεγχος ἔσεσθαι. πρὸς δὲ αὖ τὰς
τοῦ χειμῶνος καρτερήσεις—δεινοὶ γὰρ αὐτόθι χειμῶ-
νες—θαυμάσια ἠργάζετο τά τε ἄλλα, καί ποτε ὄντος
b πάγου οἵου δεινοτάτου, καὶ πάντων ἢ οὐκ ἐξιόντων
ἔνδοθεν, ἢ εἴ τις ἐξίοι, ἠμφιεσμένων τε θαυμαστὰ δὴ
ὅσα καὶ ὑποδεδεμένων καὶ ἐνειλιγμένων τοὺς πόδας
εἰς πίλους καὶ ἀρνακίδας, οὗτος δ᾽ ἐν τούτοις ἐξῄει |
ἔχων ἱμάτιον μὲν τοιοῦτον οἷόνπερ καὶ πρότερον εἰώ-
θει φορεῖν, ἀνυπόδητος δὲ διὰ τοῦ κρυστάλλου ῥᾷον
ἐπορεύετο ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ὑποδεδεμένοι, οἱ δὲ στρατιῶται
c ὑπέβλεπον αὐτὸν ὡς καταφρονοῦντα σφῶν. καὶ ταῦτα
μὲν δὴ ταῦτα·

οἷον δ᾽ αὖ τόδ᾽ ἔρεξε καὶ ἔτλη καρτερὸς ἀνὴρ

ἐκεῖ ποτε ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς, ἄξιον ἀκοῦσαι. συννοήσας γὰρ αὐτόθι ἕωθέν τι εἱστήκει σκοπῶν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ οὐ προυχώρει | αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἀνίει ἀλλὰ εἱστήκει ζητῶν. καὶ ἤδη ἦν μεσημβρία, καὶ ἄνθρωποι ᾐσθάνοντο, καὶ θαυμάζοντες ἄλλος ἄλλῳ ἔλεγεν ὅτι Σωκράτης ἐξ ἑω-

but also to all the rest—whenever we were forced to go without food after being cut off somewhere, as happens on campaign, the rest were nothing when it came to endurance; on the other hand, when it came to feasting he 220
was uniquely able to enjoy it, and in particular, though he was unwilling to drink, yet when forced to do so he used to beat the lot of us, and the most amazing thing: no one alive has ever seen Socrates drunk. Well, of that, I think, there will be proof any time now. Again as for his endurance of winter weather—for the winters are terrible up there—he managed some remarkable feats, and in particular one day when there was a frost as terrible as it could be, and with everyone either not going out from under b
cover or if anyone did go out they were remarkably well wrapped up, with their shoes on and with their feet swathed in felt and fleeces: this man went out among them wearing the sort of cloak he had been accustomed to wear before and made his way across the ice in bare feet more easily than the rest with their shoes on, and the soldiers looked askance at him, thinking he was showing contempt for them. So much, then, for that; but: c

> 'What a thing this was again which the stalwart man
> did and endured'[132]

there once on campaign was an event worth hearing about. For from daybreak he had been standing in meditation on the spot contemplating something, and when he was making no progress at it, he didn't give up, but stood there searching. By now it was midday and people were noticing him and in their amazement said to one another that Soc-

[132] Based on Homer, *Odyssey* 4.242, 271.

θινοῦ φροντίζων τι ἕστηκε. τελευτῶντες δέ τινες τῶν
d Ἰώνων, ἐπειδὴ ἑσπέρα ἦν, δειπνήσαντες—καὶ γὰρ
θέρος τότε γ᾽ ἦν—χαμεύνια ἐξενεγκάμενοι ἅμα μὲν ἐν
τῷ ψύχει καθηῦδον, ἅμα δ᾽ ἐφύλαττον αὐτὸν εἰ καὶ
τὴν νύκτα ἑστήξοι. ὁ δὲ εἱστήκει μέχρι ἕως ἐγένετο
καὶ ἥλιος ἀνέσχεν· ἔπειτα ᾤχετ᾽ ἀπιὼν προσευξάμε-
νος τῷ | ἡλίῳ. εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε ἐν ταῖς μάχαις—τοῦτο
γὰρ δὴ δίκαιόν γε αὐτῷ ἀποδοῦναι—ὅτε γὰρ ἡ μάχη
ἦν ἐξ ἧς ἐμοὶ καὶ τἀριστεῖα ἔδοσαν οἱ στρατηγοί,
e οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἐμὲ ἔσωσεν ἀνθρώπων ἢ οὗτος, τετρω-
μένον οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀπολιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ συνδιέσωσε καὶ τὰ
ὅπλα καὶ αὐτὸν ἐμέ. καὶ ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ
τότε ἐκέλευον σοὶ διδόναι τἀριστεῖα τοὺς στρατηγούς,
καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι οὔτε μέμψῃ οὔτε ἐρεῖς ὅτι ψεύδομαι·
| ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῶν στρατηγῶν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὸν ἀξίωμα
ἀποβλεπόντων καὶ βουλομένων ἐμοὶ διδόναι τἀρι-
στεῖα, αὐτὸς προθυμότερος ἐγένου τῶν στρατηγῶν
ἐμὲ λαβεῖν ἢ σαυτόν. ἔτι τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἄξιον ἦν
θεάσασθαι Σωκράτη, ὅτε ἀπὸ Δηλίου φυγῇ ἀνεχώρει
221 τὸ στρατόπεδον· ἔτυχον γὰρ παραγενόμενος ἵππον
ἔχων, οὗτος δὲ ὅπλα. ἀνεχώρει οὖν ἐσκεδασμένων
ἤδη τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὗτός τε ἅμα καὶ Λάχης· καὶ ἐγὼ
περιτυγχάνω, καὶ ἰδὼν εὐθὺς παρακελεύομαί τε αὐτοῖν
θαρρεῖν, | καὶ ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐκ ἀπολείψω αὐτώ. ἐνταῦθα
δὴ καὶ κάλλιον ἐθεασάμην Σωκράτη ἢ ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ—

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133 For the Athenian defeat at Delium (424), see Thucydides

rates had been standing there thinking about something
since daybreak. Finally when evening came, some of the
Ionians, having had their supper, brought out some pallet
beds—for it was summer at the time—and slept in the d
cool and at the same time watched him to see if he would
stand there all night as well. And he did stand there until
it was dawn and the sun rose; then he went off after praying to the sun. If you want to hear about him in the battles—for indeed it's right to pay him this tribute—when
there was a battle after which the commanders actually
gave me an award for bravery, no other man rescued me
but this man, who refused to leave me behind wounded, e
but also saved my armor as well as myself. And on that
occasion, Socrates, I was actually telling the commanders
to give you the award for bravery, and on that point you
will not blame me, nor say that I'm telling lies. But the fact
is that when the commanders were taking into account my
own standing and wanted to give me the award for bravery,
you were keener than the commanders that I should take
it rather than you yourself. And yet again, gentlemen, it
was worth looking at Socrates when the army withdrew
from Delium in flight. You see I happened to be there, I 221
with a horse, he with his arms.[133] So when the men had
already scattered, he withdrew along with Laches. I happened to meet them and as soon as I saw them I shouted
to both of them to keep their courage up and said I would
not abandon the two of them. It was then I got an even
better view of Socrates than at Potidaea—for I was less

4.89–101. Alcibiades was a cavalryman and Socrates a hoplite (heavy-armed foot soldier). For Socrates' conduct, see *Laches* 181b, and for his military service in general, *Apology* 28e.

αὐτὸς γὰρ ἧττον ἐν φόβῳ ἦ διὰ τὸ ἐφ' ἵππου εἶναι—πρῶτον μὲν ὅσον περιῆν Λάχητος τῷ ἔμφρων εἶναι·
b ἔπειτα ἔμοιγ' ἐδόκει, ὦ Ἀριστόφανες, τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ἐκεῖ διαπορεύεσθαι ὥσπερ καὶ ἐνθάδε, "βρενθυόμενος καὶ τὠφθαλμὼ παραβάλλων," ἠρέμα παρασκοπῶν καὶ τοὺς φιλίους καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους, | δῆλος ὢν παντὶ καὶ πάνυ πόρρωθεν ὅτι εἴ τις ἅψεται τούτου τοῦ ἀνδρός, μάλα ἐρρωμένως ἀμυνεῖται. διὸ καὶ ἀσφαλῶς ἀπῄει καὶ οὗτος καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρος· σχεδὸν γάρ τι τῶν οὕτω διακειμένων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὐδὲ ἅπτονται, ἀλλὰ τοὺς προτροπάδην φεύγοντας διώκουσιν.

c Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἄν τις καὶ ἄλλα ἔχοι Σωκράτη ἐπαινέσαι καὶ θαυμάσια· ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων τάχ' ἄν τις καὶ περὶ ἄλλου τοιαῦτα εἴποι, τὸ δὲ μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπων | ὅμοιον εἶναι, μήτε τῶν παλαιῶν μήτε τῶν νῦν ὄντων, τοῦτο ἄξιον παντὸς θαύματος. οἷος γὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐγένετο, ἀπεικάσειεν ἄν τις καὶ Βρασίδαν καὶ ἄλλους, καὶ οἷος αὖ Περικλῆς, καὶ Νέστορα καὶ Ἀντήνορα—εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι—καὶ τοὺς
d ἄλλους κατὰ ταὔτ' ἄν τις ἀπεικάζοι· οἷος δὲ οὑτοσὶ γέγονε τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ, οὐδ' ἐγγὺς ἂν εὕροι τις ζητῶν, οὔτε τῶν νῦν οὔτε τῶν παλαιῶν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα εἰ οἷς ἐγὼ λέγω ἀπεικά-

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134 An adapted quotation from Aristophanes' comedy *Clouds* 362, where the Chorus is satirizing Socrates' allegedly absurd meteorological speculation.

fearful on account of my being on horseback—firstly how superior he was to Laches in having his wits about him, and then it seemed to me, Aristophanes, after all this is b
one of yours, he made his way there just as he does here, 'swaggering and casting his eyes sideways'[134] calmly observing friend and foe, making it plain to all, even if they were some distance away, that if anyone attacked this man, he would defend himself with the utmost vigor. That's the reason he and his comrade got away safely. You see as a rule in war people don't lay a finger on those who behave like this, but pursue those who are fleeing headlong.

"Now one could find many other things to say in praise c
of Socrates, and remarkable ones too; and with regard to his other activities perhaps one could say such things about someone else too, but the fact that he is unlike any other human being, both from the past and the present—*that* is worthy of our total wonder. For the kind of person Achilles was, one could compare Brasidas and others; again for Pericles we have Nestor and Antenor—and there are others too—and one could make other comparisons along the same lines.[135] But as for the sort of man this fel- d
low is in his extraordinary nature, both in himself and what he says, one wouldn't get close to finding anyone if one searched among people of today or people of the past, unless perhaps one were to compare him to the figures I'm

135 Brasidas was a Spartan general in the Peloponnesian War, killed fighting at Amphipolis in 422 (Thucydides 5.10), compared to Homeric Achilles, the most prominent Greek fighter at Troy. Pericles, the Athenian leader, is compared to Homeric Nestor, renowned for oratory (Homer, *Iliad* 1.248), and Antenor for wisdom (*Iliad* 7.347).

ζοι τις αὐτόν, | ἀνθρώπων μὲν μηδενί, τοῖς δὲ σιληνοῖς καὶ σατύροις, αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς λόγους.

Καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις παρέλιπον, ὅτι καὶ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ ὁμοιότατοί εἰσι τοῖς σιληνοῖς
e *τοῖς διοιγομένοις. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλοι τις τῶν Σωκράτους ἀκούειν λόγων, φανεῖεν ἂν πάνυ γελοῖοι τὸ πρῶτον· τοιαῦτα καὶ ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα ἔξωθεν περιαμπέχονται, σατύρου δή τινα ὑβριστοῦ δοράν. ὄνους γὰρ κανθηλίους λέγει καὶ χαλκέας τινὰς | καὶ σκυτοτόμους καὶ βυρσοδέψας, καὶ ἀεὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεται λέγειν, ὥστε ἄπειρος καὶ ἀνόητος ἄνθρωπος*
222 *πᾶς ἂν τῶν λόγων καταγελάσειεν. διοιγομένους δὲ ἰδὼν ἄν τις καὶ ἐντὸς αὐτῶν γιγνόμενος πρῶτον μὲν νοῦν ἔχοντας ἔνδον μόνους εὑρήσει τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα θειοτάτους καὶ πλεῖστα ἀγάλματ᾽ ἀρετῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντας καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον | τείνοντας, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὅσον προσήκει σκοπεῖν τῷ μέλλοντι καλῷ κἀγαθῷ ἔσεσθαι.*

Ταῦτ᾽ ἐστίν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἃ ἐγὼ Σωκράτη ἐπαινῶ· καὶ αὖ ἃ μέμφομαι συμμείξας ὑμῖν εἶπον ἅ με ὕβρισεν.
b *καὶ μέντοι οὐκ ἐμὲ μόνον ταῦτα πεποίηκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Χαρμίδην τὸν Γλαύκωνος καὶ Εὐθύδημον τὸν Διοκλέους καὶ ἄλλους πάνυ πολλούς, οὓς οὗτος ἐξαπατῶν ὡς ἐραστὴς παιδικὰ μᾶλλον αὐτὸς καθίσταται ἀντ᾽ ἐρα-*

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136 “Fine and good” = *kalos k’agathos*, combining goodness, nobility, and physical courage: all the ideal qualities required of the Athenian male (see Dover, *GPM*, 41–45).

137 Charmides, a young man who gives his name to the title of

talking about, not to any human beings, but to the Silenuses and Satyrs, both him and what he says.

"And yes, there is this I left out at the beginning, that his conversations are also most like the Silenus figures that you open up. For if one were willing to listen to what Soc- e
rates says, it would appear to be quite ridiculous at first. Such are the words and phrases it is clothed in on the outside, just like the skin of some naughty Satyr. For he talks of pack asses and people like smiths and cobblers and tanners, and he always seems to be talking about the same things in the same terms, so that every person unused to
him and foolish would laugh at what he says. But anyone 222
who sees his words opened up and gets inside them will discover firstly they are the only kinds of speech that contain any meaning within them, secondly that they are to the highest degree divinely inspired and have within them very many images of virtue which reach out over the greatest area, or rather over everything that it is fitting to consider for the person whose ambition it is to be fine and good.[136]

"So, my friends, this is my speech in praise of Socrates. And I have also mixed in with it and told you the things I reproach him for and the occasions when he has abused
me. And yet I'm not the only one he's done this to: there's b
also Charmides, Glaucon's son, and Euthydemus, son of Diocles, and very many others whom this man has deceived into thinking of him as a lover while making himself more the loved one rather than the lover.[137] And what I'm

Plato's *Charmides.* Euthydemus (not the sophist who is the main speaker in Plato's dialogue of that name) is a young man mentioned in Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.29, 4.2.1. See further Nails, 90–94, 151.

*στοῦ. ἃ δὴ καὶ σοὶ | λέγω, ὦ Ἀγάθων, μὴ ἐξαπατᾶ-
σθαι ὑπὸ τούτου, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων παθημάτων
γνόντα εὐλαβηθῆναι, καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν
ὥσπερ νήπιον παθόντα γνῶναι.*

c *Εἰπόντος δὴ ταῦτα τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου γέλωτα γενέ-
σθαι ἐπὶ τῇ παρρησίᾳ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἐδόκει ἔτι ἐρωτικῶς
ἔχειν τοῦ Σωκράτους. τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη, Νήφειν μοι
δοκεῖς, φάναι, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη. οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε οὕτω
κομψῶς κύκλῳ περιβαλλόμενος | ἀφανίσαι ἐνεχείρεις
οὗ ἕνεκα ταῦτα πάντα εἴρηκας, καὶ ὡς ἐν παρέργῳ δὴ
λέγων ἐπὶ τελευτῆς αὐτὸ ἔθηκας, ὡς οὐ πάντα τούτου*
d *ἕνεκα εἰρηκώς, τοῦ ἐμὲ καὶ Ἀγάθωνα διαβάλλειν, οἰό-
μενος δεῖν ἐμὲ μὲν σοῦ ἐρᾶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἄλλου, Ἀγά-
θωνα δὲ ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐρᾶσθαι καὶ μηδ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑνὸς ἄλλου.
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔλαθες, ἀλλὰ τὸ σατυρικόν σου δρᾶμα τοῦτο
καὶ σιληνικὸν κατάδηλον ἐγένετο. ἀλλ᾽, ὦ | φίλε Ἀγά-
θων, μηδὲν πλέον αὐτῷ γένηται, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζου
ὅπως ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μηδεὶς διαβαλεῖ.*

Τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα εἰπεῖν, Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες,
e *κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ καὶ ὡς
κατεκλίνη ἐν μέσῳ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, ἵνα χωρὶς ἡμᾶς
διαλάβῃ. οὐδὲν οὖν πλέον αὐτῷ ἔσται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ παρὰ
σὲ ἐλθὼν κατακλινήσομαι.*

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[138] See Homer, *Iliad* 17.32; Hesiod, *Works and Days* 218; Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 177.

telling you too, Agathon, is don't be deceived by this man, but learning from what we have experienced take care and don't, like the proverb, learn it, like a fool, from suffering."[138]

When Alcibiades had said this, there was laughter at his frankness because it seemed he was still in love with Socrates. "So," Socrates said: "I think you're sober, Alcibiades, for otherwise, as you cast your cloak around you so elegantly,[139] you would never have tried to conceal why you have said all this and put it in at the end as a side issue, as if it were not all said for this reason, to set me and Agathon against each other, thinking that I must love you and none other, and that Agathon must be loved by you and no one else at all. But you didn't fool me; the purpose of this Satyric and Silenic play of yours has become very clear.[140] Well, my dear Agathon, don't let him gain anything by it, but make sure that no one sets you and me against each other."

Then Agathon said: "well, you could be right, Socrates. I take it as evidence that he reclined between me and you in order to keep us apart. But he won't gain any advantage; I'll come and recline beside you."

139 That is, "you'd have never been so ingenious (in trying to conceal) . . ."

140 The satyr play, comic in tone and featuring a chorus of satyrs, rounded off the set of three tragedies at the festival of the Great Dionysia. Alcibiades' speech is the comic "Satyric" speech following Socrates' serious *encomium*. It is also "Silenic" in that a comic exterior, opened up, conceals a serious purpose (see 215b6ff.).

Πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, δεῦρο ὑποκάτω ἐμοῦ | κατακλίνου.

Ὦ Ζεῦ, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, οἷα αὖ πάσχω ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. οἴεταί μου δεῖν πανταχῇ περιεῖναι. ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μή τι ἄλλο, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐν μέσῳ ἡμῶν ἔα Ἀγάθωνα κατακεῖσθαι. |

Ἀλλ᾿ ἀδύνατον, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἐπῄνεσας, δεῖ δὲ ἐμὲ αὖ τὸν ἐπὶ δεξί᾿ ἐπαινεῖν. ἐὰν οὖν ὑπὸ σοὶ κατακλινῇ Ἀγάθων, οὐ δήπου ἐμὲ πάλιν ἐπαινέσεται, πρὶν ὑπ᾿ ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεθῆναι; ἀλλ᾿
223 ἔασον, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς τῷ μειρακίῳ ὑπ᾿ ἐμοῦ ἐπαινεθῆναι· καὶ γὰρ πάνυ ἐπιθυμῶ αὐτὸν ἐγκωμιάσαι.

Ἰοῦ ἰοῦ, φάναι τὸν Ἀγάθωνα, Ἀλκιβιάδη, οὐκ ἔσθ᾿ ὅπως ἂν ἐνθάδε μείναιμι, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον μεταναστήσομαι, | ἵνα ὑπὸ Σωκράτους ἐπαινεθῶ.

Ταῦτα ἐκεῖνα, φάναι τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, τὰ εἰωθότα· Σωκράτους παρόντος τῶν καλῶν μεταλαβεῖν ἀδύνατον ἄλλῳ. καὶ νῦν ὡς εὐπόρως καὶ πιθανὸν λόγον ηὗρεν, ὥστε παρ᾿ ἑαυτῷ τουτονὶ κατακεῖσθαι.

b Τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα ὡς κατακεισόμενον παρὰ τῷ Σωκράτει ἀνίστασθαι· ἐξαίφνης δὲ κωμαστὰς ἥκειν

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[141] Plato takes the original idea of speeches to be delivered in order of reclining on couches to stage a humorously erotic byplay. Agathon ("the youngster," 223a1) is the supposed object of the competitive attentions of Socrates and Alcibiades. The proposals

"Certainly," said Socrates, "come over here and lie down below me."

"Zeus!" said Alcibiades, "the things I suffer again at this man's hands! He thinks he must get the better of me in everything. Well, if nothing else, my good friend, let Agathon recline between us."

"But that's impossible," said Socrates. "You see you sang my praises, so I must therefore in turn praise the man on my right. So if Agathon reclines below you, won't he praise me again rather than being praised by me? Well let him be, like a good fellow, and don't begrudge the youngster being praised by me. You see I'm very keen to sing his 223
praises."

"Hey hey, Alcibiades!" said Agathon, "there's no way I can remain here, but, come what may, I'm going to change places so I can be praised by Socrates."

"There we go again as usual," said Alcibiades. "When Socrates is around it's impossible for anyone else to get a share of the handsome ones. And now how easily he's found a plausible reason for this one to recline beside himself."

So Agathon got up to recline beside Socrates.[141] But b
suddenly a large crowd of revelers arrived at the doors,

are that the original order on their couch, Alcibiades between Agathon and Socrates (213a7–c5), should be changed around, first, on Agathon's proposal, to Alcibiades-Socrates-Agathon (222e3–4), then, on Alcibiades' proposal to Alcibiades-Agathon-Socrates (e8–9), and Agathon then agrees (on Socrates' proposal) that he should move to the other side of Socrates (223b1); it's not clear that any of these moves, except possibly the last, actually happens.

παμπόλλους ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας, καὶ ἐπιτυχόντας ἀνεῳγμέναις ἐξιόντος τινὸς εἰς τὸ ἄντικρυς πορεύεσθαι παρὰ σφᾶς καὶ κατακλίνεσθαι, | καὶ θορύβου μεστὰ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν κόσμῳ οὐδενὶ ἀναγκάζεσθαι πίνειν πάμπολυν οἶνον. τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἐρυξίμαχον καὶ τὸν Φαῖδρον καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἔφη ὁ Ἀριστόδημος οἴχεσθαι ἀπιόντας, ἓ δὲ ὕπνον λαβεῖν, καὶ κατα-
c *δαρθεῖν πάνυ πολύ, ἅτε μακρῶν τῶν νυκτῶν οὐσῶν, ἐξεγρέσθαι δὲ πρὸς ἡμέραν ἤδη ἀλεκτρυόνων ᾀδόντων, ἐξεγρόμενος δὲ ἰδεῖν τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους καθεύδοντας καὶ οἰχομένους, Ἀγάθωνα δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοφάνη καὶ Σωκράτη ἔτι | μόνους ἐγρηγορέναι καὶ πίνειν ἐκ φιάλης μεγάλης ἐπὶ δεξιά. τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη αὐτοῖς διαλέγεσθαι· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὁ Ἀριστόδημος οὐκ ἔφη*
d *μεμνῆσθαι τῶν λόγων—οὔτε γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς παραγενέσθαι ὑπονυστάζειν τε—τὸ μέντοι κεφάλαιον, ἔφη, προσαναγκάζειν τὸν Σωκράτη ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὺς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι κωμῳδίαν καὶ τραγῳδίαν ἐπίστασθαι | ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸν τέχνῃ τραγῳδοποιὸν ὄντα <καὶ> κωμῳδοποιὸν εἶναι. ταῦτα δὴ ἀναγκαζομένους αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐ σφόδρα ἑπομένους νυστάζειν, καὶ πρότερον μὲν καταδαρθεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη, ἤδη δὲ ἡμέρας γιγνομένης τὸν Ἀγάθωνα. τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη, κατακοιμίσαντ᾽ ἐκείνους, ἀναστάντα ἀπιέναι, | καὶ <ἓ> ὥσπερ εἰώθει ἕπεσθαι, καὶ ἐλθόντα εἰς Λύκειον, ἀπονιψάμενον, ὥσπερ ἄλλοτε τὴν ἄλλην ἡμέραν διατρίβειν, καὶ οὕτω διατρίψαντα εἰς ἑσπέραν οἴκοι ἀναπαύεσθαι.*

and finding them open as somebody went out, they pro-
ceeded straight on in to join the group and lay down on
the couches. Everywhere was full of uproar, and with
nothing any longer in any kind of order they were forced
to drink a great quantity of wine. So, said Aristodemus,
Eryximachus, Phaedrus and several others went off, but
he himself went to sleep and slept on for quite a long time,
since the nights were long,[142] and woke up when it was c
almost daylight and the cocks were already crowing. Hav-
ing woken up he saw the rest were asleep or had gone
away, but Agathon, Aristophanes and Socrates were the
only ones still awake and were drinking from a large bowl
from left to right. Socrates was then having a conversation
with them. Aristodemus said he didn't remember the rest
of what was said—for he hadn't been there from the be- d
ginning and in fact he was nodding off to sleep—how-
ever the main thing was Socrates was pressing them to
agree that the same man should know how to write com-
edy and tragedy, and that he who is a skillful writer of
tragedy is also a skillful writer of comedy.[143] Being pressed
to agree about this and not following very much, they were
nodding off, and Aristophanes fell asleep first and then
Agathon when day was already breaking. Having seen
them off to sleep, Socrates got up and left, and he, Aris-
todemus, as usual followed. Socrates went to the Lyceum
and had a wash and spent the rest of the day as on other
days, and toward evening he went home to rest.

142 The Lenaia festival, at which Agathon's play was performed, took place in midwinter.

143 This discussion was possibly intended to reflect the mix of comic and tragic elements in the dialogue and in Plato's portrayal of Socrates himself (see Introduction, §5).